Galton's problem raises questions about the nature of explanation in cross-national research using aggregate data. When political units such as states interact, to what extent can correlations between two traits or behaviors, such as socioeconomic development and political stability, be explained in terms of functional relationships within political systems, and to what extent are they the result of diffusion or borrowing among them? This article explores the logic of Galton's problem and then evaluates several empirical solutions to it, using data drawn from three different types of crossnational samples. The solutions juxtapose explanations based on internal (functional) relationships and external (diffusion) patterns, and suggest that previous research which has ignored diffusion may have led to incomplete or incorrect conclusions.

Foreign policy decision making is the result of a complex political process in which the political values and style of the chief executive play a large part. The case of Canada's decision, in 1963, to acquire nuclear weapons illustrates that external events and pressures generated by Canada's international obligations were processed through complex political interactions. The Government of Prime Minister Diefenbaker was unable to take the nuclear weapons decision because of two splits in the Cabinet, only one of which was pertinent to nuclear weapons policy. The decision was taken by Leader of the Opposition Pearson alone and in conformity with his personal values, because of his political style which commanded deference. The approach used combines historical detail with political analysis.

The author advances the thesis that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which their client, Ghana—a less developed country—formulated its economic policy between 1969 and 1972. The intergovernmental organizations and creditor countries failed to take Ghana's domestic political situation into account, however. When the country became heavily dependent upon the IGO's and creditors for financial assistance to enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange earnings, it was forced to accept extreme and politically dangerous measures in order to secure assistance. The policies that were adopted were catastrophic, and destroyed what remained of the democratic government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'etat.

The two major and interrelated questions this study poses are: (1) How has Soviet naval doctrine developed and adapted to the demands of the nuclear age?; and (2) How do the changes in Soviet naval doctrine relate to the context of Soviet foreign policy and domestic politics? The article demonstrates that Soviet doctrine has accommodated to the challenges of the nuclear age by combining the tenets of traditional and modern warfare. Changes in naval doctrine have come about because of a need to meet the competition of the United States in world politics, and as a response to active interest-group pressure within the Soviet political system. Soviet naval doctrine does not necessarily “mirror” Western doctrine, but reflects a distinct, Soviet view of naval utilization.

For over a quarter-entury, two separate states have existed in Germany. By fighting over “unity” and “unification,” the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic have in fact stabilized and legitimized their separate sociopolitical orders. This impact on the domestic politics of both states has been the main function of inter-German relations. Only recently has positive identification replaced negative orientation to the counter-state. The “German question” provides an example of “nation building” as a historical process of both the disintegration of old and the building up of new identities.

This review evaluates two recendy published works on East German political recruitment from the vantage point of future comparative research on the role of the G.D.R. within the European postindustrial order. The conclusion presents several possible ways of providing a larger comparative framework for the future study of the East German polity.