Among the constitutional devices sometimes recommended as remedies for the ills of present society, federalism has come to play a consistent, if not a major, role. A rapid glance at the balance sheet of Western European intrastate federalism over the last three decades might therefore be of some usefulness.

The uncertainty over the continued existence of federal states is shown by the difficulty in defining their distinguishing features. Assertions in constitutional documents do not help much, as they are political assertions rather than guiding principles of interpretation. Some constitutions have even tried to square the circle. Thus, the Spanish Constitution of 1931 in the same breath called Spain an “integral state” and defined it as consisting of provinces as well as regions formed according to the “principle of autonomy.” The Bonn Basic Law of 1949 dodges the issue elegantly by affirming in its preamble that it is the German people in the eleven states who have enacted the basic law.

In the 1950's, as in the 1930's, there are Congressional efforts to limit executive discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. Senators Taft and Wherry have generated a debate over the President's authority to send armed forces abroad, which is reminiscent of the debate over the neutrality legislation of the earlier decade. The time has therefore come when a more just appreciation of President Roosevelt's leadership in foreign affairs may be possible and when such an evaluation may be useful.

Hypotheses regarding differences (or lack of differences) in policy-orientation or in degrees of influence between the various members of the Soviet Politburo have always been of great interest to students of politics. Thus there have been frequent speculations regarding alleged differences in foreign policy lines and on the problem of succession. The absence of confirming or disconfirming data for any of these hypotheses is striking, and obvious in view of the secrecy that enshrouds the internal operations of the Politburo. Published statements of any kind by members of the Politburo have become infrequent in recent years. Such statements as are available for analysis have usually dealt with different subjects and have been made at different dates, so that they were difficult to compare from the point of view of testing hypotheses regarding differences in policy of influence. Through Stalin's seventieth birthday, December 21,1949, however, a rare opportunity for comparative analysis did occur.

The contrast between brave American words in support of colonial aspirations and United States military aid in support of colonial powers putting down native insurrection is painfully sharp. Checking the spread of Soviet imperialism and liquidating the remnants of old-style European imperialism are objectives which seem to stand in the way of each other. Military security can apparently be purchased only at the price of popular hostility in the colonial world. And friendship may prove unpurchasable at any price.

Foreign policy making always involves a reconciliation of not wholly compatible goals, but the dilemma which United States colonial policy poses in Asia is peculiarly distasteful. What we face there today we might tomorrow face in Africa or the Pacific islands. Some action has to be improvised in the Far East at once. But this crisis also requires the United States to remove the conditions which will present similar predicaments elsewhere in the future.

Among the increasing number of publications on the Indonesian Revolution the survey of J. W. Meyer Ranneft and the larger studies of H. J. van Mook occupy something of a unique position. It is rather seldom that high-ranking Dutch colonial civil servants are willing and able to put down their recollections and criticisms in fairly extensive form. If one browses through the volumes of such journals as Koloniale Studien, Koloniaal Tijdschrift, De Indische Gids, or Tijdschrift voor Ambtenaren bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, one is indeed struck by the number of authors who are members of various government services. But their work in this connection is primarily of a specific and localized nature; their articles may range from vaccination to irrigation problems in the Indies, but they rarely strike the broad, interpretive note that characterizes the studies now under discussion. This fact gives the present publications of Meyer Ranneft and van Mook a special cachet: both by what is said and what (admittedly purposely in the case of Meyer Ranneft) remains unsaid, their work not only illuminates many aspects of the Indonesian Revolution, but, more significantly, also the mentality of two of the highest ranking officials in the colonial civil service, who helped materially in shaping the course of events in Indonesia since the 1930's. It should also be noted that Meyer Ranneft and van Mook are representative of the chief two opposing factions and schools of thought in the Dutch administration, and their present publications are nothing short of a credo of each of these respective schools. This is particularly evident when their earlier work is examined; both men have a rather extensive bibliography, which throws added light on their present studies.

In studying world affairs we are acutely conscious of the fact that many rivalries and conflicts are carried on with hostility on all sides, but within a framework of mutual respect. We have too many examples of honor among enemy soldiers to regard this as remarkable.

At the same time we know that one of the most exacerbated forms of conflict occurs when incompatible respect demands are involved. The “ex-colonials” of the globe are asserting themselves with vindictive passion against “white imperialists.” Most of these “ex-colonials” are colored, and they are reacting against the memory of years of humiliation, fancied or real, inflicted by the West. In some states of the “West,” notably the Union of South Africa and the United States, internal politics are torn by ethnic hostilities. Many historical cases support the proposition that conflict is peculiarly atrocious when an established system of caste is challenged, or is believed to be challenged. We recall the outrages perpetrated by serfs in revolt against lords, or by masters against revolting (or allegedly revolting) slaves.