La question de l’établissement d’un organisme intergouvernemental chargé d’assurer l’exploitation rationnelle des stocks de l’Atlantique Sud-Est a été examinée par la Conférence de la FAO dès ses premières sessions. En 1946, la Conférence passa en revue les divers secteurs maritimes non desservis par un organisme approprié et porta l'Atlantique Sud-Est sur la liste des secteurs auxquels la FAO devait accorder la priorité.

World peace, like war, has tended to become indivisible. Nonetheless, the formal organization of international peace and security continues to be anchored to the principle of division and imperfect co-ordination of responsibility between universal and regional instrumentalities. The problem of maintaining world peace would probably have been much less troublesome than it is now if the international system had either been hierarchically organized, or based upon a strictly federal foundation. Needless to say, the global system remains largely a semi-primitive political order characterized, as it is, by a decentralized structure of power configuration.

In 1945, H. J. Hilton, Jr., published an excellent article in the Department of State Bulletin entitled “Commercial Arbitration in the Treaties and Agreements of the U.S.S.R.” which assessed the Soviet record in this area up to the end of the Second World War. The purpose of the present study is to carry the inquiry forward to the present, concentrating, however, exclusively on the problem of execution of foreign commercial arbitral awards in Soviet bilateral treaty practice during this period.

Before proceeding though, a quick review of the salient points of Mr. Hilton’s survey will furnish useful background information.

First, in analyzing the corpus of Soviet treaties and agreements that feature statements concerning arbitration of commercial disputes, the author found that, while the relevant provisions ranged in detail from a single phrase to comprehensive conventions containing as many as 15 articles, the data did not reveal a pattern of historic evolution in the type of formulas regarding arbitration. In other words, although the Soviet regime passed through several phases of development between 1921, when such a reference initially appeared in a treaty signed by the R.S.F.S.R., and 1945, this did not entail technical changes reflecting specific policy shifts; the various approaches used recur throughout the span of observation without any determinable regularity and no correlation could be fixed between the choice of a particular solution and the prevailing conditions at home or abroad at a given juncture. The conclusion here, then, was that “the provisions referring to arbitration included in the treaties and agreements of the U.S.S.R. vary considerably in content; however, these variations cannot be established precisely by periods of time.”

Dans un Discours prononcé le 25 janvier 1962 devant la Chambre de commerce américaine en France, l’ex-premier ministre Michel Debré mentionna qu’un délégué aux Nations Unies avait, quelques jours auparavant, tenu les propos suivants: “Le droit international est l’oeuvre des Européens. Les Européens sont colonialistes. Par conséquent, nous n’avons pas à connaître le droit international”.

Il n’y a pas de doute que le droit international classique, celui qui fut à une époque récente le droit de la planète tout entière, est, pour l’essentiel, celui des nations chrétiennes. D’abord exclusivement européen, il était destiné à régir les rapports entre Etats dits “civilisés”. Au XVIIIe siècle, ce droit fut étendu à la Russie. Au siècle suivant, il fut jugé applicable à la Turquie (1856), puis au Japon (1895). Aux yeux des Européens, il y eut donc, à une certaine époque, à côté du jus gentium, un jus inter gentes, sorte de droit aristocratique liant entre eux les sujets chrétiens de l’ordre juridique international. Mais, dès les débuts du XXe siècle, ce droit européen était devenu universel, comme en témoignent les deux conférences de LaHaye.

When States Disagree about the way in which the waters of an international drainage basin should be utilized, they should try first to resolve their differences by consultation and negotiation. This is what they usually do and, for the most part, do successfully. Sometimes, however, their negotiations do not lead to agreement. They then face the question whether or not they should involve the aid of third-parties in resolving their problem. In the words of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, must they “seek a solution by … mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”?

It is proposed to examine here the obligation of states to resort to mediation, conciliation and adjudication when they cannot otherwise settle a dispute about the development of an international drainage basin that they share.

I Persons against whom the jurisdiction cannot be enforced

The first part of this note deals with the persons who claim immunity from the compulsory jurisdiction of Canadian courts.

(1) The Foreign State, Sovereign or Head of Foreign State as a Defendant

The law relating to the immunity of foreign states and sovereigns or heads of foreign states from Canadian jurisdiction is to be found in the common law and has been stated and re-stated in leading cases such as The Parlement Belge, The Porto Alexandre, The Cristina, Dessaulles v. The Republic of Poland and Mehr v. The Republic of China et al. Lord Atkin reduced this law to two propositions:

The first is that the courts of a country will not implead a foreign sovereign, that is, they will not by their process make him against his will a party to legal proceedings whether the proceedings involve process against his person or seek to recover from him specific property or damages.

The second is that they will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of which he is in possession or control.

On October 26, 1968, the delegates to the Eleventh Session of The Hague Conference on Private International Law decided to submit, for consideration by their respective governments, a draft Convention on the law applicable to traffic accidents. Article 14 of the Convention permits ratification by a country which, like Canada, has a non-unified legal system, if the Convention has been extended to at least one of its jurisdictions. The Convention aims at uniformity in a branch of the law where, until now, to quote an eminent jurist, “case-to-case decisions [did] not add up to a system of justice.”

Under Canadian constitutional law the implementation of the Convention requires provincial legislation. At the invitation of the government of Canada a delegate of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada participated at the session in The Hague as a member of the Canadian delegation.

The International Conference on Air Law, convened under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization, met in Guatemala City from February 9 to March 8, 1971, and adopted a Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on September 28, 1955. The Protocol greatly revised the legal rules governing the international carriage by air of passengers and baggage.

Under most legal jurisdictions, motorized vehicles operating on land, in the air and on water are subject to registration. The effective management of traffic, the enforcement of standards of safety and the imputation of liability for damage all require that the parties responsible for the conduct of particular vehicles be identifiable. This identification function is normally provided for by means of a registration system.

Typically, a registration system comprises two elements — characteristic markings on each vehicle operating within the jurisdiction, and a register which lists the vehicles by their markings along with the parties legally responsible for them. The system is underpinned by obligations on the responsible persons — usually the owners — to register and mark their vehicles, and on the state to maintain appropriate registers.

As between jurisdictions there are frequently bilateral and sometimes multilateral agreements providing for reciprocal access to these registers under certain conditions.

The international legal framework has traditionally been divided into a “state of war” and a “state of peace.” Most contemporary authorities still insist upon sharp and tidy categorization in this area, although some would prefer a three-fold or a multi-fold division, instead of the standard two-fold split. This whole approach has come under attack in recent years.

A division into “states” of “war” and “peace” should theoretically produce simplicity and clarity. Instead, however, it leads to hopeless complications. This is clear as soon as any attempt is made to define the “state of war.”