The intimate, though as yet imperfectly understood, causal relation-ship between scientific and technological development and the economic growth in industrially advanced countries over the past 30 years has been investigated and refined over a number of years, and attempts have been made to quantify the relationship. Although a strong scientific and technological (S & T) base does not by itself guarantee rapid economic growth, most observers consider it to be a necessary prerequisite, after a certain level of development has been reached. One of the main ways that S & T act on the economic system is by the generation of new knowledge through research activities and the application of this in production. Such application often results in new products and processes which are grouped under the term “technological innovations.” The innovation process is usually defined as “the technical, industrial and commercial steps which lead to the successful marketing of new manufactured products and/or to the commercial use of technically new processes or equipment.”

The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization. Since late 1967, when the process of rebuilding the shattered Party began, strengthening Party leadership has been a principal theme of Chinese politics; that theme has become even more pronounced in recent years. It is now claimed that earlier efforts achieved nothing, and that during the whole “decade of turmoil” until 1976, disarray in the Party persisted and political authority declined still further. Recent programmes of Party reform, therefore, still seek to overcome the malign effects of the Cultural Revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party “traditions” and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.

To encourage economic construction and development, China is considering the reform of her system of taxation, principally the taxing of industrial and commercial enterprises. The aim of such reform is two-fold: to secure more stable revenues for the financing of key projects of national importance and, even more crucial, to try to make the tax system into a means of economic management. The latter has been called the leverage function of taxation.

This article applies standard regression techniques to examine the impact of adverse weather conditions on average grain yield per sown hectare in contemporary China. By isolating the weather impact I hope (a) to quantify the possible influence of frequent policy and organizational changes which have been so characteristic of Chinese agriculture since 1949; and (b) to show to what extent grain production in China has become more “weather-proof” after three decades of massive investment in water control and other modern inputs. I shall deal mainly with the long-term trends from 1952 to 1981, with special reference to the extraordinary 1959–61 period, during which total grain output and yield declined by an average of 21 and 12 per cent respectively (or 25 and 18 per cent for the two trough years of 1960 and 1961), measured against the benchmark year of 1957.

Hu Yaobang in his report to the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) during September 1982 announced that the Party would implement a three-year programme of rectification starting in the second half of 1983. Meeting in Beijing on 11–12 October 1983 (and after a two-day preparatory meeting) the CCP Central Committee duly adopted at its second plenary session a “Decision on Party consolidation.” Under nine separate headings that resolution provided a relatively detailed prescription for the programme, which it announced would start during the winter of 1983.