In what ways might the digital renminbi (RMB), also known as e-CNY, bolster China’s efforts to internationalize its currency? Utilizing Susan Strange’s concept of currency negotiation and borrowing the concept of infrastructures from science, technology, and society studies, this article argues that RMB internationalization is a gradual process that relies heavily on negotiation involving both state and non-state actors (i.e., private financial authorities). It further argues that while e-CNY may create new opportunities for RMB internationalization, it also raises new challenges. First, the e-CNY’s lack of coordination with other central banks represents a challenge for future evolution and standardization with other digital currency platforms, thus rendering first-mover status a potential disadvantage. Second, as a result of China’s divergent data governance direction from both the US and the EU, the e-CNY is disadvantaged when it comes to interoperability, trust of users, and diversity of data. The purpose of this study is not to predict the future of RMB internationalization once the e-CNY rolls out but rather to highlight various ways in which the latter may influence the former in order to widen analyses of the topic.

This article conceptualizes financial transactions as parts of financial infrastructures. Not only do transactions perform services for the economy, mainly in the area of calculation and pricing, but there is also merit in a conceptually infrastructural view on transactions which uncovers their ambivalence for the stability of the financial system. This is based on a conceptualization of infrastructures that distances itself from inherited modernist notions of the completeness, full operability, and functional integration of infrastructures, and instead highlights the constitutive incompleteness, error-proneness, and looming disintegration of infrastructures owing not to external threats but to their very modes of operation. The article analyzes two post-crisis reports that try to sort out this infrastructural ambivalence of transactions, and, in that attempt, mobilize different imaginaries. In the Brady Report following Black Monday of 1987, the imaginary of the efficient competitive market was cited to stabilize the boundary between functional and dysfunctional transactions. In the FCIC Report reflecting on the subprime mortgage crisis, a quasi-sociological diagnosis of mushrooming, and morally problematic transactional relationships were invoked to separate functional from dysfunctional intermediation by financial transactions.

Sustainable finance is often discussed as a solution to the climate crisis, but its impacts are limited and its discourse focuses on mobilising private investments through public de-risking, without considering direct government action. We argue that this is due to an implicit reference to mainstream economic theory assuming that an active state leads to time inconsistency problems and crowding-out effects. However, these assumptions have been sufficiently refuted as public investments may actually crowd-in private capital. We therefore propose a paradigm shift towards what we call Public Sustainable Finance, aimed at empowering the role of the state in the green transition on the discursive, policy, and political economy levels. Studying the case of Germany, we show how Public Sustainable Finance can be introduced despite tight fiscal regimes. To this end, we propose that the Climate- and Transformation Fund be given its own borrowing powers. By borrowing an average of 23 billion euros annually from 2024 to 2030, the existing financing gap that has been exacerbated following the November 2023 constitutional court ruling can be closed, enabling a more rapid and effective green transition.

I use this introduction to the book forum to situate my work within scholarly discussions of relevance to the readers of Finance and Society, thereby indicating how my work advances the broader field. I also provide a brief synopsis of the book’s core findings and offer some ideas on how to think with and beyond the book.

In The Rise of Central Banks, Leon Wansleben provides a perceptive account of the evolution of central banking practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland from the 1970s through the subprime mortgage crisis and the global pandemic. Focusing on the concrete practices of monetary policymakers, Wansleben usefully explores the relationship between the development of novel techniques of monetary policy implementation and the financialization of the economy, with the paradox that the central bank appears more powerful, but exercises this power in a system that is ever more prone to crisis. While agreeing with the broad strokes of Wansleben’s analysis, I raise questions about the nature of the ‘infrastructural power’ exercised by the state through financial markets, suggesting that the growing salience of the central bank in the policymaking apparatus should not be conflated with its independent influence over the direction of economic policy.

Leon Wansleben’s new book, The Rise of Central Banks, explains how central banks have emerged as powerful monetary governors over the past half-century. Yet the book’s recognition that central banks cannot extricate themselves from quantitative easing and market bailouts begs the question: what does it mean for central banks to be dominant but captive? In this commentary, I identify the book’s ambiguities with the concept of infrastructural power the book draws from Michael Mann. Unless the dynamics of state-market interdependence are well specified, giving due attention to the sources of both public and private power, it is unclear what kind of agency central bankers are exercising if they lack sufficient autonomy to act in the public interest.

Leon Wansleben’s new book, The Rise of Central Banks: State Power in Financial Capitalism, tells an intricately complex story of the world’s most influential central banks successfully harnessing the forces of financial globalization to build their institutional power as the principal managers of their national economies. The book argues that, regardless of central banks’ rationales and rationalizations, the resulting expansion of global money markets has failed to generate the intended macroeconomic and societal benefits. Instead, as became evident in the post-2008 era, the world’s most powerful central banks are now structurally dependent on the increasingly self-referential markets for financial assets. While the book’s narrative is focused on inflation targeting and other monetary policy innovations since the 1970s, it raises much broader questions and invites further reflection on the nonlinear dynamics of power in today’s financial markets and the uncertain future of central banks.

In this commentary, I argue that Leon Wansleben’s focus on financial plumbing as a source of central banks’ epistemic and instrumental power will be met by the profession with a mixture of relief, incredulity, and worry. More importantly, I maintain that central bankers’ relationship with finance varies according to whether or not they are independent from elected government, an under researched area. All this works as a point of departure for remarks, drawing on my own memories, on central banking’s relationship with neoliberalism in monetary policy, monetary operations, and banking. Finally, I urge that Wansleben’s method be applied to anti-trust and the micro-economic regulation of utility services.

Central banking studies continues to consolidate around common foundations, but points of tension and disagreement persist. In this reply, I discuss three such points raised by contributors to this forum. These relate to the concept of infrastructural power, the significance of financial stability policy, and questions of historiography. I also offer some reflections on future directions for the study of central banks.