The overwhelming concensus of Fourth Amendment scholars is that the Supreme Court's sea and seizure cases are a mess. This article proposes that the confusion arises from the manner in which the cases were studied, not from the decisions themselves. A legal model with variables that me the prior justification of the search, the nature of the intrusion, and a few mitigating circumstance used to explain the Court's decisions on the reasonableness of a given search or seizure. The parameters are estimated through probit.

The results show that the search and seizure cases are much more ordered than had commonly been believed. Virtually all of the estimates are as expected. Additionally, the Court is shown to act favorably toward the federal government than toward the states. Preliminary analysis suggests the model has predictive as well as explanatory value.

In the period from 1947 to 1976, the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in more than half the cases involving conflict with Supreme Court precedent or intercircuit conflict. In both instances, the denial rate has been higher in the Burger Court than in the Vinson and Warren Courts and denial has been greater for intercircuit conflict cases than for cases in which the ruling in the lower court was in conflict with one or more Supreme Court precedents. When conflict was conceptualized as a predictor of decision and examined along with federal government as petitioning party, economic issues, and civil liberty issues, it was found to have 4 to 7 times the predictive power of the other variables combined for the Vinson and Warren Courts. For the Burger Court, the petitioning party variable was found to be a better predictor than conflict, but conflict was a much better predictor than the subject variables. Discriminant function models using the four predictor variables were able to account for up to 36.9% of the variance in the Supreme Court's certiorari decisions, almost all of which was the result of the contributions made by the conflict and party factors.

This article uses a variety of multilevel data collected from a nine-county study of felony courts to examine the joint effects of contextual and individual level (sociopolitical characteristics of decision workers) upon decisions made in face-to-face groups. The research finds that although the sociopolitical characteristics of decision makers (attitudes toward punishment, Machiavellianism, and operating styles) made a difference in the outcome of interactions, their role could not be accessed independent of the contextual factors surrounding the interactions. Some of the most important contextual factors were the kind of criminal case being handled, prosecutor office policies restricting discretion, and the configuration of attributes in the group handling the case. Although the data are wholly derived from the criminal court setting, the implications of the findings for studying decision making in other face-to-face groups are developed.

The stability of the American two-party system is examined from 1866 until 1980. Following the approach of Stokes and Iversen (1962), restoring forces are posited for presidential elections, but restraining forces also are suggested for congressional elections, leading to an equilibrium between the two in elections to the House. Points of maximum restoration in presidential elections are derived using autocorrelations, and these points suggest a pattern of second-term Republican victories every 28 years beginning in 1872.

Equilibrium properties of the American two-party system lead to the twin criteria of representation and restraint in multiparty cabinet coalitions in order to achieve cabinet durabilities on the order of those found in two-party systems. Minimum entropy-minimum winning coalitions satisfy these criteria. Cabinet durabilities on the order of two-party systems can be achieved by means of a 44-55 percentage of the legislative seats won by the first party in a multiparty system.

Approval voting is being promoted as “the election reform of the 20th century” (Brams, 1980, p. 105), and indeed if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities: it is uniquely strategy-proof, a candidate wins if and only if he is a Condorcet winner, and voters have simple strategies that are at once sincere and sophisticated. However, all of these results depend on the existence of dichotomous preferences, a contrived and empirically unlikely assumption. Here I show that these virtues of approval voting are replaced by some rather undesirable features under more plausible assumptions. More fundamentally, rather than promoting “honest” behavior, as is sometimes implied, the existence of multiple sincere strategies almost begs voters to behave strategically. I also examine sophisticated approval voting and show that in the general case it need not pick a Condorcet alternative. Ironically, there is a condition under which Condorcet winners may always be picked, but for this to occur, voters sometimes have to vote for candidates of whom they disapprove.

A capitalist market system of social exchange is justified primarily because it protects individual freedom. This system, its advocates claim, achieves the complex task of production and distribution through a process of voluntary exchanges; coordination is effectively achieved without coercion. I argue that this claim is largely unwarranted. The negative concept of freedom that underlies voluntary choice (the absence of interference by others) is unable to differentiate between instances of freedom and unfreedom. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether exchanges are voluntary or coerced. A more adequate conception of free choice (as the relevant capacities and conditions for deliberate decisions and actions) suggests that a capitalist market broadly and systematically denies the possibility of voluntary agreements. This general failure to protect individuals' freedom is examined in relation to the acquisition of property, the transfer of property, and the process of production.

The study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants and consequences of presidential speechmaking, defined as the occurrence of a major, nationally broadcast and televised address. Major speeches delivered by Presidents Truman through Carter are examined during the period 1949-1980. Using a probit analysis, a prediction is made of the likelihood of a major speech occurring within a month, based on the effects of public attitudes, national conditions, and events. The results indicate that changes in public approval ratings and the presence of visible national events increase the likelihood that a president will deliver a speech. Conversely, worsening economic conditions (inflation and unemployment) as well as expanding military situations decrease speechmaking efforts. The findings also demonstrate that a president's popularity increases significantly with the delivery of a major address.

Texts designed to introduce political science students to the history of political thought or to past political theories have been commonplace in the discipline, as have disputes about their pedagogical utility or justifiability, and methodological debates concerning their adequacy or legitimacy. In an effort to address these disputes and some of these debates, I construct three models of historiographical inquiry. Each model represents a particular approach, and each is defined in terms of three common features. The methodological debates are joined both indirectly and directly: indirectly by identifying clearly the major features and purposes of these approaches, and directly by consideration of such issues as the nature of a historical tradition, the legitimacy of certain interpretive strategies and presuppositions, and the viability of certain conceptions of past political theory. I conclude that each approach can make significant contributions to the education of political science students.

The present study examines the dynamics of partisanship and voting behavior by utilizing national survey panel data gathered in 1965, 1973, and 1982 from two strategically situated generations—members of the high school senior class of 1965 and their parents. At the aggregate level, generational effects appeared in the persistently weaker partisan attachments of the younger generation. At the individual level, strong effects based on experience and habituation appeared in the remarkable gains occurring in the stability of partisan and other orientations among the young as they aged from their mid-20s to their mid-30s. Dynamic modeling of the relationship between partisanship and voting choice demonstrated that the younger voters had stabilized at an overall weaker level of partisanship, leading to more volatile voting behavior which, in turn, failed to provide the consistent reinforcement needed to intensify preexisting partisan leanings.

Provision of schooling in the native language is an important regime policy that reflects a government's commitment to maintaining ethnic and linguistic diversity. This study tests hypotheses related to three principles that may have guided the use of non-Russian languages in Soviet schools: equality, efficiency, and political status. A newly generated set of data on the use of non-Russian languages in Soviet primary and secondary schools permits examination of aspects of Soviet language policy about which scholars previously lacked systematic information. The analysis does not support the interpretations suggested by others; official policy has neither shifted back and forth between a centrist and a peripheralist emphasis, moved inexorably in a russificationist direction, nor been absolutely egalitarian. Instead, the policy can be most appropriately described as a bilingual education policy that at the same time has long differentiated among the non-Russian nationalities on the basis of their population size, their geographic concentration, or their political status.

Existing rational choice treatments of collective violence have consistently discounted the role of the public goods component of the individual's decision calculus about whether or not to participate in such acts. By assuming free rider effects with respect to the public goods, these theories are unable to account for the initial inception of violence or for the later nonlooting behaviors that constitute aspects of a riot and, indeed, are preconditions for the inception of looting, the only riot behavior for which these theories can offer any explanation. Five dimensions of discrimination are defined in rational choice terms and their elimination (or reduction) is defined as the creation of a public good. I use existing theories of individual contributions to the provision of public goods to demonstrate that free rider effects need not be assumed and that the inception of a riot and later nonlooting riot behaviors can best be explained as individual contributions to the provision of the public goods represented by the elimination of the several forms of discrimination.

A considerable amount of the international politics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations. There are, however, divergent views of this linkage. One view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power, while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal. Research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects of alliances on power relationships and has tended to focus its attention upon the occurrence of wars. This research examines the individual and joint effects of power and alliance upon the probability of 256 conflicts to escalate to reciprocated military action. The main finding is that equality of power, supplemented by alliance with a major power for those nations that are weak, tends to restrain the likelihood that a conflict will escalate.