What types of institutional dynamics and conditions allow constitutional resilience in the face of attempts at undermining gains in a constitutional democracy? Using Sri Lanka as a case-study, I claim that the legal complex acting in synergy with independent public institutions (the Speaker of the Parliament) and civil society can produce constitutional resilience. Synergy between the legal complex and these institutions can transform constitutional vulnerability into constitutional resilience. I argue therefore that the legal complex theory must be extended to consider the ways in which it can work in synergy with other public institutions in being resilient against attempts at rolling back gains for constitutional democracy. I argue further that synergy between the legal complex and formal and informal institutions over the short term can only result in “simple” constitutional resilience. The development of “reflexive” constitutional resilience requires long-term synergy between the legal complex and other public institutions.

Since its inception in 1957, Malaysia’s Federal Court (FC) has often been embroiled in high-profile decisions that have dramatically shaped the rule of law and constitutional practice in Malaysia. Recent political change has renewed hope that the FC can reassert its early role as an independent and impartial arbiter of political conflict. This paper investigates determinants of the FC’s behaviour since 1960. It draws on a unique data set of 102 major political cases and socio-biographic profiles of the 73 judges who voted in these cases. After describing patterns of court decisions across time and judges, we test specifically for the impact on their decisions of the 1988 judicial crisis, length of time on the bench, the terms of successive prime ministers, and judges’ personal attributes, such as religion and ethnicity. Ethnicity, appointment after 1988, and the appointing prime minister proved to be closely associated with the direction of voting. We then position the results in the context of Malaysia’s evolving constitutional democracy and discuss their implications for students of comparative judicial politics.

This paper investigates how individuals such as judges, lawyers, clients, and court staffers as well as institutions are elevating litigation costs in Bangladesh in multiple ways. It explores how the existing law and procedures as well as key institutions further promote case delay. It also examines the ways in which police departments and the prosecution contribute to elongate criminal trials and invite additional litigation costs. Empirical data collected through in-depth interviews are analyzed, drawing propositions to individuals’ contributions to delay in case-processing time and hike up litigation costs. Data analysis also assesses common people’s perceptions and expectations from the justice sector. Contemporary legal research has been critically analyzed, where needed.

The purpose of this study is to show how the Japanese government has created laws with harsher punishment since the 1990s. While a tendency toward harsher punishment is common in advanced Western countries, a similar tendency in Japan has prompted scholarly discussion on whether it can be understood through the “penal-populism” framework. However, it lacks in systematic evidence. This study presents three findings that differ from previous studies through a quantitative analysis of legislation with harsher punishment. First, while previous literature argues that the legislation increased in the latter half of the 1990s, this study shows that it peaked in the middle of the 2000s. Second, while previous literature argues that the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Justice promote the legislation, this study shows that it is caused by every ministry’s drafting Bills. Third, this study shows that it does not quantitatively avoid partisan conflicts, contrary to the prediction of the “penal-populism” theory.

This paper analyzes how illegality can be legitimized in authoritarian states by examining a contested case of transnational illegal drug brokerage in China. Triangulating news articles, legal documents, and interviews, the study distinguishes between two pathways of illegality legitimation: depoliticized and politicized. I argue that the depoliticized pathway is made possible through pragmatic, moral, and legalistic frames, whereas the politicized pathway builds upon an institutional frame. I also identify the media as essential agents of illegality legitimation. While illegal-practice participants and the legal authority tend to only mobilize depoliticized frames, the media make both depoliticized and politicized efforts. Through this in-depth analysis, the paper deepens our understanding of the social construction of illegality and the intricate relation between law, media, and society within authoritarian states.

Although China remains the world’s most prolific death-penalty jurisdiction, it has also reportedly reduced executions in the twenty-first century. China achieved this reduction in part through the use of a nominal capital sentence called “suspended execution.” The success of suspended execution as a diversionary tool has produced calls for its introduction elsewhere. However, there has been no empirical research on suspended execution outside China. This article fills this gap by identifying neighbouring countries where suspended-execution proposals have been considered, determining why these countries considered it, and examining how proposals were structured. We identify four Asian jurisdictions—Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia. We find that all of these countries looked to China for inspiration; each did so independently and for reasons unrelated to China’s death-penalty reforms. Our findings provide insights about capital punishment in Asia, the appeal of suspended execution, and the role of China in regional penal practice.