On January 18, 1919, the forty-eighth anniversary of the proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles after the invasion of France in 1870-1871, there assembled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Paris a meeting of the representatives of the Allied and Associated belligerent Powers, as well as the Powers which had broken off diplomatic relations, to decide upon the terms of peace to be offered to Germany and her allies.

Emulating Bismarck, who used the emasculated telegram of Ems as the pretext of waging a war of conquest upon France, William II and his General Staff seized upon the rupture between Austria-Hungary and Serbia growing out of the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince at Serajevo in June, 1914, as the pretext for launching Germany upon a carefully prepared program of world domination. Fearful lest delay might result in the loss of the opportunity for which she had deliberately planned and anxiously awaited, within a week after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, Germany had declared war on Russia and France and had shamelessly violated the neutrality of Belgium which she had solemnly undertaken to respect. Great Britain, for self-protection and in response to treaty obligations, immediately entered the war against Germany, and was successively followed from time to time, as Germany evinced her disregard of international law, the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, by all the other large Powers and many of the smaller ones whose interests were jeopardized or rights infringed upon by Germany’s increasingly reckless and ruthless conduct.

There is a general disposition to assume that four years of dreadful war have so altered men’s minds and characters and the underpinnings of organized society, that the world will be quite a different place from that which our observations and our studies have made familiar. This belief does not altogether carry conviction to my mind. The civilized world was threatened with an evil domination and combined to defend itself. This instinct and combination for defense are as old as the Greek Republics. For a generation to come the world will see less movement because of the war’s exhaustion; it will have less money to spend and must economize; it will have higher taxes and therefore higher costs of production; here and there it will experience such change of governmental forms as should insure larger self-government.

The World War has given rise to some of the most remarkable views or expressions of opinion, particularly in Germany, regarding the freedom of the seas that have ever been uttered. Indeed, it may be said to have revived this old controversy in an entirely new form, but with the ideas frequently stated in the most excessive manner. Though, along with many other products of German war psychology, the most extravagant of these views seem for the most part to be doomed to defeat, and perhaps to a deserved oblivion, yet there may be a nucleus of sense or residuum of wisdom in some of them that is worthy of consideration. In any case, it may be claimed that they possess a certain historical or academic interest which appears to justify this discussion and record, filled, as it is, with copious extracts.

It has been finely said of Switzerland that while the present war has demonstrated in a sinister manner Swiss dependence upon its powerful neighbors for fuel and food, and thus for its very existence, nevertheless neither these neighbors nor the world at large could for a moment spare the example of heroism and devotion so constantly and consistently set by the Swiss nation in its political and social life. This quality of devotion has been illustrated during the war not alone by the struggles unavoidable in the maintenance of neutrality, but also in the far-reaching activities of the International Red Cross at Geneva. Indeed, the work accomplished through the agencies of this wonderful organization in the internment and care of wounded soldiers and their repatriation where permissible under belligerent agreement, in the repatriation of civilians driven from occupied territory, the transmission of mail to prisoners, and the discovery of vast numbers of the missing, constitute one of the most striking chapters in the war’s history.

The framers of the American Constitution did not anticipate or desire the conclusion of many treaties. For this reason they made the process of treaty conclusion difficult, requiring that the President act only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, some even wishing to require adhesion of the House of Representatives or a two-thirds majority of the entire Senate.

This hope, however, has scarcely been realized. With a total of 595 treaties from its foundation to August, 1914, the United States has averaged more than four a year, and for the twentieth century fifteen a year, or a treaty ratified every three weeks. Along with the steady increase in the number of treaties concluded a year, there has been a change in their usual character. Jefferson’s warning against “entangling alliances” might be interpreted as a warning against treaties, for at that time the faithful observance of treaties commonly amounted to passive if not active alliance. Aside from definite guarantees of offensive or defensive alliance, the pious hope of “perpetual peace and amity” between the contractuaries, special privileges in war and neutrality, reciprocal favors in commerce and navigation, the termination of war, transfer of territory, fixation of boundaries, and recognition of status were the common subjects of treaty stipulation. The provisions were of a character indicating the competitive nature of international society. By mutually enjoying special privileges, the contracting states hoped to improve their political position with respect to other states of the world. Thus the carrying out of treaty provisions was ordinarily a matter for the political organs of government.

The origin of the right of angary is traceable to early Roman times, and a study of its origin and development throws much light on the right as it is understood today. Several writers on international law refer to the first chapter, 41st verse, of Saint Matthew’s Gospel, as showing a possible origin of the term angary. This verse reads:

The Greek word for compel or force is also cited, and it is clear that the idea of compelling some service was linked up with the early notion of angary.

The following passage from the Justinian Code (529 A.D.) shows the word angary in its noun form, and shows that all classes alike were subject to the law: