Gold value clauses are rarely used in England. In the United States, before the Joint Resolution of both Houses of Congress of January 5, 1933, which abrogated gold clauses in the U.S. retrospectively and prospectively, declaring them to be against public policy, gold coin clauses were a common occurrence. In the past on the European continent much use has been made of gold value clauses.

In England gold value clauses may assume greater importance in the future. Lately, the two-tier system of gold prices has been introduced, one between Central Banks and another at the free market price. In an individual gold value clause, the question of which price is recognized by the parties, who probably did not in fact foresee the possibility of the creation of a two-tier system, is one of construction. Even today, a party to a gold value clause which refers to the free market price may gain a profit, if there is an appreciation of the price of gold on the free market above the U.S. government minimum level of $35.00 per ounce.

I. Historical and Comparative Backround: (1) Early medieval times. (2) The Ottoman Empire and successor States. (3) Personal laws in the colonies. (4) State and Church law as personal laws.

II. The Personal Laws as Autonomous Legal Systems: (1) Notion of legal system. (2) Personal legal systems. (3) Relationships between personal legal systems and between such systems and the State. (4) The dominant position of the State. (5) The personal laws as autonomous legal systems.

III. The Conflict of Personal Laws and the Interpretation of its Rules: (1) State legislation relating to personal laws. (2) The problem of qualification. (3) The renvoi problem. (4) Public policy.

IV. Connecting Principles: (1) Membership of an ethnic or religious group. (2) Influence of the will of the parties. (3) Other connecting principles.

V. Nature and Historical Function of the Conflict of Personal Laws: (1) The legal nature of the Conflict of Personal Laws. (2) The historical function of the conflict of Personal Laws.

The centenary of the Mejelle, the Ottoman Civil Code, is not being commemorated by any jubilations. This is not only because so little of it is left in force, but also, and perhaps mainly, because it has remained much of a mystery right up to the present day.

The mystery is due partly to certain initial defects inherent in its preparation. One of these is the ambiguity purposefully introduced into the Mejelle, with the aim of camouflaging its deviations from the Holy Law of Islam which, theoretically, reigned supreme in the Ottoman Empire to its last day. Indeed, true to a long-standing tradition, the assent of the highest religious authority in the Empire, Sheikh-u 'l-Islam, was required before any law could be promulgated. Thus, in the case of the Mejelle too, the said religious authority was associated in its preparation. Once involved in the matter it could no longer shun delicate problems, when the religious law came into conflict with the interests of the State. In order to avoid this dilemma in the Mejelle, its authors applied a new stratagem, that of silent omission.

Most writers discussing pre-Republican Yemen stress its complete isolation from the rest of the world. Those sympathetic to the Republic are anxious to point out that the Imams, or kings, of the country consciously followed a policy of almost hermetic isolation in order to ensure the continuation of the feudal privileges which they and the tribal sheikhs enjoyed. Whether or not this interpretation is accurate it is necessary to point out that some countries, and not only Arab states, had already been in contact with the kingdom for several decades at the time of the 1962 coup.

Italy was the first European nation to make a deliberate attempt to develop its relations with Yemen in this century. The Italians, anxious to make their position in Eritreamore secure and, if possible, to gain an economic foothold in Arabia, concluded a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Imam on September 2, 1926. From that time, and in spite ofthe disappearance of Italian colonies in East Africa, the Italians have continued to enjoy a somewhat privileged position among Western Europeans in the country. At times during the past few years, they have been almost the only Westerners permitted to remain in Yemen.

Can the members of a company in general meeting ratify a transaction of the directors by simple majority, when the latter—in breach of their fiduciary duties—have not acted “bona fide in the interests of the company”? This question is likely to prove of importance in a number of different contexts. In Bamford v. Bamford it arose in connection with the validity of an act of the directors in the sphere of the company's relations with a third party—the contention that the act was invalid having been made by the minority shareholders, who objected to ratification, and not by the third party himself. The possibility of ratification gives rise to two questions: is the general meeting of the company the competent organ to exercise this power? And, assuming that it is, can the act done in breach of a duty be ratified by it by simple majority? In the Bamford case it is only the former aspect of the problem that is considered.

The articles of the company vested the power to allot shares in the directors. In exercising this power the directors failed to act “bona fide in the interests of the company”. Their act was ratified by the members in general meeting by simple majority and the validity of the ratification was challenged. Both the judge of first instance and those sitting on appeal decided that it was valid. Plowman J., in the Chancery Division, held that, since the directors had been actuated by an improper motive, they thereby lost their power of allotment, which accordingly vested in the general meeting, as the organ of the company with residual power in this respect. The general meeting—he went on to hold—could ratify the directors' action by simple majority. Harman L.J. and Russel L.J., in the Court of Appeal, reached the same conclusion— but for different reasons. In their opinion, the fact that the directors allotted the shares for an improper motive does not mean that what they did was in excess of their powers; the allotment simply became voidable. The power to remedy the defect—they held—is in the hands of the general meeting, which can exercise this power by simple majority.