Germany is currently in a deep structural crises which has been furthered by the combination of ongoing economic stagnation and a desolate situation of state finances. That these circumstances are due to—according to a widespread opinion—not just the failure of political leadership in the Federation and Länder during the last decades, but also, and especially, the German system of federalism in its current form, is anything but evident. It has become commonplace to hear that the German federal state is in the throes of a serious legitimacy crises and is in need of fundamental structural reform, if the current federation is to have any future. Advocates of reform claim the process needs to result in a widespread disentanglement of powers, so that responsibility can once again be clearly attributed to its proper bearers. Meanwhile, criticism continuously takes on an ever stronger tone: Germany is supposedly to have fallen into the “trap of federalism”. As Klaus von Dohnanyi stated: “If, as in our German Bund-Länder-consensus-system of the so-called ‘cooperative federalism', one level can always interfere with the other level even into details—and that is now the case in almost every aspect— immobility and stagnation, irresponsibility and chaos appear. It would have been better, if we had chosen a centralistic organization. Centralism is better than halfhearted decentralism. A well-lead central state is better than an undecided federalism.”

In both the United States and Germany constitutional lawyers, politicians, and the attentive public speak of “dual federalism.” In the United States this means that the federal government and the states have separate political and administrative responsibilities and their own sources of revenues. In Germany, in contrast, dual federalism means that the federal government, i.e., the executive and legislative branches, are responsible for most legislation, and that the Länder (states; singular, Land) generally administer the laws (in large part through their local governments) on their own responsibility. In both federal systems “dual federalism” has been undermined if not replaced by “cooperative federalism,” generally associated with the New Deal era in the United States and the Finance Reform of 1969 in Germany. In the meantime “intergovernmental relations” has more or less replaced the concept of “cooperative federalism” in the United States, while Politikverflechtung (political/policy interconnection and coordination) is perhaps the more commonly used term in Germany today. In both cases the new terms reflect an interrelationship among federal, regional, and local levels that goes beyond mere cooperation.

Innumerable attempts have been made to explore the theoretical nature of federalism. Due to the long history, worldwide existence and interdisciplinary character of federalism, a plethora of literature has been written on the topic. Yet, these endeavours have not even resulted in a clear and commonly used definition of the term. Surely, it is one of the great dilemmas of this field of research that despite so much discussion, there is no settled common denominator of ‘federalism'. Whereas practical studies and exchange of experience between the various federal systems offer a more conventional research arena, comparative theoretical approaches are much more seldom. This is not the least because of the tremendous semantic challenges of a comparative theoretical approach. At first glance, it is sometimes difficult to understand the terminology of federalism, the meaning of which differs according to the perspectives of constitutional law, political science or economics. Even more difficulty arises when the substance of federal theories is discussed. Again, differences between theories may be due to different academic approaches, particularly between understanding federalism as an overall principle or as a more concrete concept of a federal state and, in particular, whether the constituent units of a federal state are states, and, if states, whether they are sovereign.

In the last years, several Muslim associations applied at the competent Ministries of Education of the German Federal States for the introduction of Islamic religious instruction in public schools. These applications raise a series of legal questions, in particular, whether the States are obliged to allow associations to teach their version of Islam in schools. Of particular concern is that this religious instruction may not have a religious purpose, but rather a political, or even militant or criminal, purpose. Further, there is the possibility that the associations may invite students to take part in a “holy war”, to call for racial hatred, or to proclaim that women were inferior human beings. The answer to these questions is laid down in Article 7 paragraph 3 of the German Basic Law which is a typical provision of the German Law on Church and State that is molded not by a strict separation or laicism as it is, for instance, in France but by a cooperation of the State and the religious communities.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a state that shows a strong support for culture of any kind. While it is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), it can be argued that very few nations regard the promotion of the arts, sciences and education as a public undertaking to the extent that Germany does. The federal structure of the German constitution is reflected in the allocation of governmental tasks between the federal government and the individual federal states, or Länder. Under this structure, the Länder bear the primary responsibility for cultural matters. However, contrary to widely-held belief, the Basic Law also grants the federal government a range of legislative, administrative and financial powers with respect to cultural matters. Although when taken together these do not add up to a comprehensive promotional authority of the federal government in the cultural sector, due to numerous individual empowerments, the federal government is without doubt in a position to take an active role in cultural affairs to a significant extent.

Just one year after Polish accession to the European Union, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was provided the opportunity to clarify its position regarding the supremacy of EC and EU law. In its two recent judgments, it joined the long tradition of a rather uneasy relationship between national Constitutional Courts and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The uneasiness of this relationship results from an ever-unsolved dilemma – which of the two judicial fora should have the last word in case of conflict between European norms and national constitution norms? The solution given by European Court of Justice in a series of early judgments seems obvious. It opted for an absolute supremacy of EC norms over national norms. On the other hand, the national Constitutional Courts usually accept the supremacy of EC law - but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions. They thus accept the concept named by Neil Walker “constitutional pluralism”, meaning that the states are no longer the sole source of constitutional authority. However, national constitutions are still the “primary” source of any such authority.

On 30 June 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued a judgment concerning the expropriation of the heirs of new farmers in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). With this decision, the Grand Chamber overturned a unanimous judgment by the Chamber of 22 January 2004. This article outlines the facts of the case (section A), the German case law (section B) and the Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments (section C) and provides an evaluation of the judgments (section D).

The Africa Caribbean Pacific–European Union (ACP-EU) Development and Trade Cooperation Relationship is currently regulated by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This agreement, which has been described as “the only one of its kind in the world” is based on the three pillars of politics, trade, and development between the EU and its Member States on the one hand and a group of developing countries on the other.

The last decade has been a time of changes in all branches of German company law. Whilst the changes in the law of civil partnerships go to the very fundaments of what was a firm belief for a hundred years in national law, the future of the private limited company is increasingly determined by the competition of regulators in the European common market. The European dimension of modern company law making is even more pervasive in the law of stock corporations where growing convergence can be noted in regard to the national approaches of the European Member States towards internal controls. A common denominator for most of the changes in German company law is the partly court driven, partly legislature driven attempt of a better adjustment of investor and creditor protection to evolving business needs. Looking on the changes from a wider angle that includes capital markets, however, there are signals for a shifting in the traditional approach of German corporate governance towards an increasingly market driven system.

Several fundamental questions concerning internet law come to a head over search engines. There are trademark cases, issues about the protection of minors and questions of liability. However, as far as we know, the fundamental role that search engines play in public communication based on the World Wide Web has not yet been subjected to any legal analysis. This seems to leave a significant gap in our knowledge, given the fact that the market for search engines tends to be monopolistic.