“A trust for mankind” is what President Cleveland in a message termed such an enterprise as the Panama Canal. The question just now is whether such a trust is administered properly by giving to vessels engaged in the coasting trade of the United States a total exemption from tolls. It should be noticed that the question is not whether exemption may be given to war ships and other ships of the government, but whether it may be given to the ships of private owners. It should be noticed also that the question is not whether there may be a subsidy, —in other words, not whether the tolls of such vessels may properly be paid out of the national treasury — in which case the burden would be bome by all residents of the United States through the internal revenue, the tariff, and other taxes, and the benefit would be enjoyed initially by the treasury of the Panama Canal and eventually by all persons whom the canal may serve. No, the question is whether, in the words of the Panama Canal Act of 1912, “no tolls shall be levied upon vessels engaged in the coastwise trade of the United States,” — with the almost inevitable result that the tolls exacted from other vessels will thus be made heavier than they otherwise would be.

The signing of the Franco-Spanish treaty concerning the Moroccan question on November 27th marks the last stage in the process of establishing a French protectorate in the Shereefian Empire. For years the European Powers have watched the steady decline of the “little Realm of the West,” the continued loss of power and prestige by its sovereigns both in local and in national affairs, and the gradual disruption of the entire state. Ever since 1880, France, the nearest and most interested African neighbor, has been a keen observer of every move of the Sultans; and she has rendered the harassed and incapable rulers every assistance, diplomatic and otherwise, that these sovereigns would accept and the Powers permit. The French have seen from the first that nothing short of an European protectorate would suffice to save the Sultans, to ensure the establishment of an efficient administration, to afford ample security for life and property, and to give peace and prosperity to the long-suffering and oppressed people.

I suppose there is a stage in the development of the creature at which opinion may very well vary as to whether it is a tadpole or a full-fledged, or rather a four-footed, frog. Canada, constitutionally, is in a somewhat uncertain case; for, if you say that she is a colony, you will be confronted with some well-developed legs, and if you say that she is an independent state, you will be asked to explain away the remains of the tail. What sort of compromising language a biologist would apply to his dubiosity, I do not know; but, with reference to Canada, I am prepared to make a distinction, — to say that she is nominally a colony, and really an independent state. A veritable bit of the actual tail is still visible; there may not, indeed, be enough for performance of its former function of control, but quite enough to betray the origin of the animal; while the legs can very clearly kick, if not speak, for themselves. Nominally, I say, Canada is a colony; the forms, the nomenclature, the legal appearance still exist. But in reality Canada is independent and governs herself. A short summary of Canadian political history will establish that point.

The Final Act of the Second Hague Conference “recommends to the parties the assembling of a Third Peace Conference, which might be held within a period corresponding to that which has elapsed since the preceding conference,” and recommends the appointment of a “preparatory committee” which (in the language of the.Final Act), shall be “charged by the governments with the task of collecting the various proposals to be submitted to the conference, and of ascertaining what subjects are ripe for embodiment in an international regulation,” and of preparing a program for the conference and a plan for its organization and procedure. This recommendation, in the absence of some catastrophe, such, for instance, as the outbreak of a great European war, means the meeting of the Third Hague Conference some time in 1915, or thereabouts, and already many of the great nations of the world, among them the United States, have appointed their members on the preparatory committee.

Until the great goal of the peace movement, that is to say, the world peace treaty without reservation of any kind and extending to all nations, shall at some future time have been concluded, two periods in the development of arbitration, each of which is in turn marked by three successive stages of growth, are clearly discernible. The first embraces the development of special treaties; the second that of the world treaty. In point of time, these two periods follow one another; yet the world treaty is ushered in even before the special treaty has reached its highest stage.

It is a truism that the science of law proper – the science dealing with the United States or the law of Great Britain, one finds the whole science based on the fact of the existence of a political society known as the United States or Great Britain, which formulates, applies and enforces the law which governs these nations in their internal relations. When one enters upon the study of what is called international law, one finds himself expected to accept as a fundamental proposition that there is no political society which formulates, applies and enforces the law which he is told governs all nations in their external relations, and that this law is formulated, applied and enforced among or between the nations. This difference in fundamentals leads to corresponding differences in the derivative notions. Practitioners of law proper take little or no interest in what is called international law. From their point of view, that which is called international law is only a collection of the rules of a highly interesting game, success in which depends largely upon “face ” and personality; nor can it be denied that there is much to justify this opinion. Students of law reflect the attitude of mind of the practitioner, and the great majority of students end their legal education when they finish the courses in national domestic law, giving no consideration to the law which governs the actions and relations of the nations.