3. See Dwan, R. and Gustavsson, M., ‘Major armed conflicts’, SIPRI Yearbook (2004) pp. 95–147Google Scholar.

4. Massive anti-war rallies took place in the capital cities of many states, with up to one million people taking to the streets of London, New York, Madrid and Rome, inter alia, to protest the war. ‘European protesters fill cities: largest-ever gatherings reported in London, Madrid’, CNN.com/World, 15 February 2003 <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/15/sprj.irq.protests.europe/>.

5. A key debate took place at the SC on 14 February 2003. See Press Release SC/7664 (summarising the debates) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7664.p2.doc.htm>.

6. Operation Iraqi Freedom has been dubbed ‘the mother of all military campaign’ and used firepower on an unprecedented scale. The military campaign was named ‘Shock and Awe’ by the Pentagon to convey the sense of the enormity of the firepower used and the hoped for reaction of the Iraqi armed forces. See <http://shockandawe.com/>; S. Schifferes, ‘Analysis: US ‘shock and awe’ tactic’, BBC News online, 21 March 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2874075.stm>.

7. See, for example, Glennon, M.J., ‘Why the Security Council failed’, 82 Foreign Affairs (No. 3, 2003) pp. 16–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dawisha, A.I. and Dawisha, K., ‘How to build a democratic Iraq’, 82 Foreign Affairs (No. 3, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030501faessay11218/adeed-i-dawisha-karen-dawisha/how-to-build-a-democratic-iraq.html>.

8. ‘The linchpin of international law, the UN Charter, has been written more than five decades ago at a time when the prime security threat was the conflict between states (state A attacking state B it was very simple to define attacker and defender). Today, our major security concerns problems within states, like genocide, balkanization, civil war or crumbling state authority. There is not a single word in the Charter on these problems, neither on terrorism or non-state actors using asymmetrical violence.’ K.-H. Kamp, ‘Eight theses on asymmetrical risks and future terrorist threats’ <http://www.politikwis-sen.de/expertenforum/exp_kamp403.html>.

9. Damrosch, L.F. and Oxman, B.H., eds., ‘Agora: Future implications of the Iraq conflict — Editors' introduction’, 97 AJIL (2003) p. 553Google Scholar.

10. Glennon, supra n. 7, p. 16.

11. For a summary, see ‘The year in review’, 5 YIHL (2002) pp. 297–299Google Scholar.

12. The primary aim of the war appeared to be regime change in order to advance two main foreign policy goals: (1) Iraq's disarmament, in order to avert a possible future threat to US national security posed by the use of WMD by Iraq or terrorists; and (2) the furtherance of US national security and other interests by increasing US geopolitical influence in the Persian Gulf region, and particularly ensuring the continuing supply of oil to meet US domestic energy needs.

13. HJ Res. 114, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002), reprinted in 5 YIHL (2002) pp. 819–823Google Scholar.

14. 97 AJIL (2003) pp. 553 et seqGoogle Scholar.

15. John Yoo indicated that use of force had two possible legal bases: prior SC resolutions and self-defence. Yoo, J., ‘International law and the war in Iraq’, 97 AJIL (2003) pp. 563–576CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. SC Res. 678, 28 October 1990.

17. SC Res. 687, 3 April 1991.

18. SC Res. 1441, 2 November 2002.

19. Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith's longer memorandum, 7 March 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/28_04_05_attorney_general.pdf<.

20. Lord Goldsmith wrote: ‘I am aware that the USA has been arguing for a broad recognition of a right to use force to pre-empt danger in the future. If this means more than a right to respond proportionately to an imminent attack (and I understand that the doctrine is intended to carry that connotation) this is not a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists or is recognised in international law.’ Ibid., para. 3.

21. While stating that ‘the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force’, he nonetheless concluded that ‘a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution. …However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity.’ Ibid., paras. 27–29.

22. One of three possible bases for the use of force, after self-defence (which may include collective self-defence) and authorisation by the SC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in his opinion. Ibid., para. 2.

23. Ibid., para. 4.

24. ‘Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994).’

HJ Res. 114, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002), reproduced in 5 YIHL (2002) p. 821Google Scholar.

25. Taft, W.H. IV and Buchwald, T.F., ‘Preemption, Iraq, and international law’, 97 AJIL (2003) pp. 557 at 563Google Scholar.

26. Interview by A. Dworkin, ‘Would war be lawful without another U.N. resolution?’ Crimes of War Project, 10 March 2003 <http://crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/news-iraq2.html>.

27. ‘The US Permanent Representative to the UN, John Negroponte, was reported thus: “the resolution contained, he said, no hidden triggers and no automaticity with the use of force. The procedure to be followed was laid out in the resolution. And one way or another, Iraq would be disarmed. If the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation, the resolution did not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by that country, or to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.” …The UK Explanation of Vote concluded thus: “We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about automaticity and hidden triggers — the concern that on a decision so crucial we should not rush into military action; that on a decision so crucial any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the Council. Let me be equally clear in response, as a co-sponsor with the United States of the text we have adopted. There is no automaticity in this Resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required in Operational Paragraph 12. We would expect the Security Council then to meet its responsibilities.”’

T. Youngs and P. Bowers, ‘Iraq and UN Security Council resolution 1441’, Library Research Paper 02/64, House of Commons, 21 November 2002, p. 23 <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-064.pdf>.

28. As Adam Roberts pointed out, there are ‘two principal accepted legal grounds for the use of force: self-defence, as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter; and authorisation by the UN Security Council’. Roberts, A., ‘Law and the use of force after Iraq’, 45 Survival (2003) p. 31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29. Art. 51 provides that: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security….’

30. Dinstein, for example, is insistent that:

‘There is not the slightest indication in Article 51 that the occurrence of an armed attack represents only one set of circumstances (among others) in which self-defence may be exercised. In fact, if that is what the framers of the Charter had in mind, the crafting of Article 51 makes very little sense. What is the point in stating the obvious (i.e., that an armed attack gives rise to the right of self-defence), while omitting a reference to the ambiguous conditions of preventive war? Preventive war in self-defence (if legitimate under the Charter) would require regulation by lex scripta more accurately than a response to an armed attack, since the opportunities for abuse are comparatively greater.’

Dinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001) p. 168CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. L.A. Casey and D.B. Rivkin, Jr, ‘“Anticipatory” self-defense against terrorism is legal’, Legal Opinion Letter, Washington Legal Foundation, 14 December 2001.

32. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US) Merits, ICJ Rep. (1986) p. 93, para. 173 (hereafter, Nicaragua case).

33. Ibid., p. 93, para. 174.

34. Ibid., p. 94, para. 176.

35. Ibid.

36. See DoD News Release, ‘A statement from Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld’, 4 October 2004, in which he stated: ‘I have acknowledged since September 2002 that there were ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq. This assessment was based upon points provided to me by then CIA Director George Tenet to describe the CIA's understanding of the Al Qaeda-Iraq relationship.’ <http://www.dod.gov/releases/2004/nr20041004-1352.html>.

37. Miller, G., ‘Cheney is adamant on Iraq “evidence”: vice president revives assertions on banned weaponry and links to Al Qaeda that other administration officials have backed away from’, in The Los Angeles Times, 23 01 2003Google Scholar <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0123-02.htm>; ‘Bush rejects Saddam 9/11 link’, BBC News online, 18 September 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3118262.stm>; Pincus, W. and Milbank, D., ‘Al Qaeda-Hussein link is dismissed’, in The Washington Post, 17 06 2004, p. A01Google Scholar <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A47812-2004Jun16.html>.

38. Interview by Dworkin, supra n. 26.

39. Art. 2(4) UN Charter.

40. See ‘Geneva and Hague law’, infra p. 253.

41. ‘President Bush discusses Iraq in national press conference’,6 March 2003Google Scholar <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html>.

42. Michael Glennon proclaimed with some satisfaction that: ‘The charter has gone the way of the Kellogg-Briand Pact….’ He argued that the repeated breaches of the Charter rules relating to use of force have caused them to fall into desuetude. ‘[T]he United States did indeed have the authority it needed to attack Iraq — not because the Security Council authorized it, but because there was no international law forbidding it. It was therefore impossible to act unlawfully.’ Glennon, supra n. 7, pp. 23–24.

43. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that: ‘The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international law.’ ICJ Rep. (1986) p. 106, para. 202.

44. Practice to the contrary is not sufficient to nullify the conventional and customary rule. As the ICJ pointed out in the Nicaragua case: ‘It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that all States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other's internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.’ Ibid., p. 98, para. 186.

45. According to Gray: ‘It seems that the massive state support for the legality of the US claim to self-defence [against Afghanistan] could constitute instant customary international law and an authoritative reinterpretation of the UN Charter, however radical the alteration from many States' prior conception of the right of self-defence.’ Gray, C., ‘The use of force and the international legal order’, in Evans, M.D., ed., International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) pp. 589 at 604Google Scholar.

46. Report presented by the ICRC at the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,December 2003(Geneva,ICRC 2003)Google Scholar.

47. Ibid., p. 6.

48. Ibid., p. 7.

49. Ibid., pp. 25–26.

50. Ibid., p. 10.

51. Ibid., p. 9.

52. Ibid., p. 10.

53. The agenda and report of the meeting are available at the websites of the ICRC <http://www.icrc.org> and the T.M.C. Asser Institute's Section of International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law <http://www.wihl.nl>.

54. ICRC Report, supra n. 46, pp. 10–11.

55. Ibid., p. 14.

56. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

57. Ibid., p. 16.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., p. 17.

60. Ibid., p. 18.

61. Ibid., p. 19.

62. Ibid.

63. Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) on the possible need for further development of the Geneva Conventions (Venice, 12—13 December 2003), Opinion No. 245/2003, Council of Europe Doc. CDL-AD (2003) 18, 17 December 2003, para. 85 <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2003/CDL-AD(2003)018-e.pdf>. The Opinion, which was based on comments made by the rapporteurs Christoph Grabenwarter, Jan Helgesen and Georg Nolte, followed on several prior draft opinions. See Draft Opinion on the Possible Need for Further Development of the Geneva Conventions: On the Basis of Comments by Mr Christoph Grabenwarter and Mr Georg Nolte, Opinion No. 245/2003, Strasbourg, 10 October 2003 <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2003/CDL-DI(2003)002-e.asp>; Comments on the Draft Opinion on the Possible Need for Further Development of the Geneva Conventions by Mr Jed Rubenfeld: Reply to the Draft Opinion on the Possible Need for Further Development of the Geneva Conventions in Light of the New Categories of Combatants that have Emerged Recently, Opinion No. 245/2003, Strasbourg, 15 October 2003 <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2003/CDL-DI(2003)003-e.asp>; Draft Opinion on the Possible Need for Further Development of the Geneva Conventions: On the Basis of Comments by Mr Christoph Grabenwarter, Mr Jan Helgesen and Mr Georg Nolte, Opinion No. 245/2003, Strasbourg, 16 October 2003 <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2003/CDL-DI(2003)002rev-e.asp>.

64. Ibid., para. 4.

65. Ibid., para. 6.

66. Ibid., para. 12.

67. Ibid., para. 14.

68. Ibid., para. 13.

69. Ibid., para. 85.

70. Dwan and Gustavsson, supra n. 3.

71. UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/27, 15 December 2003.

72. Adopted by the Security Council as a practical guide for its consideration of protection issues. UN Doc. S/PRST/2002/6, 15 March 2002.

73. SC Res. 1261, 25 August 1999, see 2 YIHL (1999) pp. 215–216Google Scholar; SC Res. 1314, 11 August 2000, see 3 YIHL (2000) pp. 174–175Google Scholar; SC Res. 1379, 20 November 2001, see 4 YIHL (2001) pp. 263–264Google Scholar.

74. Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, UN Doc. S/2002/1299, 26 November 2002. See 5 YIHL (2002) p. 267Google Scholar.

75. UN Doc. A/58/546-S/2003/1053, 10 November 2003.

76. SC Res. 1261 (1999), SC Res. 1314 (2000), SC Res. 1379 (2001) and SC Res. 1460 (2003).

77. UN Doc. A/58/546-S/2003/1053, supra n. 75, paras. 3–5.

78. Ibid., paras. 9–21.

79. Ibid., para. 7.

80. Ibid., para. 8.

81. See ibid., paras. 24–44.

82. Ibid., para. 65.

83. Ibid., para. 100. See also para. 105(i).

84. Adopted by the General Affairs Council of the European Union on 8 December 2003.

85. Ibid., para. 3.

86. Ibid., para. 6.

87. See Sunshine Project News Release, ‘US army patents biological weapons delivery system, violates Bioweapons Convention’, 8 May 2003 <http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/pr080503.html>.

88. <http://www.associvile.it/saluto1997.htm>.

89. See A. Dworkin, ‘Justice for war crimes in Iraq’, Crimes of War Project, 16 April 2003 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/special/Iraq/brief-justice.html>.

90. The Statute of the Special Tribunal is available at <http://www.associvile.it/saluto1997.htm>.

91. On this issue, see A. Dworkin, ‘Saddam Hussein and Iraq's war crimes tribunal’, Crimes of War Project, 21 December 2003 <http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-saddaml.html>.

92. For example, Human Rights Watch said that: ‘We do not believe that this course of action is the most appropriate to ensure that justice is done’. See HRW News Release, ‘Iraq: law creating war crimes tribunal flawed — Protections for legitimate, credible trials needed’, 11 December 2003; Human Rights Watch, ‘The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Rules of Procedure and Evidence missing key protections’, Briefing Paper, 22 April 2005 <hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/22/iraq10533.htm>.

93. It followed the 19 August attack against the UN headquarters in Baghdad. See Statement of the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/13, 20 August 2003.

94. More particularly, an ambulance packed with high explosives, making the attack not only a violation of the principle of distinction but perfidious.

95. ‘Up to 40 die in Baghdad attacks’, Guardian Unlimited, 27 October 2003 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1071917,00.html>.

96. ICRC Press Briefing, ‘The ICRC remains in Iraq but is changing how it operates’, 29 October 2003.

97. Miranda, V., ‘The missing: the right to know’, Red Cross Red Crescent Magazine (No. 1, 2003)Google Scholar <http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2003_1/22-23.html>.

98. ‘The missing — why a new initiative?’, ICRC Focus/Missing persons, 19 February 2003.

99. ‘The missing and their families, action to resolve the problem of people unaccounted for as a result of armed conflict or internal violence and to assist their families’, report prepared by the ICRC for the 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, held inGenevafrom 2 to 6 December 2003, p. 3Google Scholar. The report describes the full range of the ICRC's activities in this area.

100. Ibid.

101. See ‘Report on the follow-up of the resolution 3 of the 27th International Conference on the emblem’, 28th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,December 2003, pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

102. For background to the problems concerning the emblem, see Meriboute, Z., ‘The emblems of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: their content and meaning’, 3 YIHL (2000) p. 258CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a thorough overview of the problem, see Bugnion, F., Towards a Comprehensive Solution to the Question of the Emblem, rev. 3rd edn. (Geneva, ICRC 2005)Google Scholar <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0778/$File/emblem_third_edition_en.pdf>.

103. UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/5, 13 May 2003.

104. UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/15, 24 September 2003.

105. See ‘The year in review’, 4 YIHL (2001) pp. 301–302Google Scholar and 5 YIHL (2002) p. 292Google Scholar.

106. <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonaccord.html>.

107. See ‘The year in review’, 4 YIHL (2001) pp. 313–314Google Scholar.

108. See Correspondents' Reports in this volume, p. 484.

109. See ibid.

110. UN Doc. S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002.

111. See Correspondents' Reports in this volume, p. 486.

112. UN Press Release S/7759, ‘Security Council welcomes ceasefire agreement for Democratic Republic of Congo, Secretary-General's efforts to address urgent humanitarian situation’, 19 May 2003 <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sc7759.html>.

113. See Correspondents' Reports, 3 YIHL (2000) p. 484Google Scholar.

114. The UN Oil for Food Programme was established by SC Res. 986, UN Doc. S/RES/986 (1995).

115. Bush, G.W., ‘Remarks from the USS Abraham Lincoln at sea off the coast of San Diego, California’, 1 05 2003Google Scholar <http://www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/2003501-15.htm>.

116. See M. Mari, ‘Occupied Palestinian Territories’, in Correspondents' Reports, this volume, pp. 554–561.

117. UN Doc. A/58/416-S/2003/947 (2003).

118. Ibid., para. 15.

119. Ibid., para. 16.

120. UN Doc. S/2003/529, 7 May 2003. See also UN Press Release SC/7924, ‘Security Council adopts resolution endorsing Road Map leading towards two-state resolution of Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, 19 November 2003 >http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7924.doc.htm>. See Correspondents' Reports in this volume, pp. 504 and 557.

121. For background on the situation in Liberia, see Correspondents' Reports in this volume, p. 542.

122. See ‘The year in review’, 4 YIHL (2001) pp. 306–307Google Scholar.

123. See ‘The year in review’, 5 YIHL (2002) pp. 300–301Google Scholar.

124. UN Doc. S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002. Submitted pursuant to SC Res. 1408 (2002) para. 16.

125. See Correspondents' Reports in this volume, p. 605.

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128. Polisario Front <http://www.wsahara.net/polisario.html>; See also Gasser, H.-P., ‘The conflict in Western Sahara — an unresolved issue from the decolonization period’, 5 YIHL (2002) p. 375CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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130. GAOR (United Nations), 58th Sess., Supp. No, 52, UN Doc. A/58/52* (2003).

131. Ibid., para. 1.

132. Ibid., para. 10.

133. Ibid., para. 11.

134. Ibid., para. 16.

135. See supra p. 260.

136. Faite, A. and Grenier, J. Labbe, eds., Expert Meeting on Multinational Peace Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to UN Mandated Forces (Geneva, ICRC 2004)Google Scholar.

137. ‘NATO “needs rapid-response force”’, CNN.com/World, 9 October 2003 <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/10/08/nato.defense>.

138. ‘Report of the Secretary-General on “The promotion of and respect for international humanitarian law,” pursuant to AG/RES. 1904 (XXXII-O/02)’, 6 May 2003 <http://www.oas.org/xxxiiiga/english/docs/cpdoc374l_03.htm>.

139. AG/RES. 1944 (XXXIII-O/03). Resolution adopted at the 4th Plen. Sess., 10 June 2003.

140. ‘Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor’, September 2003 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf>.

141. <http://www.mines.gc.ca/VII/pdfVII_Ic-en.asp>.

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143. See Letter dated 4 June 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex I, Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the new strategic relationship, UN Doc. A/58/91-S/2003/617, 5 June 2003.

144. GAOR (United Nations), 58th Sess., Supp. No. 42, UN Doc. A/58/42 (2003).

145. Ibid.

146. Pursuant to GA Res. 56/24 V: ‘The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’, UN Doc. A/RES/24, 10 January 2002, p. 36.

147. UN Doc. A/58/138, 11 July 2003.

148. UN Doc. S/PRST/2003/22, 19 November 2003.

149. GA Res. 58/241, 23 December 2003. Earlier, on 22 November 2003, the GA adopted Res. 57/ 72, also titled ‘The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’, which decided that the GA would consider at its 58th session further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, taking into account the views of states.

150. ‘Small arms’, report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2003/1217, 31 December 2003.

151. See ‘The year in review’, 5 YIHL (2002) p. 268Google Scholar.

152. UN Doc. S/PRST/2002/30 (2002).

153. Ibid., para. 61.

154. Ibid., para. 63.

155. UN Doc. A/58/365-S/2003/888 (2003). Submitted pursuant to GA Res. 55/281, 1 August 2001, by which the Assembly called upon governments, regional and subregional organisations and civil society actors to consider the report of the SG on the prevention of armed conflict, UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574 and Corr.l (2001). See 4 YIHL (2001) pp. 310–311Google Scholar.

156. UN Doc. A/58/365-S/2003/888, supra n. 155, para. 4.

157. Ibid., para. 16.

158. Ibid., para. 37.

159. Ibid. para. 32.