page 18 note * Sadat's Bebe Rebozo is Osman Ahmad Osman, who, in addition to having a reputation for corruption (whether deserved or not), has another distinctly noteworthy occupation: His major firm, the Arab Contractors, is regarded as the most efficient and competent construction firm in the Middle East. However, more distance between the president and this competent but compromised man and his business activities would improve the president's image in Egypt.

page 18 note ** Mrs. Sadat makes public statements on controversial issues, particularly those affecting the welfare of women and children. As long as she, and the regime, continue to support women's rights, she will continue to offend conservative elements in Egypt and elsewhere. However, she may counter some of this criticism by her current well-publicized campaign to conserve and restore the major Islamic monuments of Egypt, thus perhaps gaining some support among mainstream Moslems, if not the Far Right.

page 18 note *** These criticisms are widespread but have been most persuasively noted in “The Struggle for Egypt's Soul” by Fouad Ajami in Foreign Policy (Summer, 1979); “Egyptian Foreign Policy” by Mohammed H. Heikal in Foreign Affairs (July, 1978); and “Letter From Egypt” by Joseph Kraft, The New Yorker (May 28, 1979).

page 20 note * See Worldview Associate Editor Mark Bruzonsky's interview with Butros Ghali in the July/August, 1979, issue of Worldview.

page 20 note ** For an insightful and provocative essay on this theme see Fouad Ajami's “The End of Pan-Arabism” in Foreign Affairs (Winter, 1978-79). He continues exploring the theme, with specific but oversimplified reference to Egypt, in “The Struggle for Egypt's Soul,” Foreign Policy (Summer, 1979).

page 20 note *** Viewed from Israel, Egyptian troop movements may have looked like overt preparation for war; while from Egypt, Israeli actions brought back memories of 1967.

page 21 note * While the Moslem Right, if it came to power, might upset the system, it may do so more as a result of political and economic inexperience and naivete than because it is Islamic. An Islamic political revival is not in itself a threat to a healthy polity any more than a Christian revival is a threat to political order in the West. If there can be Chrisitan Democrats in Europe, why not Islamic Democrats in the Middle East? This question is especially relevant for Egypt, which has a large number of humanistic, well-educated, and politically sophisticated intellectuals who are as committed to democracy as they are to Islam. The implication that the Sadat regime will collapse and that Egypt “awaits its death as less sophisticated, less polished sorts, claiming authenticity, push it into its grave” is one of the most moving, and misleading, portions of Fouad Ajami's recent essay, “The Struggle for Egypt's Soul.” What he projects as a certainty is only one of many possibilities— and, rather than imminent and certain, as he implies, it is among the least likely.

page 21 note ** The October war was touted as a holy war. It was an event through which Egypt regained some territory and, most important, its lost pride, reinforcing and linking patriotism and Islam. But increased contact with Western states following the war threatened traditional Islamic values by exposing virtually the whole population to the tantalizing materialism of the West. The consequence was a defensive backlash. Many in the Coptic community have had a similar reaction to Western materialism. As a result, magnasticism and asceticism have enjoyed a vigorous revival.

page 22 note * An interesting discussion of some of the problems related to this issue can be found in Edgar L. Feige's “The Economic Consequences of Peace in the Middle East” in Challenge (January-February, 1979). The specific case of Israel is taken up by Ann Crittenden in “Israel's Economic Plight” in Foreign Affairs (Summer, 1979). In Egypt the military is the most viable potential rival to Sadat, and the current regime is not likely to reduce the military budget. As of now, the military supports Sadat, but a significant cut in the budget could cause active opposition. Besides, the military may be needed in the near future to defend the Sudan or Egypt's border with Libya.

page 24 note * Sudan is to Egypt what the Balkans were, in Churchill's mind, to Europe, a “soft underbelly.” Those who wish to defend Sadat's policies must defend Sudan and its current regime, which is under severe internal and external pressure to withdraw support from Sadat. And for those who oppose the settlement, there is no better way to undermine it than through Sudan.

page 24 note ** Heikal's “Egyptian Foreign Policy” neglects the North, while Ajami's “The Struggle for Egypt's Soul” fails to discuss the South. Thus they both miss the relative importance to Egypt of the East.

page 25 note * For the short term our new relationship with Egypt, and our continuing acquiescence in Israeli occupation of Arab land held since 1967, may weaken our relationship with such important oil-exporting states as Saudi Arabia. The short-term damage may well be long lasting if we do not make significant progress in and with Egypt and unless there can be a positive role for Saudi Arabia to play in the peace process and, perhaps, in helping Egypt as well.