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Economic Statecraft: Is There a Sub-National Dimension? Evidence from United States–China Rivalry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 February 2021

Simon J. Evenett
Simon J. Evenett*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland and CEPR
*
Email: simon.evenett@gmail.com
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Abstract

Using detailed information on policy interventions by US sub-national governments between 2009 and 2019, the contribution of such public bodies to Sino-US geopolitical rivalry is examined, in particular since President Trump took office in 2017. While US sub-national governments accounted for 28% of all US policy interventions that harmed Chinese commercial interests, awarding firm-specific subsidies in 88% of cases, the timing and sectoral incidence of such intervention suggests that economic statecraft considerations could only be part of the explanation for their actions. Ironically, the interventions of US sub-national governments and their weak commitment to transparency have much in common with their frequently maligned Chinese counterparts.

Keywords

Economic statecraftgeopoliticssubsidysub-national government
Type
Original Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 20 , Special Issue 2: Economic Statecraft and Global Trade in the 21st Century , May 2021 , pp. 220 - 237
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Founder of the Global Trade Alert initiative. I thank participants at a conference titled Great Power Competition in the 21st Century: Linking Economics and Security, held at Berkeley on 24 October 2019 for comments on a powerpoint presentation that became the basis of this paper. I also thank the reflections of two anonymous referees, James Davis, and Jonathan Fried. Comments on this paper are welcome and can be sent to the author at simon.evenett@unisg.ch.

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