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The “Satisfied” and “Dissatisfied” States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Robert L. Friedheim
Robert L. Friedheim
Affiliation:
Purdue University
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Extract

Peace will be achieved, virtually all Western leaders say upon issuing a general statement on foreign policy, when all men learn to obey a common law. The achievement of world peace through world law is a popular solution to the problems of world politics of our times. However, creating a viable international law that all or even most states are willing to obey has proved difficult.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , October 1965 , pp. 20 - 41
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1965

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References

1 Falk, Richard A., “Revolutionary Nations and the Quality of International Legal Order,” in Kaplan, Morton A., ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York 1962), 323.Google Scholar

2 Although the Soviet-bloc states are members of the anticolonialist group, a full discussion of their conduct must be omitted for reasons of space. However, it should be pointed out that the Soviet-bloc states should not be classified as “dissatisfied.” Although often allied with the dissatisfied, the Soviet bloc did not participate in the allout assault on law per se so characteristic of the dissatisfied states. The positions adopted by the Soviet Union (and her satellites) at the conferences were typical of a conservative revolutionary state ambivalently trying to accomplish two ends—on the one hand, export of revolutionary principles and harassment of cold-war enemies; on the other, a genuine attempt to negotiate commonly accepted legal principles in areas where important material interests would be protected if normative behavior could be enforced. For a discussion of conservative revolutionary states, see Falk, 315.

3 The reader should not assume that the characteristics ascribed to a category of states created for purposes of analysis are wholly applicable to all states that generally fall into that category.

4 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. III, First Committee (A/CONF. 13/39), 4th meeting, par. 30. Hereafter all citations from the records, documents, or reports of both UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea will be made with the official UN document number.

5 See, for example, A/CONF. 13/C.5/L.6 (19 “dissatisfied” sponsors), A/CONF. 13/C.3/L.65, 66, 66/Rev. 1 (12 sponsors), A/CONF. 19/C.I/L.2/Rev. 1 (18 sponsors), A/CONF. 19/C.1/L.6 (16 sponsors), A/CONF. 19/L. 9 (10 sponsors), among many others.

6 “International Negotiations Under Parliamentary Procedure,” Lectures on International Law and the United Nations (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1957), 419.Google Scholar

7 These figures were compiled from the list of delegations to the Conferences on the Law of the Sea and to Sessions XII, XIII, XIV, and XV of the General Assembly.

8 General Assembly Resolution 1105, XI Session, par. 2. For example, see A/CONF. 13/42, 19th meeting, par. 33.

9 A/CONF. 13/42, 11th meeting, par. 14.

10 A/CONF. 13/38, 9th plenary meeting, par. 34.

11 Ibid., 14th plenary meeting, par. 66.

12 A/CONF. 19/8, 10th meeting, par. 12.

13 A/CONF. 13/41, 13th meeting, par. 22.

14 A/CONF. 13/39, 4th meeting, par. 6.

15 Ibid., 5th meeting, par. 13.

16 A/CONF. 19/8, 18th meeting, par. 6.

17 Ibid., 3rd meeting, par. 6.

18 A/CONF. 13/38, 20th plenary meeting, par. 70.

19 A/CONF. 19/8, 14th meeting, par. 13–14.

20 A/CONF. 13/41, 23rd meeting, par. 11.

21 A/CONF. 13/39, 7th meeting, par. 1.

22 A/CONF. 19/8, 19th meeting, par. 14.

23 A/CONF. 13/39, 50th meeting, par. 1.

24 Ibid., 21st meeting, par. 4.

25 A/CONF. 13/38, 14th plenary meeting, par. 51.

26 A/CONF. 13/43, 8th meeting, par. 32.

27 A/CONF. 13/40, 31st meeting, par. 24.

28 A/CONF. 13/39, 15th meeting, par. 14.

29 A/CONF. 13/38, 21st plenary meeting, par. 21.

30 A/CONF. 13/42, 19th meeting, par. 33.

31 See the general debates of the Fourth Committee for views of the dissatisfied on sovereignty. A/CONF. 13/42, 1st meeting-29th meeting.

32 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.5/L.6.

33 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.4/L.57.

34 A/CONF. 13/39, 53rd meeting, par. 17. For other death pronouncements see ibid., 54th meeting, par. 1 and 15; 55th meeting, par. 35; A/CONF. 19/8, 20th meeting, par. 26.

35 A/CONF. 19/8, 20th meeting, par. 12.

36 Ibid., 12th plenary meeting, par. 24.

37 A/CONF. 13/43, 25tn meeting, par. 40–43.

38 A/CONF. 19/1, 25th meeting, par. 22.

39 A/CONF. 13/38, 9th plenary meeting, par. 60.

40 A/CONF. 13/39, 6th meeting, par. 1–2; see also par. 24–25; 18th meeting, par. 10.

41 A/CONF. 13/39, 53rd meeting, par. 10.

42 Ibid., 4th meeting, par. 10.

43 Ibid., 9th meeting, par. 10, 18; 16th meeting, par. 18; 17th meeting, par. 11; 44th meeting, par. 11, respectively.

44 A/CONF. 13/43, 21st meeting, par. 40. See also Becker, Loftus, “Some Political Problems of the Legal Advisor,” Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII (May 19, 1958), 835Google Scholar; and U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Hearings, 86th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, January 20, 1960), 5.Google Scholar

45 A/CONF. 13/38, 18th plenary meeting, par. 74–77.

46 A/CONF. 19/8, 23rd meeting, par. 17.

47 UN Doc. A/3159.

48 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.4/L.22.

49 UN Doc. A/3159 (italics added).

50 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.83 (italics added).

51 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/C.2/L.81.

52 Gidel, Gilbert, Le Droit international public de la mer, Vol. III, La mer territorial et la zone contiguë (Paris 1934), 151.Google Scholar

53 A/CONF. 13/39, 37th meeting, par. 16–20.

54 A/CONF. 13/42, 17th meeting, par. 36.

55 See, for example, A/CONF. 13/39, 5th meeting, par. 35; 9th meeting, par. 23; 17th meeting, par. 18; 28th meeting, par. 15.

56 Alternative schemes, such as allowing the General Assembly to declare codes of customary law, or giving legislative power to an enlarged Security Council or to a special majority in the General Assembly, would not avoid those problems in negotiating that became obvious at the law of the sea conferences. Legal rules under these schemes would still have to be negotiated under parliamentary diplomacy. For these schemes see Castaneda, Jorge, “The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International Law,” International Organization, XV (Winter 1961), 38–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Holcombe, Arthur N., “The Improvement of the International Law-Making Process,” Notre Dame Lawyer, XXXVII, Symposium (1961), 16–23.Google Scholar