¹ Of the 18 presidential elections held in Africa between 1990 and March 1993, 9 were vouchsafed as “free and fair” by international observers, and 8 resulted in the peaceful replacement of the incumbent ruler. In all cases where the incumbent survived, the opposition charged electoral fraud. See Michael Bratton, “Political Liberalization in Africa in the 1990s: Advances and Setbacks” (Paper presented at a donors conference on Economic Reform in Africa's New Era of Political Liberalization, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., April 14-15,1993).

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³ Ibid., 77-78.

⁴ Huntington, Samuel, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)Google Scholar. Huntington classifies transitions into three main types: transformation, replacement, and transplacement. These labels are unnecessarily jargonistic; we prefer to speak of three routes—top-down, bottom-up, and negotiated political change—distinguished according to whether state elites, opposition forces, or both take the lead in pressing transition forward. On this theme, see Rustow, Dankwart A., “The Surging Tide ofDemocracy,” Journal of Democracy 3, no. 1 (1992), 119–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Huntington (fn. 4), 588.

⁶ O'Donnell, and Schmitter, , Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3Google Scholar. See also Palma, Guiseppe, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

⁷ Bermeo, , “Rethinking Regime Change,” Comparative Politics 22 (April 1990), 361CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Karl, , “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 5 (October 1990)Google Scholar.

⁹ Ibid., 6; emphasis added.

¹⁰ For general theoretical discussions of this point, see Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society: An Outline ofthe Theory ofStructuration (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and Taylor, Michael, “Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social Change,” Politics and Society 17, no. 2 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Bermeo (fn. 7), 366-67.

¹² Karl (fn. 8), 6-7.

¹³ This central point is made in relation to the French Revolution by Tocqueville, Alexis de, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955)Google Scholar; and in a comparison of the Russian and German revolutions by Moore, Barrington, Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience Revolt (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 357–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where differences in outcomes are linked to differences in the strength of political institutions. “Interestingly, two recent comparative studies of regime change are based on the analysis of political institutions.

¹⁴ Collier, Ruth Berins and Collier, David, Shaping the Political Arena: CriticalJunctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and Stephens, John D., Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Not all extant analyses assume corporatist institutions and ignore regime variations. See Fishman, Robert M., “Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy,” World Politics 42 (April 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Karl, Terry Lynn and Schmitter, Philippe, “Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,” International Social Science Journal 128 (May 1991)Google Scholar. See also the interesting analyses of the role of political parties as an explanatory factor in Brazil's transition in Mainwaring, Scott, “Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone,” Comparative Politics 21 (October 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, “Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective,” Political Science Quarterly 107 (Winter 1992).

¹⁶ Weber, Max, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968)Google Scholar. See also Theobold, Robin, “Patrimonialism,” World Politics 34 (July 1982)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Eisenstadt, Samuel N., Traditional Patrimonialism andModern Neopatrimonialism (London: Sage, 1972)Google Scholar; Clapham, Christopher, ed., Private Patronage and Public Power (London: Frances Pinter, 1985)Google Scholar; and Snyder, Richard, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ See Joseph, Richard, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second R£public (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 5. On the recent evolution of these phenomena, see the excellent analysis in Lemarchand, Rene, “The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems,” in Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Theobold (fn. 16), 549.

²⁰ Clapham, Christopher, Third World Politics: An Introduction (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Waterbury, John, “Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime,” World Politics 25 (July 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Callaghy, Thomas, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Sandbrook, Richard, The Politics ofAfrican Economic Stagnation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Joseph (fn. 18); Bayart, Jean François, L'Etat au Cameroun (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1985)Google Scholar; and idem, L'Etat en Afrique (Paris: Fayard, 1989)Google Scholar.

²² In addition to works already cited, see Baloyra, Enrique A., ed., Comparing New Democracies: Transitions and Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone (Boulder, Colo.: Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Malloy, James M. and Seligson, Mitchell A., eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transitions in Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Pastor, Robert A., ed., Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989)Google Scholar; Remmer, Karen, “New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? The Study of Latin American Democracy,” Comparative Politics 23 (July 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ See Sandbrook (fn. 21); and Callaghy (fn. 21).

²⁴ Thus, Allen argues that “in failing to pay salaries [the Kerekou regime in Benin] . . . signed the death warrant it had drafted by its own gross corruption, for it led to the actions of 1989 that in turn caused the regime's collapse.” See Allen, Christopher, “Restructuring an Authoritarian State: Democratic Renewal in Benin,” Review ofAfrican Political Economy 54 (July 1992), 46Google Scholar.

²⁵ Przeworski, Adam, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,” in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe, and Whitehead, Laurence, eds., Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 51Google Scholar.

²⁶ O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 6), 19.

²⁷ Ibid., 17.

²⁸ Elsewhere, O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 6) concede that ordinary citizens commonly take a leading role in transitions: whereas “political democracies are usually brought down by conspiracies involving a few actors . . . the democratization of authoritarian regimes . . . involves ... a crucial component of the mobilization and organization of large numbers of individuals” (p. 18).

²⁹ Linz, Juan, “Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration,” in Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Huntington, Samuel, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1992)Google Scholar; Rene Lemarchand, “African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim (and Mostly Pessimistic) Assessment” (Revised version of a paper presented at a seminar on Democracy and Economic Development, Oslo, February 1992).

³⁰ Samuel Huntington finds only six cases of transitions by “replacement,” that is, from below, see Huntington (fn. 29).

³¹ See Bratton, Michael and Walle, Nicolas van de, “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa,” Comparative Politics 24 (July 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The five exceptions were Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Sao Tome, and Tanzania. Of these, only Cape Verde and São Tomé have completed a protest-free full transition. See also Cahen, M., “Vent des lies: La victoire de l'opposition aux lies du Cap Vert et à São Tomé e Principe,” Politique Africaine 43 (October 1991)Google Scholar. In Madagascar massive protests erupted in mid-1991, when it became clear that President Ratsiraka's reforms were only window dressing. The elections of February 1993, which brought the opposition to power, were clearly the result of popular pressures. See “Madagascar: Hanging on in the Face of Change,” Africa Confidential, September 1991, p. 7. Finally, in Tanzania and Guinea Bissau, political liberalization has fallen well short of a full transition.

³² African states with particularly acute fiscal crises were also vulnerable to donor pressures to engage in political liberalization. See Bratton and van de Walle (fn. 31) for a discussion of the relative role of domestic and international factors in recent African transitions.

³³ Migdal, Joel S., Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 6Google Scholar.

³⁴ Rustow, Dankwart, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), 352CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ Przeworski (fn. 25), 56.

³⁶ A large literature analyzes factional conflict within the African state elite; see, for example, Sandbrook (fn. 21); and Bayart (fn. 21).

³⁷ In Huntington's work (fn. 29), for example, the success of democratization hinges largely on the ability of “liberal reformers” within the government to outmaneuver the standpatters.

³⁸ As Waterbury (fn. 21) argues with respect to the monarchy in Morocco, “The king's degree of political control varies directly with the level of fragmentation and factionalization within the system... The king must always maintain the initiative through the systematic inculcation of an atmosphere of unpredictability and provisionality among all elites and the maximization of their vulnerability relative to his mastery” (p. 552).

³⁹ Walle, Nicolas van de, “Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with an Illustration from Cameroon,” in Widner, Jennifer, ed., Economic Change and PoliticalLiberalization in Sub-Saharan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 6), 38.

⁴¹ Carr, Raymond and Aizpurua, Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy (London: and Unwin, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁴² Hagopian, Frances, “Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition in Brazil,” Comparative Political Studies 23, no. 2 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ Karl, Terry Lynn, Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela, America no. 107 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 1981)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Thus, by 1991, some 76 parties had been officially recognized in Cameroon, 42 in Guinea, 27 in Gabon, and allegedly over 200 in Zaire. In these countries, as well as in the Ivory Coast, the opposition's credibility and strength has been undermined by internal divisions, ethnic rivalries, and personal disputes. See Faure, Yves A., “Nouvelle donne en Cote d'lvoire,” Politique Africaine 20 (December 1985)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Confronted by a journalist on national television with evidence that the government had disregarded its own laws in the manipulation of voter lists on the eve of the legislative elections of March 1992, the Cameroonian minister of territorial administration explained that “laws are made by men, and are no more than reference points.” Cited in Celestin Monga, “La recomposition du marche poli-tique au Cameroun (1991-1992)” (Unpublished paper, GERDES, Cameroon, 1992), 10.

⁴⁶ The national bar associations played leading opposition roles in Cameroon, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Togo. See Tedga, Paul John Marc, Ouverture democratique en Afrique Noire? (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1991), 64–72Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Evans, Peter, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; Collier, David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 6), 62,69. For a critique of these arguments, see Levine, Daniel H., “Paradigm Lost: Dependence to Democracy,” World Politics 40 (April 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ Collier, Ruth Berins, Regimes in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Numerous studies have chronicled and analyzed this process. The locus classicus remains Zolberg, Aristide, Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966)Google Scholar. But see also Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967)Google Scholar; and Foltz, William, “Political Opposition in Single-Party States of Tropical Africa,” in Dahl, Robert, ed., Regimes and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Bienen, Henry, Armies and Parties in Africa (New York: Africana Publishing, 1979)Google Scholar; Decalo, Samuel, “The Morphology of Military Rule in Africa,” in Markakis, John and Waller, Michael, eds., Military Marxist Regimes in Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1976)Google Scholar; idem, and, Coups and Army Rule Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976)Google Scholar.

⁵² The exceptions include South Africa, of course, but also arguably present-day Sudan and Mauritania, where Arab/Islamic regimes are increasingly excluding non-Arab/non-Muslim segments of the population.

⁵³ See, for example, Young, Crawford, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism (Madison: University Wisconsin Press, 1976), esp. chap. 3Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Bayart (fn. 21,1989). See also Rothchild, Donald and Olorunsola, Victor, eds., State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ On Ethiopia, see Clapham, Christopher, “State, Society and Political Institutions in Revolutionary Ethiopia,” in Manor, James, ed., Rethinking Third World Politics (New York: Longman, 1991)Google Scholar. On Burkina Faso, see Rene Otayek, “The Revolutionary Process in Burkina Faso,” in Markakis and Waller (fn. 51), 95-96.

⁵⁶ For a proposal of seven regime types based loosely on seven diverse criteria, see Chazan, Naomi et al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988)Google Scholar. For compet ing typologies, see also Young, Crawford, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Charlton, Roger, “Dehomogenizing the Study of African Politics: The Case of Interstate Influence on Regime Formation and Change,” Plural Societies 14, no. 1-2 (1983)Google Scholar; and Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, “African Political Systems: Typology and Performance,” Comparative Political Studies 17, no. 1 (1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Remmer (fn. 2).

⁵⁹ These categories and labels build on existing typologies. Ruth Collier distinguishes military, multiparty, and two types of one-party regime: plebiscitary and competitive. Huntington identifies four regime types: personal, one-party, and military regimes, plus the special category of racial oligarchy for South Africa.

⁶⁰ Dahl (fn. 57) labeled regimes that had been “highly popularized and liberalized” as polyarchies rather than democracies because, he argued, no large system in the real world is fully democratized (p. 8).

⁶¹ See Bratton, Michael, “Patterns of Development and Underdevelopment: Toward a Comparison,” International Studies Quarterly 26, no. 3 (1982)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Remmer (fn. 2), 71—76.

⁶² Remmer (fn. 2) even holds that “it is possible for exclusion to be achieved even more effectively under competitive political arrangements than under authoritarian ones. Exclusionary democracy not only makes it possible to secure regime support from dominant social groups in a highly stratified society, it obviates the costs of coercion and problems of regime legitimacy that are associated with exclusionary authoritarianism” (p. 74).

⁶³ Writing about Mobutu's consolidation of power, Callaghy (fn. 21) speaks of the systematic “dismantlement of inherited structures, especially departicipation and depoliticization,” including the emasculation of parliament, the elimination of the position of prime minister, the banning of all parties and youth organizations, and the centralization of state power away from the provinces to Kinshasa (p. 171).

⁶⁴ For a similar argument, see Snyder (fn. 17).

⁶⁵ News reports in mid-1992 indicated that Zaire's national currency, printed in Germany, was being flown directly to Mobutu's luxury yacht on the Zaire River, for use as he saw fit (Africa News, May 24, 1992). Amidst a crumbling economy, in which the average civil servant had not been paid in months, Mobutu was still personally ensuring the support of key followers, including elements of the armed forces charged with protecting him. See also “Mobutu's Monetary Mutiny,” Africa Confidential, February 5, 1993; and “Zaire, a Country Sliding into Chaos,” Guardian Weekly, August 8, 1993.

⁶⁶ Lemarchand, René, “Mobutu and the National Conference: The Arts of Political Survival” (Manuscript, University of Florida, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ See Tedga (fn. 46).

⁶⁸ Collier (fn. 49), 104-8.

⁶⁹ For country examples of these practices, see Bayart (fn. 21) on the Ahidjo regime in Cameroon (pp. 141-84); and Toulabor, Comi M., Le Togo sons Eyadema (Paris: Karthala, 1986)Google Scholar, on Togo.

⁷⁰ See Lemarchand (fn.29); Pearl T. Robinson, “The National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone Africa” (Paper presented at the colloquium on the Economics of Political Liberalization in Africa, Harvard University, March 6—7, 1992); and Eboussi-Boulaga, Fabien, Les conférences nationales en Afrique Noire: Une affaire à suivre (Paris: Karthala, 1993)Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Collier (fn. 49), 119-24. See also Zolberg, Aristide, “The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa,” American Political Science Review 62, no. 2 (1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² As Allen (fn. 24) argues in relation to the national conference in Benin: “It was conceived originally by the government as a means of discussing mainly the political and economic problems of the time . . . and of co-opting the opposition into a joint solution in which the government would retain the leading role” (p. 48).

⁷³ Bienen (fn. 51), 122-45; Decalo (fn. 51, Coups and Army Rule in Africa), 231-54.

⁷⁴ Even then, the military has sought to limit the power and autonomy of the party, despite Leninist principles regarding the supremacy of the party over all other political institutions. See Decalo (fn. 51, “Morphology of Military Rule in Africa”), 134-35.

⁷⁵ Samuel Huntington writes: “The problem is military opposition to politics. Military leaders can easily envision themselves in a guardian role; they can also picture themselves as the far seeing impartial promoters of social and economic reform in their societies. But with rare exceptions, they shrink from assuming the role of political organizer. In particular, they condemn political parties.” Huntington, See, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 243Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Bienen, Henry, “Military Rule and Political Processes: Nigerian Examples,” Comparative Politics 10 (January 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁷ On these events, see “Nigerian Military Rulers Annul Election,” New York Times, June 24,1993; and “Nigeria: About Turn!” Africa Confidential, July 30, 1993.

⁷⁸ Clapham, Christopher and Philip, George, “The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes,” in Clapham and Philip, eds., The Political Dilemmas ofMilitary Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ For a discussion of this point, see Welch, Claude, “Cincinnatus in Africa: The Possibility of Military Withdrawal from Politics,” in Lofchie, Michael F., ed., The State ofthe Nations: Constraints on Development in IndependentAfrica (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the military coup by junior officers that toppled the Traoré regime in Mali in March 1991 shows that there are limits to the extent to which even a military regime can rely on force to maintain its power. See Turrittin, Jane, “Mali: People Topple Traoré,” Review ofAfrican Political Economy 52 (November 1991)Google Scholar.

⁸¹ As Lemarchand (fn. 29) argues: “Transitions from above are the more promising in terms of their ability to ‘deliver’ democracy in that they tend to be rather specific about the time frame, procedural steps and overall strategy of transition. Unlike what often happens with transitions from below, the net result is to reduce uncertainty” (p. 10).

⁸² In addition to the aborted transition in Nigeria, one might note events in Ghana, where Rawlings lifted the ban on political parties in May 1992 in preparation for pluralist elections in November, while simultaneously having the constitution rewritten to protect members of the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) from prosecution by future governments. Rawlings won the elections of November 1992, in a contest widely perceived to have been marred by extensive fraud; see Abdulai, David, “Rawlings ‘Wins’ Ghana's Presidential Elections,” Africa Today 39 (Fall 1992), 66–71Google Scholar. In Uganda, President Museveni slowed down his country's managed transition in order to give himself time to build a new political party with a broad ethnoregional base; see Africa Confidential, April 17, 1992.

⁸³ These trends can be attributed to elite efforts at demobilization of formerly active participants and the co-optation or elimination of opposition power centers. They are well covered by Kasfir, Nelson, The Shrinking Political Arena: Participation and Ethnicity in African Politics with a Case Study of Uganda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976)Google Scholar. On the characteristics of single-party elections in Africa, see the following: Lavroff, D. G., ed., Aux urnes rAfrique! Elections etpouvoirs en Afrique Noire (Paris: Pedone, 1978)Google Scholar; Chazan, Naomi, “African Voters at the Polls: A Re-Examination of the Role of Elections in Africa Politics,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 17 (July 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hayward, Fred M., Elections in Independent Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987)Google Scholar. On competitive single-party elections in Tanzania and Kenya, see Hyden, Goran and Leys, Colin, “Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania,” British Journal of Political Science 2 (April 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Donge, Jankees Van and Liviga, Athumani, “The 1985 Tanzanian Parliamentary Elections: A Conservative Election,” African Affairs 88 (January 1989)Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Ivory Coast moved progressively to competitive primaries within the single party after 1980. See Bakary, Tessi, “Cote d'lvoire: Une decentralisation politique centralise,” Geopolitique Africaine 2 (June 1986)Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Bienen, Heniy and Walle, Nicolas van de, “Of Time and Power in Africa,” American Political Science Review 83 (March 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁶ The 1991 transition in Zambia was “a struggle over the rules of the political game and the resources by which it is played (in which)... the ruling party employ(ed) all its strength to tilt the rules of political competition in its own favor.” See Bratton, Michael, “Zambia Starts Over,” Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 (1992), 82CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Even so, the opposition successfully forced incumbent president Kaunda to forgo a referendum on multiparty politics and move directly to elections. They also felt confident enough to contest the October 1991 election under a less-than-perfect voter register and constitution.

⁸⁷ In the case of Ivory Coast at least, this calculation proved to be sound. Thus, regarding Ivory Coast, Faure (fn. 44) argues that the victory of the ex-single party was due to the fact that “the government, thanks to its effective and very loyal territorial administration, and to the PDCI apparatus, present all over the country down to the most isolated hamlet, controlled electoral operations throughout ... and all official information sources” (p. 37).

⁸⁸ Barkan, Joel, “Kenya: Lessons from a Rawed Election,” Journal of Democracy 4 (July 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Andraesson, Bard-Anders, Geisler, Gisela, and Tostensen, Arne, A Hobbled Democracy: The Kenya General Elections, 1992 (Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelson Institute, 1993)Google Scholar.

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⁹¹ Bermeo, Nancy, “Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 3 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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