¹ Betts, Richard K., Surprise Attack. Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982).Google Scholar

² Fischhoff, Baruch, “Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Certainty,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1 (No. 2, 1975), 288–99Google Scholar; Fischhoff, , “The Silly Certainty of Hindsight,” Psychology Today 8 (April 1975), 70–76Google Scholar; Fischhoff, and Beyth, Ruth, “‘I Knew It Would Happen’: Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things,” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 13 (February 1975), 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ The major case studies are cited in Chan, Steve, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning,” American Political Science Review 73 (March 1979), 171–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The warning aspect of the Falklands conflict is covered in the Rt. Hon. the Franks, Lord, Falkland lslands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counselors (London: H. M. Stationery Office, January 1983).Google Scholar

⁴ See, respectively, Betts (fn. 1); Whaley, Barton, “Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War” (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, unpub., 1969).Google ScholarWohlstetter's, Roberta “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs 43 (July 1965), 691–707CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is a useful comparative case study.

⁵ Stein, Janice Gross, “‘Intelligence’ and ‘Stupidity’ Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 1973,” Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (September 1980), 155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Betts (fn. 1), 4.

⁷ Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

⁸ In addition to his book (fn. 1), see “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics 31 (October 1978), 61–89.

⁹ For example, there was a major invasion alert in South Korea on May 7, 1950, prior to the real North Korean attack in late June. During 1949, there had been 874 border violations in the Korean arena (Betts, fn. 1, 53–54).

¹⁰ For example, see the article “The Inquest Into How It Began,” The Economist, June 19–25, 1982, 12.

¹¹ Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

¹² The most extreme example is policy making without regular and meaningful inputs from intelligence. A much less extreme example of policy failure occurs when intelligence is “good” but policy turns out to be “bad.” For example, intelligence may generate estimates that are fairly accurate and offer relatively valid warnings, but the decision maker may—for perfectly justifiable policy reasons—feel obligated to take action inconsistent with the inputs. Then, the disaster is a policy failure, not an intelligence failure. See Betts, Richard K., “Intelligence for Policymaking,” in Hopple, Gerald W., Andriole, Stephen J., and Freedy, Amos, eds., National Security Crisis Forecasting and Management (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983).Google Scholar

¹³ Belts (fn. 8), 88.

¹⁴ Grabendorff, Wolf, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 24 (August 1982), 267–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ The historical background is provided in: Franks (fn. 3); Beck, Peter J., “Cooperative Confrontation in the Falkland Islands Dispute: The Anglo-Argentine Search for a Way Forward, 1968–1981,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 24 (February 1982), 37–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Calvert, Peter, The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982)Google Scholar; and Freedman, Lawrence, “The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982,” Foreign Affairs 61 (Fall 1982), 196–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ The Franks report (fn. 3, 87) points out that, at the time, the most serious risk was action against British shipping. The two frigates and the submarine were sent prior to the December 1977 talks, when it was believed that a breakdown in the negotiations was very possible. The circumstances surrounding the February 1982 talks were not analogous.

¹⁷ Argentine press comment leading up to the New York talks stressed that a resort to military means was very possible during 1982. This was emphasized in La Prensa on January 24, 1982 and February 7, 1982 as well as in other newspapers and journals.

¹⁸ At the time, the Foreign Office warned that this decision “could well be misread in Buenos Aires. This [action] left a garrison of some 70 Royal Marines to deter Argentina from attempting to retake the Falkland Islands by force” (Freedman, fn. 15, 198). See also Calvert (fn. 15), 66. Several Argentine newspapers featured versions of an article in the Daily Telegraph regarding this decision, with an emphasis on the theme that Britain was “abandoning the protection of the Falkland Islands” (Franks, fn. 3, 34).

¹⁹ “Falkland Islands: The Origins of a War,” The Economist, June 19–25, 1982, 36.

²⁰ Ibid., 38.

²¹ Ibid. The Franks report (fn. 3) discusses the intelligence assessments, but not the raw data.

²² Admiral Jorge Anaya, the chief of the Argentine navy and the architect of the invasion, was actively lobbying for such an option. The invasion may have been triggered by the incident on March 19, when some Argentine scrap metal merchants raised the Argentine flag on the dependency of South Georgia. The Endurance, which was already scheduled to be withdrawn from the area, was sent with a detachment of 21 Marines from Port Stanley to South Georgia. There has been speculation that this incident occurred with the knowledge and possible involvement of Anaya (“Falkland Islands,” fn. 19, 43; Freedman, fn. 15, 199). Galtieri had pledged privately to take control of the Falklands by the time of the highly symbolic 150th anniversary of Britain's occupation (that is, by January 3, 1983) and the junta had made plans prior to the February talks to prepare for an effective occupation (Calvert, fn. 15, 56). See also Franks (fn. 3).

²³ Freedman (fn. 15), 200. Well into 1981, Britain had been preoccupied with another potential flashpoint in Latin America: the Guatemala-Belize crisis (Calvert, fn. 15, 68–69).

²⁴ “Falkland Islands” (fn. 19), 35; Record, Jeffrey, “The Falklands War,” Washington Quarterly 5 (Autumn 1982), 45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ Freedman (fn. 15), 198. See also Franks (fn. 3), 79.

²⁶ Freedman (fn. 15), 199. See also Franks (fn. 3), 77.

²⁷ Stein (fn. 5), 152.

²⁸ According to Franks (fn. 3, 80), there were no detailed military contingency plans. Earlier plans had featured a “concept of operations,” but were not detailed contingency plans (ibid., 31–32).

²⁹ Stein (fn. 5), 152.

³⁰ Moodie, Michael, “Six Months of Conflict,” Washington Quarterly 5 (Autumn 1982), 32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also: Freedman (fn. 15), 198; Sir Cable, James “The Falklands Conflict,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 108 (September 1982), 72Google Scholar; Moorer, Admiral Thomas H. and Cottrell, Alvin J., “In the Wake of the Falklands Battle,” Strategic Review 10 (Summer 1982), 27Google Scholar; Hessman, James D., “The Lessons of the Falklands,” Sea Power 25 (July 1982), 16.Google Scholar

³¹ In fact, at that point, a deterrent force would have ignited a preemptive Argentine attack (forcing them to advance their timetable slightly). If it had been too small to be noticed or had been sent secretly (as occurred in response to the 1977 invasion scare), it would not have prevented the desperate junta from invading. See “Falkland Islands” (n. 19), 43. See also Franks (fn. 3), 87.

³² Betts (fn. 1), 309–10.

³³ Ibid., 273.

³⁴ Freedman (fn. 15), 199.

³⁵ Record (fn. 24), 44.

³⁶ “Falkland Islands: Will Two Weeks' Steaming Let Off the Pressure?” The Economist, April 10, 1983, 22; see also Franks (fn. 3), 75–76. Former President Leopoldo Galtieri, the leader of the military junta during the war, maintained that Argentina would not have invaded if the junta had known that the U.S. would support Britain (“Argentine Military Arrests Chief During Falklands War,” Washington Post, April 13, 1983, A27). Prior to the invasion, the clear perception in Argentina was that the U.S. would not react. In fact, when the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs unilaterally issued a communiqué on the New York talks, Iglesias Rouco in La Prensa discussed the advantages of a direct seizure of the Falklands, an act which he believed would be “understood” by the United States, which could be placated with an offer of joint naval facilities.

³⁷ Record (fn. 24), 44–45.

³⁸ Cable (fn. 30), 73.

³⁹ Grabendorff (fn. 14).

⁴⁰ Ideological conflicts include disputes between dictatorships and democracies, civilian and military regimes, and capitalist and socialist alternatives. Big power claims to supremacy or hegemonic conflicts include as special cases the hegemony of a colonial power (Britain) and the hegemony of a regional power (Brazil).

⁴¹ Beck (fn. 15).

⁴² Ibid., 40.

⁴³ Ibid., 54.

⁴⁴ Franks (fn. 3), 47.

⁴⁵ Stein (fn. 5), 168.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Betts (fn. 8, 63–65) makes this tripartite breakdown.

⁴⁸ Moodie (fn. 30), 31–32.

⁴⁹ Hopple, Gerald W., “Internal and External Crisis Early Warning and Monitoring,” Technical Report (McLean, Va.: International Public Policy Research Corporation, 1980).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ DARPA sponsored research on international crises as perceived by both the Chinese and the Soviets (in addition to crises as defined from the U.S. perspective); see Mahoney, Robert Jr, “Crisis Management: A Survey of Findings and Unresolved Problems,” in Hopple and others (fn. 12).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981), 160.Google Scholar

⁵² Moran, Theodore H., “North-South Relations in the 1980s,” Naval War College Review 35 (September–October 1982), 29–30.Google Scholar

⁵³ Kolodziej, Edward A. and Harkavy, Robert, “Developing States and the International Security System,” in Stremlau, John J., ed., The Foreign Policy Priorities of Third World States (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), 19–47.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Moodie (fn. 30) amends this proposition slightly by arguing that arms inventories of LDCs are likely to feature a combination of simple and sophisticated weaponry.

⁵⁵ For a particularly lucid and sophisticated analysis of recent Soviet activity in the third world, see Zagoria, Donald S., “Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World,” in Hoffman, Erik P. and Fleron, Frederic J., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine, 1980), 495–514.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Stein (fn. 5), 151.