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Concerning Strategies for a Science of International Politics*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Herbert McClosky
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Extract

The outsider who presumes to instruct specialists in the needs of a field which is theirs and not his is very like the bachelor who dares to lecture parents on the requirements of child-rearing: having learned everything secondhand, he is in frightful danger of talking nonsense and, what is worse, of thinking it sagacity.

Two things encourage me to undertake the risk: (1) The difficulties which beset the study of international politics do not seem to me peculiar to that field alone, but are encountered firsthand and in substantially the same form in other fields of which I have direct knowledge. (2) It is apparent from even a casual exposure to the field that its own practitioners are currently in a stock-taking mood in which they seem eager to scrutinize their own product and to have its value assessed. This mood of disquiet has also begun to express itself in proposals for new general approaches to the field, new areas of inquiry, new schemes for collating and analyzing data, explorations into questions once thought remote from the concerns of international politics, and other such developments signifying vitality and a lively spirit of inquiry. The two works which provide the occasion for this essay are items in point, but many others could be cited.

Type
Review Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1956

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References

1 It might be noted that there already exists a body of theory in the form of “game theory” which purports to handle decision-making in contexts of conflicting interests. Game theory might prove useful in helping to conceptualize certain strategic aspects of conflict situations, but it is cast in a form and proceeds at a level of abstraction that severely limit its utility for empirical research, especially for contexts like international decision-making, which are extremely complex.