¹ See, for example, Faurby, Ib, “Premises, Promises, and Problems of Comparative Foreign Policy,” Cooperation and Conflict, XI (No. 3, 1976), 141–44Google Scholar; Hermann, Charles F., “Foreign Policy Behavior: That Which Is To Be Explained,” in East, Maurice A., Salmore, Stephen A., and Hermann, Charles F., eds., Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills/London: SAGE, 1978), 25–32.Google Scholar

² Rose, Richard, “Comparing Public Policy,” European Journal of Political Research, 1 (April 1973), 73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For similar observations, see Anckar, Dag, “Politikprocesser och politikinnehåll: till frågan om politik som orsak och policy som verkan,” Politiikka (No. 2, 1978), 113–14Google Scholar; Heiskanen, Ilkka and Martikainen, Tuomo, “On Comparative Policy Analysis: Methodological Problems, Theoretical Considerations, and Empirical Applications,” Scandinavian Political Studies, IX (1974), 11.Google Scholar

³ ibid., 11–12. For similar distinctions, see Ranney, Austin, “The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice,” in Ranney, , ed., Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968), 7Google Scholar; Rose (fn. 2), 73.

⁴ Kerr, Donna H., “The Logic of ‘Policy’ and Successful Policies,” Policy Sciences, VII (September 1976), 351–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Hermann (fn. I), 32.

⁶ Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).Google Scholar

⁷ Rose, Richard, “Models of Change,” in Rose, , ed., The Dynamics of Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis (London/Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1976), 14–23.Google Scholar

⁸ This is discussed in more detail in Goldmann, , International Norms and War Between States (Stockholm: Läromedelsförlagen, 1971), 51–53.Google Scholar

⁹ Axelrod, Robert, ed., Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).Google Scholar A positive arrow from X to Y means that, in the actor's view, X (or an increase in X) leads to an increase in Y, and non-X (or a decrease in X) leads to a decrease in Y. A negative arrow means that X (or an increase in X) leads to a decrease in Y, etc.

¹⁰ ibid., 70, 262–65.

¹¹ “Any change in Soviet policy, when acknowledged at all, is described as the natural response of a perfectly consistent program to differences in conditions.” Hough, Jerry F., “The Evolution in the Soviet World View,” World Politics, XXXII (July 1980), 509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² See Wiberg, Hakan, “Rational and Non-Rational Models of Man,” in Israel, Joachim and Tajfel, Henri, eds., The Context of Social Psychology (London: Academic Press, 1972), 297–364.Google Scholar

¹³ Rosenau, James N., The Study of Political Adaptation (London: Frances Pinter, and New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1981), 38.Google Scholar

¹⁴ McGowan, Patrick J., “Problems in the Construction of Positive Foreign Policy Theory,” in Rosenau, James N., ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods (New York/London/Sydney/Toronto: SAGE, 1974), 36, 38.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The first version was published in Barry Farrell, R., ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, lll.: Northwestern University Press, 1964).Google Scholar A revised version can be found in Rosenau, , The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pinter, and New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 115–69.Google Scholar For a clarifying interpretation of Rosenau's hypotheses, see McGowan (fn. 14).

¹⁶ East, Salmore, and Hermann (fn. I).

¹⁷ Two of the chapters are about sources rather than stabilizers of foreign policy: those on national attributes and on the international system. The chapter on situations regards the likelihood of change as a function of perceptions (e.g., ibid., 188–89); such propositions tend to be truisms and to beg the question of what factors bring about different kinds of perceptions.

¹⁸ ibid., 66.

¹⁹ ibid., 58.

²⁰ ibid., 98.

²¹ ibid., 115.

²² ibid., 161–72.

²³ ibid., 80.

²⁴ ibid., 81–83, 98.

²⁵ ibid., 115–16.

²⁶ Allison (fn. 6).

²⁷ Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).Google Scholar

²⁸ ibid., 25–46.

²⁹ ibid., 136–37.

³⁰ ibid., 103–9.

³¹ ibid., 61.

³² The same observation is made in Hughes, Barry B., The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978), xi.Google Scholar Hughes's own work, while concerned with the domestic politics of foreign policy, does not directly address the question of stability and change.

³³ The further development of the notion of the decision process as stabilizer can benefit from George, Alexander L., Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1980).Google Scholar

³⁴ For a more detailed discussion, see Goldmann (fn. 8), 34–36.

³⁵ For a detailed discussion, see ibid.; Cohen, Raymond, “Rules of the Game in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, XXIV (March 1980), 129–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also the discussion about “focal points” in Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chaps. 3–4.Google Scholar

³⁶ Reynolds, Philip A. and McKinlay, Robert D., “The Concept of Interdependence: Its Uses and Misuses,” in Goldmann, Kjell and Sjöstedt, Gunnar, eds., Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems in the Study of International Influence (London/Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1979), 161.Google Scholar

³⁷ For an operational procedure, see Axelrod (fn. 9).

³⁸ For an operational procedure, see Goldmann (fn. 8).

³⁹ The distinction between links to other policies and the remaining stabilizers affecting the costs of policy change may seem to be illogical. As made clear in the introduction to Section III-B, the distinction is meant to be operational: the links are identified by, and only by, the study of the agent's ideas, whereas other stabilizers are identified by the study of “objective” phenomena such as relations of interdependence and the behavior of enemies and allies. The relationship between “objective” and “subjective” stabilizers needs further study; some hypotheses are mentioned in section III-C. Note that the existence of an “objective” stabilizer necessarily implies a link to other policies only in the sense that it can be taken for granted that all actors pursue a policy of minimizing costs.

⁴⁰ For a detailed discussion of this way of defining international tension, see Goldmann, Kjell, Tension and Détente in Bipolar Europe (Stockholm: Esselte Studium, 1974). 13–27Google Scholar

⁴¹ This is of course a matter of degree. Agent A may pursue a policy of détente in relation to B to a greater or lesser extent, depending upon the ratio of friendly to hostile elements in A's behavior. It may be misleading to talk of a qualitative change from a policy of non-détente to one of détente when this ratio increases. Similarly, it may be an oversimplification to describe a decrease in this ratio as a shift from a policy of amity to one of enmity, or as the abandonment of a policy of détente.

⁴² For quantitative data, see Goldmann (fn. 40), 41–47; Goldmann, Kjell and Lagerkranz, Johan, “Neither Tension Nor Detente: East-West Relations in Europe, 1971–1975,” Cooperation and Conflict, XII (No. 4, 1977), 254–56Google Scholar; Lagerkranz, Johann, Stor-maktsattityder 1950–75 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1980).Google Scholar

⁴³ Keesing's Contemporary Archives [hereafter cited as KCA], 1979, pp. 30123–24.

⁴⁴ Since we are limiting ourselves to suggesting questions for further study, we will talk in a rather loose fashion about “détente,” “cold war,” and the like. In a more definite analysis it would be imperative to specify the policies with which we are concerned along the lines suggested in section II-A.

⁴⁵ Statement on December 31, 1979, KCA, p. 30232.

⁴⁶ Statement on January 12, 1980, KCA, p. 30236.

⁴⁷ ibid., p. 30238.

⁴⁸ Summit declaration, February 5, 1980. KCA, p. 30382.

⁴⁹ Goldmann (fn. 8), 28–31, 141–75.

⁵⁰ KCA, p. 30236.

⁵¹ Kreile, Michael, “Ostpolitik Reconsidered,” in Krippendorff, Ekkehard and Rittberger, Volker, eds., The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents (London/Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 138–39.Google Scholar One aspect of East-West interaction is summarized by an index of bipolarization developed by Roger Wall, G. and reported in his The Dynamics of Polarization (Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm, 1975).Google Scholar The index aggregates data about the way in which each country divides its interaction with the two superpowers between the United States and the Soviet Union. In one version, the index can vary between 100 (all superpower interaction of all countries is either with the U.S. or with the U.S.S.R.) and o (equal interaction with both). Data are available on European trade bipolarization for the period 1946–1978. The time series peaked as early as 1951 and 1952 with a value of 89. The period from 1954 to 1961 was one of gradual depolarization to a level of about 70. Europe then remained at this level for twelve years. In 1974 the figure dropped to 63, and remained at 63–64 through 1978. For data on 1946–1970, see Goldmann (fn. 40), 228; on 1971–1974, see Goldmann and Lagerkranz (fn. 42), 264. Data on 1975–1978 have been computed on the basis of the 1978 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: United Nations, 1978).

⁵² These and subsequent figures are from the 1978 Yearbook, ibid.

⁵³ On the relationship between the Ostpolitik and business interests, see Kreile (fn. 51).

⁵⁴ Schelling (fn. 34), 123.

⁵⁵ Joachim Krause and Lothar Wilker, “Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Krippendorff, and Rittberger, (fn. 51), 155–57, 165.Google Scholar