¹ Goodwin, Leonard, ”The Historical-Philosophical Basis for Uniting Social Science with Social Problem-Solving,” Philosophy of Science, xxix (October 1964), 377–92Google Scholar.

² Montesquieu, The Persian Letters, as quoted by Rapaport, David C., “Coup d'etat: The View of the Men Firing Pistols,” in Friedrich, Carl J., ed., Revolution (New York 1966), 58Google Scholar.

³ Alexis de Tocqueville, L'Ancien Régime et la Revolution, as quoted by Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville's Contributions to the Theory of Revolution,” ibid., 2, 81.

⁴ “Violence on the Fanatical Left and Right,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXIV (March 1966), 142Google Scholar. Quotation courtesy of Ted Gurr.

⁵ “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” World Politics, xx (January 1968), 245–78.Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., 278; see also “A Causal Model of Civil Strife; A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices,” American Political Science Review, LII (December 1968)Google Scholar, and , Gurr and Ruttenberg, C., “The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model,” Research Monograph 28. Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1967Google Scholar.

⁷ This argument is in accord with Haas, Michael, “Bridge-Building in International Relations: A Neotraditional Plea,” International Studies Quarterly, xi (December 1917),; 320–38Google Scholar.

⁸ The Psychology of Social Movements (New York 1941), 118Google Scholar.

⁹ See, for example, Draper, Theodore, “The Dominican Intervention,” Commentary (December 1965)Google Scholar and Szulc, Tad, Dominican Diary (New York 1965)Google Scholar. Firsthand observations and reports of participants concerning Communist roles in organizing the revolt at the levels of direct violent engagement indicate a very active participation, although participation at higher levels of the political structure was reported by these observers to be minimal. My direct observations agree with reports of Martin, John Bartlow in Overtaken by Events (New York 1966)Google Scholar and statements of U.S. government spokesmen at the time of the uprising. I think this discrepancy arises from differences in die levels of political observation and, almost certainly, from the biases of the observers. At the outset of my studies I shared the views of Draper and Szulc, on the basis of my readings of reports and judgments as to the credibility of sources, but the method of participant dialogue led me to the different conclusions reported here.

¹⁰ P. 252.

¹¹ Whitehead, Alfred North, The Function of Reason (Princeton 1929), 11Google Scholar.

¹² Gurr, 249 ff.

¹³ Horowitz, Irving L., Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation (New York 1964)Google Scholar, gives substantial evidence of social frustration before the crisis.

¹⁴ “Some International Implications of the Political Psychology of Brazilians” (July 1961) and “Attitudes, Hopes, and Fears of the Dominican People” (June 1962), Institute for International Social Research Publications (Princeton 1962)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Ibid., Brazil, 66.

¹⁶ Ibid., Dominican Republic, 16.

¹⁷ While Leonard Berkowitz considers that threat-aggression is a special case of frustration-aggression, in Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York 1962), 38–49Google Scholar, Frank, Jerome clearly distinguishes the two, in Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (New York 1968), 75Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Ibid., chap. 2.

¹⁹ ,, Glenn“A Cognitive Approach to the Analysis of Cultures and Cultural Evolution,” General Systems, xi (1966), 115–31Google Scholar. , Wedge, “Communication Analysis and Comprehensive Diplomacy,” in Hoffman, A., ed., International Communication and the New Diplomacy (Bloomington, Ind. 1968), 24–47Google Scholar.

²⁰ Tavora, Araken, How Brazil Stopped Communism (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), 85Google Scholar.