Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Value, Reason and Hedonism

  • ALISON HILLS (a1)

Abstract

It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this ‘teleological’ conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that. But there are reasons to think that even the value of pleasure is not teleological.

    • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      Value, Reason and Hedonism
      Available formats
      ×

      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      Value, Reason and Hedonism
      Available formats
      ×

      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      Value, Reason and Hedonism
      Available formats
      ×

Copyright

References

Hide All

1 Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), p. 80.

2 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, p. 87.

3 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, p. 82.

4 Scanlon, What We Owe To each Other, p. 100.

5 Timmermann, Jens, ‘Too Much of a Good Thing? Another Paradox of Hedonism’, Analysis 65.2 (2005), pp. 144–6.

6 Timmermann, ‘Hedonism’, p. 146.

7 Timmermann, ‘Hedonism’, p. 144.

8 Timmermann, ‘Hedonism’, p. 144.

9 Timmermann considers a response to the new paradox which denies that we have reason to maximize pleasure, on the basis that we are not capable of appreciating goodness under all circumstances. He rejects this response, questioning whether it is right to separate the theory of value from the theory of what we ought to do; and whether it makes sense to say that pleasure is good, independently of its being the kind of experience that we appreciate. By contrast, if we deny that we have reason to maximize pleasure because pleasure is not a teleological value, we do not separate the theory of value from the theory of what we ought to do; and we do not claim that the value of pleasure is independent of our appreciation of it.

10 Timmermann, ‘Hedonism’, p. 144.

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed