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Experience Machines, Conflicting Intuitions and the Bipartite Characterization of Well-being

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 February 2018

CHAD M. STEVENSON Open the ORCID record for CHAD M. STEVENSON [Opens in a new window]
CHAD M. STEVENSON*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne, Australiachad.stevenson@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract

While Nozick and his sympathizers assume there is a widespread anti-hedonist intuition to prefer reality to an experience machine, hedonists have marshalled empirical evidence that shows such an assumption to be unfounded. Results of several experience machine variants indicate there is no widespread anti-hedonist intuition. From these findings, hedonists claim Nozick's argument fails as an objection to hedonism. This article suggests the argument surrounding experience machines has been misconceived. Rather than eliciting intuitions about what is prudentially valuable, these intuitive judgements are instead calculations about prudential pay-offs and trade-offs. This position can help explain the divergence of intuitions people have about experience machines.

Type
Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 383 - 398
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

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13 Barber, ‘Hedonism and the Experience Machine’; Feldman, ‘What We Learn from the Experience Machine’. Both Barber and Feldman mean that even if hedonism were true, we would still refuse to plug into an experience machine if we believe that hedonism is false. And as they point out, just because we believe some view or proposition to be false does not mean that the view or proposition is actually false, as our beliefs do not determine their truth-value.

14 Weijers and Schouten, ‘Responses to the Experience Machine’, p. 471.

15 Weijers and Schouten, ‘Responses to the Experience Machine, pp. 466–7.

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20 Kolber, ‘Mental Statism’, p. 15.

21 De Brigard, ‘Does It Matter If It's Real?’, p. 47.

22 Weijers, ‘Long Live the Experience Machine!’.

23 Weijers, ‘Long Live the Experience Machine!’, p. 523.

24 Weijers, ‘Long Live the Experience Machine!’, p. 526.

25 Weijers, ‘Long Live the Experience Machine’, p. 529.

26 Lin, ‘How to Use the Experience Machine’.

27 Lin, ‘How to Use the Experience Machine’, pp. 320–1.

28 Lin, ‘How to Use the Experience Machine’, p. 321.

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30 R. Kim, ‘What is this Thing called Well-being?’ (unpublished manuscript).

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37 I thank an anonymous reviewer for motivating me to give further justification for using the bipartite distinction.

38 I say particular types because other types of objective-list theories (those which did not include any subjective experience) would be incompatible with the bipartite distinction. I should also note that not all list or pluralist theories are compatible with the bipartite distinction. As I have said above, strict objective-list theories are not, but nor would subjective-list theories be either, as both pluralist theories can only account for a single dimension (doing-well for subjective-list, going-well for objective-list). For subjective-list theories, see Lin, E., ‘The Subjective List Theory of Well-being’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2016), pp. 99–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify my point here.

40 It should be noted that Nozick does not think that the question he is posing is ‘whether plugging in is preferable to extremely dire alternatives’, but rather, ‘whether plugging in would constitute the very best life, or tie for being best, because all that matters about a life is how it feels from the inside’ (Nozick, The Examined Life, p. 105).

41 Belshaw, C., ‘What's Wrong with the Experience Machine?’, European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014), pp. 573–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Weijers and DiSilvestro have also argued for this point at length. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention. See Weijers, D. and DiSilvestro, R., ‘The Morality of Experience Machines for Palliative and End of Life Care’, Experience Machines: The Philosophy of Virtual Worlds, ed. Silcox, M. (London, 2017), pp. 183–201Google Scholar.

42 As one reviewer noted, participants could have manipulated the response forms by adding this third option. Or, as in Weijers, ‘Long Live the Experience Machine’, could have stated their preference for a third option (their indecision) in the qualitative section of the response form. I hope to test my hypothesis empirically in future research.

43 I am indebted to my MA supervisor, Daniel Halliday, for his guidance and support over the years. For helpful conversations on this topic I thank Keny Nichols and James Matthews. And I extend particular thanks to the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and feedback. This article was written with the support of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.