No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Concurrent Awareness Desire Satisfactionism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 May 2023
Abstract
Desire satisfactionists are united by their belief that what makes someone well-off is the satisfaction of their desires. But this commitment obscures a number of underlying differences, since there are several theoretical choice points on the way to making this commitment precise. This article is about two of the most important choice points. The first concerns an epistemic requirement on well-being. Suppose that one's desire that P is satisfied. Must one also know (or believe, or justifiably believe) that one's desire that P is satisfied in order to benefit from P? If so, there is an epistemic requirement on well-being. The second concerns the time at which one benefits. Well-being is a temporal phenomenon: given that one benefits from the satisfaction of one's desire that P, when does one benefit? Perhaps one benefits at the times at which one desires P, or the times at which P obtains, or both. I defend a view I call “concurrent awareness desire satisfactionism”: one benefits only at times at which both one desires P and P obtains (concurrence) and one benefits only if one is aware that one's desire is satisfied (awareness). I motivate this view by showing how it gives us solutions to many of the canonical problems facing desire satisfactionism. Then I put the two parts of the view together and explore some of its further implications. Ultimately, I conclude that well-being is an organic unity composed of a desiderative component, an epistemic component, and a worldly component, none of which are valuable on their own, but which are valuable when they are related in the right way.
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Bramble, Ben. 2018. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315213385.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Darwall, Stephen. 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dorsey, D. 2013. “Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(1): 151–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9315-6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Emery, Nina, Markosian, Ned, and Sullivan, Meghan. 2020. “Time.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Zalta, Edward N., Winter 2020. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entriesime/.Google Scholar
Forcehimes, Andrew T. 2019. “Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15(2): 175–85. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v15i2.644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Frugé, Christopher. Forthcoming. “Structuring Wellbeing.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12830.Google Scholar
Griffin, James. 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Heathwood, Chris. 2005. “The Problem of Defective Desires.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(4): 487–504. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400500338690.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heathwood, Chris. 2006. “Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 128(3): 539–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurka, Thomas. 1998. “Two Kinds of Organic Unity.” The Journal of Ethics 2(4): 299–320. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115589.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurka, Thomas. 2019. “On ‘Hybrid’ Theories of Personal Good.” Utilitas 31(4): 450–62. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820819000256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurka, Thomas. 2020. “The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.” Erkenntnis 85(3): 589–608. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00245-0.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagan, Shelly. 2009. “Well-Being as Enjoying the Good.” Philosophical Perspectives 23(1): 253–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00170.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lin, Eden. 2017. “Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfactionism and Time.” In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198808930.003.0009.Google Scholar
Lin, Eden. 2021. “The Experience Requirement on Well-Being.” Philosophical Studies 178(3): 867–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01463-6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowe, Dan, and Stenberg, Joseph. 2017. “The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3(2): 247–63. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, M. C. 1999. “The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory.” Noûs 33(2): 247–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Overvold, M. C. 1980: “Self-Interest and the Concept of Self-Sacrifice.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10: 105–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, John. 1979. “The Problem of the Essential Indexical.” Noûs 13.(1): 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Raibley, Jason. 2013. “Health and Well-Being.” Philosophical Studies 165(2):469–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Railton, Peter. 1986. “Moral Realism.” The Philosophical Review 95(2): 163–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Velleman, J. David. 1991. “Well-Being and Time.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72(1): 48–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1991.tb00410.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
von Kriegstein, Hasko. 2018. “Scales for Scope: A New Solution to the Scope Problem for Pro-Attitude-Based Well-Being.” Utilitas 30(4): 417–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weelden, Joseph van. 2019. “On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value.” Utilitas 31(2): 137–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820818000237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiland, Eric. Manuscript. “The Power of Positive Thinking.”Google Scholar
Yu, Xiang. 2022. “Hidden Desires: A Unified Strategy for Defending the Desire-Satisfaction Theory.” Utilitas, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000309.Google Scholar