¹ Weston, J.L., From Ritual to Romance (Kindle ebook, Princeton University Press, 1932), Ch. XGoogle Scholar. The writer goes on to explain that the grail was such a secret thing that no woman could speak of it, which I intend to ignore, as did she.

² Mar, M. Del, Artefacts of Legal Inquiry: The Value of Imagination in Adjudication (Hart, 2020)Google Scholar; Hanne, M. & Weisberg, R. (eds), Introduction: Narrative and Metaphor in the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Abate, R.S., ‘Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream or Pipeline to Justice for Future Generations?’, in Abate, R.S. (ed.), Climate Justice (Kindle ebook, Environmental Law Institute, 2016), Ch. 20Google Scholar.

⁴ As suggested in Bouwer, K., ‘The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation’ (2018) 30(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 483–506CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 496–9.

⁵ And specifically by Weston, n. 1 above.

⁶ Markale, J., The Grail: The Celtic Origins of the Sacred Icon (Kindle ebook, tr. Graham, J., Inner Traditions International, 1999), Ch. 2Google Scholar.

⁷ See Weston, n. 1 above, Ch. XI and generally. There is a good overview of the background in Jung, E. & von Franz, M.-L., The Grail Legend (Kindle e-book, Princeton University Press, 1998), Ch. IGoogle Scholar.

⁸ Wood, J., ‘The Search for the Holy Grail: Scholars, Critics and Occultists’ (2002) 22 Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium, pp. 226–48Google Scholar. E.g., it is suggested that much of Malory's account was influenced by contemporary politics: the War of the Roses in England in 1455–85.

⁹ Ibid., p. 226.

¹⁰ Weston, n. 1 above, Ch. II.

¹¹ Wood, n. 8 above, pp. 233–4.

¹² Although many of these distractions may indeed be initiations: see Markale, n. 6 above, Ch. 1.

¹³ Weston, n. 1 above, Ch. I.

¹⁴ Markale, n. 6 above, Ch. 1 (‘Percival hurls himself into this quest for the Grail with his head down in utter unconsciousness. But he still doesn't know which direction he should take’).

¹⁵ Malory, Sir T., Le Morte d'Arthur (University of Adelaide Press, 2014), Book XIIIGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., Book XI, Ch. 14 (the pure knight Percival (a virgin) is ‘made whole by the holy vessel of the Sangreal’, whereas the ‘womanising’ Gawain cannot see it).

¹⁷ Ibid., Books X–XVII (Galahad dies in Book XVIII).

¹⁸ This is the grail in the most widely read and significant of the original continuations, by Robert de Boron: see Murphy, G.R., Gemstone of Paradise: The Holy Grail in Wolfram's ‘Parzival’ (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 6–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Jung & von Franz, n. 7 above, Ch. II; see also Malory, n. 15 above.

¹⁹ Jung & von Franz, n. 7 above, Ch. VII.

²⁰ Murphy, n. 18 above, pp. 20–30; Jung & von Franz, n. 7 above, Ch. VIII.

²¹ Currer-Briggs, N., Holy Grail and the Shroud of Christ (Ara Publications, 1984)Google Scholar.

²² Weston, n. 1 above, Ch. XIV.

²³ Weston, n. 1 above, Ch. XII (explaining that the environmental difficulties could be accounted for by the violation of the fairy guardians of the wells, represented in the tales by the theft of a cup).

²⁴ Markale, n. 6 above, Ch. 2.

²⁵ Ibid., Ch. 1.

²⁶ Ibid., Ch. 1 (explaining that ‘Gawain is skillful, courteous, diplomatic, courageous’. However, in Malory's version he cannot see the Grail because of his ‘impure’ ways).

²⁷ Bradley, M. Zimmer, The Mists of Avalon (Penguin, 1998)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Eliot, T.S., The Waste Land (Kindle e-book, Harcourt Brace & Co, 1934)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Malory, n. 15 above, Book XIII, Ch. VIII.

³⁰ See, e.g., the reimagining in Zimmer Bradley, n. 27 above (Morgan Le Fay (Morgaine) nurses a dying King Arthur, reassuring him that he has not failed, despite not really knowing whether this is true, then retreats to do the work of maintaining what remains).

³¹ I am grateful to Doug Kysar for this incisive description.

³² Little, G., ‘Developing Environmental Law Scholarship: Going beyond the Legal Space’ (2016) 36(3) Legal Studies, pp. 48–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 68.

³³ IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Stocker, T.F. et al. (eds), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 3–29Google Scholar.

³⁴ This is implicit in Art. 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (which seeks to stabilize GHGs at a level that will ‘avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’).

³⁵ Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016 available at: http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/ 9485.php.

³⁶ Art 2(1)(a) Paris Agreement.

³⁷ Art. 4.1 Paris Agreement.

³⁸ See fuller discussion below in Section 3.1.

³⁹ Decision 1/CP.21, ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ (13 Dec. 2015), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 21.

⁴⁰ IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C above Pre-Industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty (IPCC, 2018).

⁴¹ Rogelj, J. et al. , ‘Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well Below 2°C’ (2016) 534(3) Nature, pp. 631–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See fuller discussion and sources below in Section 3.1.

⁴² Urpelainen, J. & de Graaf, T.V., ‘United States Non-Cooperation and the Paris Agreement’ (2018) 18(3) Climate Policy, pp. 839–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ S. Evans & J. Timperley, ‘COP24: Key Outcomes Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Katowice’, Carbonbrief, 16 Dec. 2018, available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop24-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-katowice.

⁴⁴ The Talanoa Dialogue was a cooperative process intended to take stock of collective efforts towards the joint goals of the agreement and to support the preparation of pledges, both under Art. 4 Paris Agreement: Lesniewska, F. & Siegele, L., ‘The Talanoa Dialogue: A Crucible to Spur Ambitious Global Climate Action to Stay Within the 1.5°C Limit’ (2018) 12(3) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 41–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/the-paris-agreement/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform.

⁴⁵ UN, ‘Decisions Adopted at the Climate Change Conference in Katowice, Poland’ (15 Dec. 2018), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2018/10/Add.1, para 14, and generally Section III. The adoption of the Talanoa Dialogue was somewhat lukewarm: the COP decision only ‘[t]akes note of’ (para 35) and ‘[i]nvites Parties to consider’ (para 37) the ‘outcome, inputs and outputs’ of the Talanoa Dialogue.

⁴⁶ Fisher, E., ‘Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v. EPA’ (2013) 35(3) Law & Policy, pp. 236–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 240–1.

⁴⁷ Wilensky, M., ‘Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate Litigation’ (2015) 26(3) Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, pp. 131–79Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Osofsky, H.M., ‘The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Establishing the Scale of Energy Regulation’ (2011) 101(3) Annals of the Association of American Geographers, pp. 775–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ Markell, D. & Ruhl, J.B., ‘An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual’ (2012) 64(3) Florida Law Review, pp. 15–86Google Scholar, at 15 and generally.

⁵⁰ Fisher, n. 46 above, p. 242.

⁵¹ Bouwer, n. 4 above.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Grossman, D.A., ‘Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation’ (2003) 28(3) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 1–61Google Scholar; Hunter, D. & Salzman, J., ‘Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation’ (2007) 155(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 1741–94Google Scholar; Penalver, E.M., ‘Acts of God or Toxic Torts: Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change’ (1998) 38(3) Natural Resources Journal, pp. 563–602Google Scholar; Kysar, D., ‘What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law’ (2011) 41(3) Environmental Law Reporter, pp. 1–71Google Scholar (a lengthy list of articles discussing this issue is found in Kysar at note 3); Kaminskaite-Salters, G., ‘Climate Change Litigation in the UK: Its Feasibility and Prospects’, in Faure, M. & Peeters, M. (eds), Climate Change Liability (Edward Elgar, 2011), pp. 65–89Google Scholar; Brunnée, J. et al. , ‘Overview of Legal Issues Relevant to Climate Change’, in Lord, R. et al. (eds), Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 23–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ Bouwer, n. 4 above, pp. 499–501.

⁵⁵ Penalver, n. 53 above; Grossman, n. 53 above.

⁵⁶ Brunnée et al., n. 53 above, p. 33.

⁵⁷ Kysar, n. 53 above, p. 43 (‘[P]laintiffs seem best advised to identify presently realized injuries and to connect them to the ongoing nuisance of climate change, hoping to obtain in the process the holy grail of injunctive relief to address future harms [citation omitted]. Of course, as noted throughout this Part, that path faces numerous obstacles of its own’).

⁵⁸ Blomquist, R.F., ‘Comparative Climate Change Torts’ (2012) 46(3) Valparaiso University Law Review, pp. 1053–75Google Scholar, at 1060; Bouwer, n. 4 above, pp. 484–5; Setzer, J. & Vanhala, L.C., ‘Climate Change Litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and Litigants in Climate Governance’ (2019) 10(3) WIREs Climate Change, e580, p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thornton, J. & Covington, H., ‘Climate Change Before the Court’ (2016) 9(3) Nature Geoscience, pp. 3–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Noonan, D., ‘Imagining Different Futures through the Courts: A Social Movement Assessment of Existing and Potential New Approaches to Climate Change Litigation in Australia’ (2018) 37(3) University of Tasmania Law Review, pp 26–69Google Scholar, at 45.

⁵⁹ Perhaps most significantly (although not exclusively) by James Thornton of ClientEarth in London, ref the author's private notes from ‘UCL Environmental Law and Policy Away Day’, 39 Essex Street Chambers, London (UK), 16 Feb. 2018. The potential of ‘holy grail’ cases was also discussed at the ‘Climate Change Law, Litigation and Governance’ event at Warwick University (UK), 18 Feb. 2018: see S. Adelman & S. Hossain, ‘Climate Change Law, Litigation and Governance – GNHRE’, Apr. 2018. The term is also used by Richard Lord QC, ref the author's notes from ‘Climate Change Liability, Some Issues’, a talk at Schroders, 2 Nov. 2012.

⁶⁰ A good summary is provided in Butti, L., ‘The Tortuous Road to Liability: A Critical Survey on Climate Change Litigation in Europe and North America’ (2011) 12(3) Sustainable Development Law & Policy, pp. 32–66Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Hsu, S.-L., ‘A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit’ (2008) 79(3) University of Colorado Law Review, pp. 701–57Google Scholar, at 714.

⁶² Peel, J. & Osofsky, H.M., Climate Change Litigation (Cambridge University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also McCormick, S. et al. , ‘Strategies in and Outcomes of Climate Change Litigation in the United States’ (2018) 8(3) Nature Climate Change, pp. 829–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ Setzer & Vanhala, n. 58 above, pp. 5–6.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 6 (citing, e.g., Nosek, G., ‘Climate Change Litigation and Narrative: How to Use Litigation to Tell Compelling Climate Stories’ (2018) 42(3) William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, pp. 733–803Google Scholar). I would add Fisher, n. 46 above (who explores the narratives emerging from legal scholarship with a focus on climate cases).

⁶⁵ Epstein, R.A., ‘Beware of Prods and Pleas: A Defense of the Conventional Views on Tort and Administrative Law in the Context of Global Warming’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal Online, pp. 317–33Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ Williams, G., ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ (1951) 4(3) Current Legal Problems, pp. 137–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similar arguments appear in tort scholarship and discussions of tort and environmental law. Particularly helpful is Robertson, A. & Wu, T.H., The Goals of Private Law (Hart, 2009)Google Scholar. See also Lee, M., ‘Tort, Regulation and Environmental Liability’ (2002) 22(3) Legal Studies, pp. 33–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lowry, J. & Edmunds, R. (eds), Environmental Protection and the Common Law (Hart, 2000)Google Scholar. For an account of the interplay between private liability and insurance, in particular, refuting that any impact of private law is absorbed by insurance: Merkin, R. & Steele, J., Insurance and the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 3–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁷ For a comprehensive discussion, see S. Hedley, ‘Looking Outward or Looking Inward? Obligations Scholarship in the Early 21st Century’, in Robertson & Wu, ibid, pp. 193–297.

⁶⁸ Jong, E.R. de et al. , ‘Judge-made Risk Regulation and Tort Law: An Introduction’ (2018) 9(Special Issue 1) European Journal of Risk Regulation, pp. 6–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 7.

⁶⁹ Halliday, S., Scott, C.D. & Ilan, J., ‘The Public Management of Liability Risks’ (2011) 31(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 527–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Trebilcock, D. Dewees & M., ‘The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its Alternatives: A Review of Empirical Evidence’ (1992) 30(3) Osgoode Hall Law Journal, pp. 57–138Google Scholar; also Cardi, W.J., Yoon, R.D. Penfield & A.H., ‘Does Tort Law Deter Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study’ (2012) 9(3) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, pp. 567–603CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁰ Tamanaha, B.Z., ‘The Tension between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law’ (2005) 33(3) Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, pp. 131–54Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Dewees & Trebilcock, n. 69 above, pp. 108–12 (finding deterrence is weak in environmental law). Faure, M.G., ‘Effectiveness of Environmental Law: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?’ (2012) 36(3) William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, pp. 293–336Google Scholar; Cardi, Penfield & Yoon, n. 69 above (finding no impact on behaviour).

⁷² Peel & Osofsky, n. 62 above, p. 124; also generally Little, n. 32 above.

⁷³ Peel & Osofsky, ibid., p. 124.

⁷⁴ Nosek, n. 64 above, p. 753.

⁷⁵ Ritchie, D.T., ‘The Centrality of Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication: An Introduction’ (2007) 58(3) Mercer Law Review, pp. 839–46Google Scholar, at 839.

⁷⁶ M. Hanne & R. Weisberg, ‘Introduction: Narrative and Metaphor in the Law’, in Hanne & Weisberg, n. 2 above, pp. 1–12.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Duncan, T. Hutchinson & N., ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17(3) Deakin Law Review, pp. 83–119Google Scholar, at 107.

⁷⁹ Of course, this is not the sole purpose of legal scholarship, or activism, and not to suggest that scholarly considerations are subservient to those of an instrumental nature; our job as scholars is not just polemical discussion, or commentary: see Fisher, E. et al. , ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 213–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 224 and 230–1.

⁸⁰ Nosek, n. 64 above.

⁸¹ Discussed in G. Olsen, ‘On Narrating and Troping the Law: The Conjoined Use of Narrative and Metaphor in Legal Culture’, in Hanne & Weisberg, n. 2 above, pp. 19–36, at 19.

⁸² Berger, L., ‘The Lady, or the Tiger? A Field Guide to Metaphor & Narrative’ (2010) 50(3) Washburn Law Journal, pp. 275–318Google Scholar, at 275.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Olsen, n. 81 above; Thornburg, E.G., ‘Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex Shape the Adversary System’ (1995) 10 Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, pp. 225–81Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ Thornburg, ibid.

⁸⁶ E.g., Del Mar, n. 2 above; Johnson, M.L., ‘Mind, Metaphor, Law’ (2007) 58(3) Mercer Law Review, pp. 839–68Google Scholar; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, A., ‘Flesh of the Law: Material Legal Metaphors’ (2016) 43(3) Journal of Law and Society, pp. 45–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar. All have differing understandings of precisely what the cognitive process is that underlies this, and when and how this process happens. I will discuss Del Mar's work as I find it the most interesting. Resolving these differences is not necessary for the purposes of the article.

⁸⁷ Del Mar, n. 2 above, Ch. 6 ‘Metaphors’, pp. 278–339; also Mar, M. Del, ‘Metaphor in International Law: Language, Imagination and Normative Inquiry’ (2017) 86(3) Nordic Journal of International Law, pp. 170–95Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Hanne & Weisberg, n. 76 above, p. 10.

⁸⁹ L.L. Berger & K.M. Stanchi, ‘Gender Justice: The Role of Stories and Images’, in Hanne & Weisberg, n. 2 above, pp. 157–92, at 158.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Del Mar, n. 2 above, p. 308.

⁹² Del Mar, ibid., p. 281; Berger & Stanchi, n. 89 above, p. 174.

⁹³ Berger & Stanchi, n. 89 above, p. 163.

⁹⁴ Stichting Urgenda v. The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment), Rechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague], C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (Urgenda I).

⁹⁵ The Netherlands had committed to this percentage reduction as part of the EU's climate policy, in terms of which the EU had given itself a 20% reduction target: see discussion in Peeters, M., ‘Urgenda Foundation and 886 Individuals v. The State of the Netherlands: The Dilemma of More Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Reduction Action by EU Member States’ (2016) 25(3) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp. 123–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 124–6.

⁹⁶ Stichting Urgenda v. The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment), Gerechtshof Den Haag [The Hague Court of Appeal], C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, 9 Oct. 2018, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610, para. 4.3 (Urgenda II); Peeters, ibid., p. 124.

⁹⁷ Rome (Italy), 4 Nov. 1950, in force 3 Sept. 1953 (ECHR), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home. aspx?p=basictexts.

⁹⁸ Osofsky, J. Peel & H.M., ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018) 7(3) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 37–67Google Scholar, at 52. The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment) v. Stichting Urgenda, Hoge Raad [Supreme Court], 20 Dec. 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, paras 4.42–4.52 (Urgenda III).

⁹⁹ Urgenda II, n. 96 above.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁰¹ Urgenda III, n. 98 above, para. 4.42.

¹⁰² As this article focuses on the instrumental effect of these cases, it is not necessary to say much about the appeal decision, although this has quite a distinct flavour from Urgenda I, specifically showing more distinct human rights reasoning. It is still a tort claim: see Minnerop, P., the, ‘Integrating “Duty of Care” under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Science and Law of Climate Change: The Decision of The Hague Court of Appeal in the Urgenda Case’ (2019) 37(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, pp. 149–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 152–3.

¹⁰³ Urgenda II, n. 96 above, paras 34–36.

¹⁰⁴ Roy, S., ‘Urgenda II and its Discontents’ (2019) 13(3) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 130–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 134.

¹⁰⁵ Urgenda II, n. 96 above, paras 8.65, 8.78.

¹⁰⁶ Urgenda III, n. 98 above. This article was substantially completed prior to the Supreme Court decision on 20 Dec. 2019. Accordingly, I shall not discuss it in detail here but reference is made to it in various places.

¹⁰⁷ M. Minnesma, ‘Hague Climate Change Verdict: “Not Just a Legal Process but a Process of Hope”’, The Guardian, 25 June 2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/jun/25/hague-climate-change-verdict-marjan-minnesma. See also R. Cox, Revolution Justified (Planet Prosperity Foundation, 2012).

¹⁰⁸ Further details in the decision or Lin, J., ‘The First Successful Climate Negligence Case: A Comment on Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment)’ (2015) 5(3) Climate Law, pp. 65–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Further details on EU climate ambition and effort sharing in Woerdman, E., Roggenkamp, M. & Holwerda, M., Essential EU Climate Law (Edward Elgar, 2015)Google Scholar, Chs 2 and 5.

¹⁰⁹ Cox, R., ‘A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands’ (2016) 34(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, pp. 143–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 144; Cox explains the choice of a government over a polluter defendant: ibid., p. 146.

¹¹⁰ E.g., Friends of the Irish Environment v. The Government of Ireland [2019] IEHC 747 and Thomson v. The Minister for Climate Change Issues [2017] NZHC 733. There are also plans for an ‘Urgenda’ in Belgium (Klimaatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium and Others, available at: http://www.klimaatzaak.eu/en) and France (Commune de Grande-Synthe v. France, available at: http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/commune-de-grande-synthe-v-france).

¹¹¹ E.g., R (Plan B Earth and Others) v. SoS for BEIS [2018] EWHC 1892 (Admin).

¹¹² N. 34 above. Heinrich Böhl Stiftung, ‘Climate Justice: Can the Courts Solve the Climate Crisis?’, Tipping Point Podcast 2/5, 30 Mar. 2017, https://www.boell.de/en/2017/03/30/tipping-point-25-climate-justice-can-courts-solve-climate-crisis.

¹¹³ See, e.g., Baxter, T., ‘Urgenda-Style Climate Litigation Has Promise in Australia’ (2017) 32(3) Australian Environment Review, pp. 70–83Google Scholar.

¹¹⁴ Setzer & Vanhala, n. 58 above, p. 4 (‘the Urgenda effect’).

¹¹⁵ Lin, n. 108 above; Peeters, n. 95 above; Graaf, K. de & Jans, J., ‘The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change’ (2015) 27(3) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 517–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹⁶ Roy, S., ‘Distributive Choices in Urgenda and EU Climate Law’, in Roggenkamp, M. & Banet, C. (eds), European Energy Law Report XI (Intersentia, 2017), pp. 47–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Peeters, n. 95 above.

¹¹⁷ Loth, M.A., ‘The Civil Court as Risk Regulator: The Issue of its Legitimacy’ (2018) 9(Special Issue 1) European Journal of Risk Regulation, pp. 66–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bergkamp, L. & Hanekamp, J.C., ‘Climate Change Litigation against States: The Perils of Court-made Climate Policies’ (2015) 24(3) European Energy and Environmental Law Review, pp. 102–14Google Scholar.

¹¹⁸ Cox, n. 109 above.

¹¹⁹ This decision is not exportable to English tort law: van Zeben, J., ‘Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?’ (2015) 4(3) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 339–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar, although see Kysar, R.H. Weaver & D.A., ‘Courting Disaster: Climate Change and the Adjudication of Catastrophe’ (2017) 93(3) Notre Dame Law Review, pp. 295–359Google Scholar, from 337.

¹²⁰ Urgenda II, n. 96 above, p. 66.

¹²¹ Mayer, B., ‘The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: Ruling of the Court of Appeal of The Hague (9 October 2018)’ (2019) 8(3) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 167–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 174–5.

¹²² Specifically, an ‘obligation to perform’ in respect of a 95% reduction by 2050, and a ‘best-efforts obligation’ in respect of a 49% reduction by 2030. This is helpfully discussed by the Advocate General in The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) and Stichting Urgenda, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:1026, paras 4.32 and 5.68 (Urgenda, Advocate General).

¹²³ Steele, J., ‘Assessing the Past: Tort Law and Environmental Risk’, in Jewell, T. & Steele, J. (eds), Law in Environmental Decision-Making: National, European, and International Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 107–38Google Scholar, at 109. See also Cane, P., ‘Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations’ (2001) 41(3) Washburn Law Journal, pp. 427–68Google Scholar, at 451.

¹²⁴ Steele, ibid., pp. 130–3.

¹²⁵ K. Stanton & C. Willmore, ‘Tort and Environmental Pluralism’, in Lowry & Edmunds, n. 66 above, pp. 93–113, at 93–109.

¹²⁶ Lee, n. 66 above.

¹²⁷ J. Murphy, ‘Noxious Emissions and Common Law Liability’, in Lowry & Edmunds, n. 66 above, pp. 52–74, at 53.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

¹²⁹ Decision 1/CP.16, ‘The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention’ (10–11 Dec. 2010), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/ 2010/7/Add.1.

¹³⁰ Ibid., para. 1.2.4.

¹³¹ Chinkin, C.M., ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38(3) International & Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 850–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³² Ibid. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the Dutch, the EU, and international temperature targets and emissions reductions goals see Lin, n. 108 above, Sections 3 and 6; discussed by the Court of Appeal in Urgenda II, n. 96 above, pp. 57–8, 72.

¹³³ Lee, M., ‘The Sources and Challenges of Norm Generation in Tort Law’ (2018) 9(Special Issue 1) European Journal of Risk Regulation, pp. 34–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 44

¹³⁴ Art. 2.1(a) Paris Agreement.

¹³⁵ This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of the multilateral climate negotiations or of developments in climate science. Suffice to say that this goal was undemocratically adopted in Copenhagen in 2009: see Dimitrov, R.S., ‘Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference’ (2010) 27(3) Review of Policy Research, pp. 795–821CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and since 2011, with the negotiations in Durban, a formulation of ‘well-below 2°C’ had been de rigueur: see, e.g., Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J. & Rajamani, L., International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 114–6Google Scholar. Strong authoritative alternative views have confirmed that more stringent action is required: Hansen, J. et al. , ‘Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature’ (2013) 8 PLOS ONE, e81648CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed, available at: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0081648.

¹³⁶ Urgenda II, n. 96 above, paras 3.5 and 4.4.

¹³⁷ Urgenda III, n. 98 above, para. 4.3.

¹³⁸ IPCC, n. 40 above.

¹³⁹ Art. 4.1 Paris Agreement.

¹⁴⁰ The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has emphasized the increasing urgency of making sharper emissions reductions, and the ‘gap’ between the trajectory of global emissions and what was required to stay within safe levels of warming: see, most recently, A. Olhoff & J.M. Christensen, The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A UN Environment Synthesis Report (UNEP, 2017); see also Cox, n. 109 above, p. 155.

¹⁴¹ Urgenda II, n, 96 above, para. 47, also para. 72.

¹⁴² IPCC (S. Solomon et al., eds), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Throughout the Urgenda decisions the courts favoured the earlier 2007 reports, despite the 2014 report being available, which provided slightly better prospects for the 2°C goal, in short because most of the more ambitious scenarios relied on untested BECCS technologies, and as such allowed some overshoot, among other factors: see Urgenda III, n. 98 above, para. 2.19.

¹⁴³ Urgenda III, ibid., from para. 2.14.

¹⁴⁴ Urgenda II, n. 96 above, paras 3.9 and 7.5.

¹⁴⁵ Discussed in Urgenda III, n. 98 above, from para. 4.31.

¹⁴⁶ Urgenda, Advocate General, n. 122 above, para. 4.73.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., para 4.96.

¹⁴⁸ Urgenda III, n. 98 above, paras 4.97–4.98. See also van Zeben, n. 119 above, pp. 352–6.

¹⁴⁹ Urgenda II, n. 96 above, paras 67–69.

¹⁵⁰ But see Verschuuren, J., ‘The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation: The Hague Court of Appeal Upholds Judgment Requiring the Netherlands to Further Reduce Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (2019) 28(3) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp. 94–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 96; van Zeben, n. 119 above, p. 352; de Graaf & Jans, n. 115 above, p. 523; Bergkamp & Hanekamp, n. 117 above.

¹⁵¹ Urgenda III, n. 98 above, para. 4.100.

¹⁵² As discussed above, but see, e.g., Urgenda III, n. 98 above, para. 4.86; the introductory comments of the Court of Appeal in Urgenda II, n. 96 above; Urgenda, Advocate General, n. 122 above, from para. 5.70.

¹⁵³ Lee, n. 133 above, p. 44.

¹⁵⁴ Hutchinson & Duncan, n. 78 above, p. 107.

¹⁵⁵ Lee, n. 133 above, p. 44.

¹⁵⁶ Eliot, n. 28 above, Part IV.

¹⁵⁷ The evolution of climate litigation through generations is explained in Abate, n. 3 above. Other significant first-generation ‘holy grail’ cases are American Electric Power Co v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527 (2011) (a nuisance case focused on abatement), and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (in which the claimants sought damages for considerable harm), both of which were dismissed on federal displacement grounds. I have chosen Comer because of its interesting procedural history, which provides more detail in its decisions.

¹⁵⁸ See discussion above in Section 2.2.

¹⁵⁹ It is beyond the scope of this article, but this does raise interesting questions about the possibilities for differing motivations between litigants and their representatives in environmental or climate justice cases. The claimants were represented by Luke Cole, a seasoned environmental justice attorney, who acknowledges the complexity in motivations and functions in his own role: Cole, L.W., ‘Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy Community Initiatives’ (1994) 14(3) Virginia Environmental Law Journal, pp. 687–710Google Scholar. I am grateful to Doug Kysar for our discussion about this.

¹⁶⁰ Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 880 (5th Cir. 2009).

¹⁶¹ All loss and damage cases will present quite distinct causation problems: see discussion in the articles cited at n. 53 above. In addition to the question of what caused the hurricane, it would appear that decades-long poor management of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet shipping canal contributed to the scale of the devastation. Litigation brought on this basis has also been subject to mixed fortunes: see, however, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation (Robinson), 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009), which provides a good account of the management problems and how these contributed to the storm surge.

¹⁶² The history is summarized in Comer, n. 160 above, and in Woods, P.A., ‘Reversal by Recusal? Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the Need for Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements’ (2016) 13(3) University of New Hampshire Law Review, pp. 177–213Google Scholar; see also Weaver & Kysar, n. 119 above.

¹⁶³ Woods, ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Only three grounds are of relevance to this article. The defendants also succeeded on the first ground, res judicata, and limitation was in issue.

¹⁶⁵ This was not the only aspect of the standing enquiry in issue. The injury had to be ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendants: Comer, n. 160 above, p. 23. The plaintiffs were also unlikely to meet a more stringent test of ‘proximate cause’ under Mississippi law: ‘The assertion that the defendants’ emissions combined over a period of decades or centuries with other natural and man-made gases to cause or strengthen a hurricane and damage personal property is precisely the type of remote, improbable, and extraordinary occurrence that is excluded from liability’: ibid., p. 35.

¹⁶⁶ Comer, ibid., pp. 24–9, distinguishing Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 549 US 497 (2007). There was also a third, related point: that the plaintiff's action had been pre-empted by statute: ibid., pp. 30–2.

¹⁶⁷ Grossman, n. 53 above, pp. 33–7.

¹⁶⁸ As discussed in the literature cited at n. 53 above.

¹⁶⁹ Markell & Ruhl, n. 49 above, p. 78.

¹⁷⁰ Williams, n. 66 above, pp. 137 and 171–2.

¹⁷¹ Cane, n. 123 above, p. 429.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Williams, n. 66 above.

¹⁷⁴ Williams, ibid., p. 170. Maybe this is obvious, but in complex multi-party actions the apportionment of liability among defendants and their insurers can be as contentious as primary liability. For instance, the broad trends in mesothelioma actions in English tort law range from securing compensation for the claimants (e.g., Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 33) and struggles between defendants to reduce their portion of liability (e.g., Barker v. Corus (UK) Plc [2006] UKHL 20), to struggles between insurers to avoid bearing risk (Durham v. BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2012] UKSC 14).

¹⁷⁵ Burkett, M., ‘Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal Online, pp. 115–20Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁶ Wilensky, n. 47 above.

¹⁷⁷ ‘Indeed, this prescribed order of decision making – the first decider under the Act is the expert administrative agency, the second, federal judges – is yet another reason to resist setting emissions standards by judicial decree under federal tort law’: Comer, n. 160 above, citing Connecticut, n. 157 above, p. 2539. See also Fisher, n. 46 above, pp. 246–8.

¹⁷⁸ M. Burger & J. Gundlach, The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review (UNEP and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 2017), available at: http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CC-Litigation.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.

¹⁸⁰ Fisher, n. 46 above, p. 240.

¹⁸¹ See discussion above and Ganguly, G., Setzer, J. & Heyvaert, V., ‘If at First You Don't Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 841–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸² Heede, R., ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122(1–2) Climatic Change, pp. 229–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸³ Ibid.; Ekwurzel, B. et al. , ‘The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO₂, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers’ (2017) 144(3) Climatic Change, pp. 579–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸⁴ Frumhoff, P.C., Oreskes, R. Heede & N., ‘The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers’ (2015) 132(3) Climatic Change, pp. 157–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shue, H., ‘Responsible for What? Carbon Producer CO₂ Contributions and the Energy Transition’ (2017) 144(3) Climatic Change, pp. 591–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸⁵ Patton, S. Marjanac & L., ‘Extreme Weather Event Attribution Science and Climate Change Litigation: An Essential Step in the Causal Chain?’ (2018) 36(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, pp. 265–98Google Scholar, at 273–5; although see James, R.A. et al. , ‘Attribution: How Is It Relevant for Loss and Damage Policy and Practice?’, in Mechler, R. et al. (eds), Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options (SpringerOpen, 2019), pp. 113–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸⁶ Although see Ganguly, Setzer & Heyvaert, n. 181 above, pp. 850–5 (in relation to carbon majors and corporates).

¹⁸⁷ Most significantly by the Philippines: see Savaresi, A. & Hartmann, J., ‘The Impacts of Climate Change and Human Rights: Some Early Reflections on the Carbon Majors Inquiry’, in Lin, J. & Kysar, D. (eds), Climate Change Litigation in the Asia Pacific (Cambridge University Press, 2020 forthcoming)Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁸ L. Paddison ‘Exxon, Shell and Other Carbon Producers Sued for Sea Level Rises in California’, The Guardian, 26 July 2017, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/jul/26/california-communities-lawsuit-exxon-shell-climate-change-carbon-majors-sea-level-rises. Some complaints are available at: https://www.sheredling.com/press-room.

¹⁸⁹ W. Frank, C. Bals & J. Grimm, ‘The Case of Huarez: First Climate Lawsuit on Loss and Damage against an Energy Company before German Courts’, in Mechler et al., n. 185 above, pp. 475–82.

¹⁹⁰ A fairly recent summary and overview of these cases is available in M. Burger, ‘Update: Upcoming Hearings on Motions to Dismiss Climate Change Nuisance Cases in California and New York’, Climate Law Blog, 23 May 2018, available at: http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2018/05/23/update-upcoming-hearings-on-motions-to-dismiss-climate-change-nuisance-cases-in-california-and-new-york.

¹⁹¹ City of New York v. BP Plc, 325 F. Supp. 3d 466; for updates see: http://climatecasechart.com/case/city-new-york-v-bp-plc.

¹⁹² For a useful overview of the cases, and a discussion of how the claimants sought to avoid federal displacement through the use of state law, see Hester, T., ‘Climate Tort Federalism’ (2018) 13(3) FIU Law Review, pp. 79–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹³ City of Oakland v. BP Plc, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017; for updates see: http://climatecasechart.com/case/people-state-california-v-bp-plc-oakland.

¹⁹⁴ New York, n. 191 above. A further set of proceedings, County of San Mateo v. Chevron, is at the pleadings stage for a jurisdictional hearing; updates are available at: http://climatecasechart.com/case/county-san-mateo-v-chevron-corp.

¹⁹⁵ Applying Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. and Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corp., n. 157 above.

¹⁹⁶ Distinguished from Massachusetts v. EPA, n. 166 above, on the basis that the EPA sought only to regulate six local coal-fired electricity plants, rather than a broader section of the industry, including international activities. In this respect, a third point in both decisions related to the international nature of the defendants’ activities.

¹⁹⁷ See K. Boom, J.-A. Richards & S. Leonard, ‘Climate Justice: The International Momentum towards Climate Litigation’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2016, p. 22.

¹⁹⁸ This seems to be a feature of Global South climate litigation: see Peel, J. & Lin, J., ‘Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South’ (2019) 113(3) American Journal of International Law, pp. 679–726CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 709–15.

¹⁹⁹ Boom, Richards & Leonard, n. 197 above, p. 22.

²⁰⁰ Frank, Bals & Grimm, n. 189 above; for updates see: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/litigation/lliuya-v-rwe.

²⁰¹ Following the discussion in Abate, n. 3 above.

²⁰² Ganguly, Setzer & Heyvaert, n. 181 above.

²⁰³ Also known to lawyers as precedence – for instance, issuing in the state courts to avoid displacement (whether this is ultimately successful), the more narrowly framed causes of action, the careful use of science, etc.

²⁰⁴ Acknowledged by Judge William Alsup in Oakland, n. 193 above.

²⁰⁵ One questions whether constraining the focus of the litigation to the ‘promotion of phony science’ would have found a more receptive audience: see remarks of Judge Alsup in Oakland, n. 193 above, para. 6.

²⁰⁶ Ganguly, Setzer & Heyvaert, n. 181 above, p. 866. In Oakland, n. 193 above, Judge Alsup goes so far as to suggest that a campaign of this nature could make the defendant’s business ‘unfeasible’; his concern is for the ‘public benefits’ of fossil fuels: ibid., para. 14.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Oakland, n. 193 above, per Judge Alsup, para. 8.

²⁰⁹ New York, n. 191 above, per Judge Keenan, para. 16.

²¹⁰ Marshall, A.-M. & Sterett, S., ‘Legal Mobilization and Climate Change: The Role of Law in Wicked Problems’ (2019) 9(3) Oñati Socio-Legal Series, pp. 267–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 272.

²¹¹ Frank, Bals & Grimm, n. 189 above, p. 482.

²¹² Boom, Richards & Leonard, n. 197 above, p. 23.

²¹³ Frank, Bals & Grimm, n. 189 above, pp. 480–1.

²¹⁴ Vanhala, L. & Hestbaek, C., ‘Framing Loss and Damage in the UNFCCC Negotiations: The Struggle over Meaning and the Warsaw International Mechanism’ (2016) 16(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 111–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹⁵ Siegele, L., ‘Loss and Damage (Article 8)’, in Klein, D. et al. (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 224–38Google Scholar.

²¹⁶ Verheyen, M. Mace & R., ‘Loss, Damage and Responsibility after COP21: All Options Open for the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25(3) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, pp. 197–214Google Scholar; Pekkarinen, V., Toussaint, P. & van Asselt, H., ‘Loss and Damage after Paris: Moving Beyond Rhetoric’ (2019) 13(3) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 31–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I am grateful to Patrick Toussaint for some very helpful discussions.

²¹⁷ Roberts, J.T. et al. , ‘How Will We Pay for Loss and Damage?’ (2017) 20(3) Ethics, Policy & Environment, pp. 208–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Page, E.A. & Heyward, C., ‘Compensating for Climate Change Loss and Damage’ (2017) 65(3) Political Studies, pp. 356–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lyster, R., ‘A Fossil Fuel-Funded Climate Disaster Response Fund under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts’ (2015) 4(3) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 125–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar (suggesting a tax on major emitters, which may be better on distribution but unlikely on consensus).

²¹⁸ ‘Whilst paragraph 51 of CP/21 explicitly excludes liability, it is clear from the rhetoric surrounding the conference, not least from the “victim” states, that liability, ultimately, may be necessary if sufficient support is to be provided to such states to allow them to adequately handle the loss and damage that they will suffer’: Lees, E., ‘Responsibility and Liability for Climate Loss and Damage after Paris’ (2017) 17(3) Climate Policy, pp. 59–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 68; Mace & Verheyen, n. 217 above, pp. 205–6, and n. 72.

²¹⁹ Shue, H., Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 180–94Google Scholar.

²²⁰ Burkett, M., ‘Loss and Damage’ (2014) 4(1–2) Climate Law, pp. 119–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; I. Wallimann-Helmer et al., ‘The Ethical Challenges in the Context of Loss and Damage’, in Mechler et al., n. 185 above, pp. 39–62, at 47–52.

²²¹ See Okereke, C. & Coventry, P., ‘Climate Justice and the International Regime: Before, during, and after Paris’ (2016) 7(3) WIREs Climate Change, pp. 834–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar, from 844.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ See Gardiner, S.M., ‘Climate Justice’, in Dryzek, J.S., Norgaard, R.B. & Schlosberg, D. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society (online version, Oxford University Press, 2011)Google Scholar, Section 3.2 (for comments on broader forms of restitution).

²²⁴ Burkett, M., ‘Reading between the Red Lines: Loss and Damage and the Paris Outcome’ (2016) 6(1–2) Climate Law pp. 118–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 128.

²²⁵ Weston, n. 1 above, Ch. XII (arguing that many of the later stories were simply hero romances and had lost the meaning of the legend).

²²⁶ Grasso, M. & Vladimirova, K., ‘A Moral Analysis of Carbon Majors’ Role in Climate Change’ (2020) 29(3) Environmental Values, pp. 175–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar (conceptualizing this as a non-homogenous duty of reparation).

²²⁷ Ibid.