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The Desirability of Depoliticization: Compliance in the International Climate Regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2015

Anna Huggins
Anna Huggins*
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, School of Law, Sydney (Australia). Email: a.huggins@unsw.edu.au.
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Abstract

The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable among global multilateral environmental agreements for its efforts to depoliticize compliance. However, attempts to create autonomous, arm’s length and rule-based compliance processes with extensive reliance on putatively neutral experts were only partially realized in practice in the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. In particular, the procedurally constrained facilitative powers vested in the Facilitative Branch were circumvented, and expert review teams (ERTs) assumed pivotal roles in compliance facilitation. The ad hoc diplomatic and facilitative practices engaged in by these small teams of technical experts raise questions about the reliability and consistency of the compliance process. For the future operation of the Kyoto compliance system, it is suggested that ERTs should be confined to more technical and procedural roles, in line with their expertise. There would then be greater scope for the Facilitative Branch to assume a more comprehensive facilitative role, safeguarded by due process guarantees, in accordance with its mandate. However, if – as appears likely – the future compliance trajectories under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will include a significant role for ERTs without oversight by the Compliance Committee, it is important to develop appropriate procedural safeguards that reflect and shape the various technical and political roles these teams currently play.

Keywords

Kyoto Protocol compliance systemDepoliticizationExpert review teamsCompliance CommitteeUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Type
Articles
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 2015 , pp. 101 - 124
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2015 

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Footnotes

I wish to thank Ellen Hey, Bronwen Morgan and Rosemary Rayfuse for their insightful feedback and guidance on earlier versions of this article, and Alexander Zahar for valuable preliminary discussions. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions of two anonymous reviewers.

References

1 Compliance systems may be defined as encompassing performance review information, multilateral non-compliance procedures, and non-compliance response measures: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Compliance Mechanisms under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements (UNEP, 2007), at p. 9, available at: http://www.unep.org/pdf/delc/Compliance_Mechanism_final.pdf.

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11 Rajamani, L., Brunnée, J. & Doelle, M., ‘Introduction: The Role of Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime’, in J. Brunnée, M. Doelle & L. Rajamani (eds), Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1–14Google Scholar, at 7.

12 G. Ulfstein, ‘Depoliticizing Compliance’, in Brunnée, Doelle & Rajamani, ibid., at pp. 418–34. Ulfstein’s account of the attempts to depoliticize compliance in the Kyoto compliance system primarily focuses on the Enforcement Branch. The discussion that follows adds to Ulfstein’s account by, inter alia, teasing out the roles of the expert review process and the bypassing of the Facilitative Branch in undermining attempts to depoliticize the Kyoto compliance system.

13 This definition of depoliticization draws inspiration from what Dubash and Morgan define as the ‘rules’ end of a spectrum between ‘rules and deals’ in the context of theorizing the regulatory state in the global south: Dubash, N. & Morgan, B., ‘The Embedded Regulatory State: Between Rules and Deals’, in N. Dubash & B. Morgan (eds), The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 279–296CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 279–83.

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18 Members of ERTs shall ‘serve in their individual capacities’ and have ‘recognized competence in the areas to be reviewed’: Decision 22/CMP.1, Guidelines for Review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 30 Mar. 2006, at paras 23 and 24.

19 Members of the Compliance Committee are required to ‘serve in their individual capacities’ and shall have ‘recognized competence relating to climate change and in relevant fields such as the scientific, technical, socio-economic or legal fields’: Decision 27/CMP.1, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3Annex, 30 Mar. 2006, Annex, at section II, para. 6.

20 See nn. 98–9 below. The focus of this article is on global rather than regional MEAs such as the Aarhus Convention, which is relatively highly depoliticized but operates against a different political backdrop to global environmental agreements: see Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Aarhus (Denmark), 25 Jun. 1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html.

21 Ambrus, M., Arts, K., Hey, E. & Raulus, H., ‘The Role of Experts in International and European Decision-making Processes: Setting the Scene’, in M. Ambrus, K. Arts, E. Hey & H. Raulus (eds), The Role of ‘Experts’ in International and European Decision-Making Processes: Advisors, Decision Makers or Irrelevant Actors? (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 1–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 6.

22 W.G. Werner, ‘The Politics of Expertise: Applying Paradoxes of Scientific Expertise to International Law’, in Ambrus, Arts, Hey & Raulus, ibid., pp. 44–62, at 56.

23 L. Schrefler, ‘Reflections on the Different Roles of Expertise in Regulatory Policy Making’, in Ambrus, Arts, Hey & Raulus, n. 21 above, pp. 63–81, at 76.

24 Werner, n. 22 above, at p. 56.

25 See discussion in Section 4.1 below.

26 J. Morgan, ‘The Emerging Post-Cancun Climate Regime’, in Brunnée, Doelle & Rajamani, n. 11 above, pp. 17–37, at pp. 26 and 34; R. Lefeber & S. Oberthür, ‘Key Features of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance System’, in Brunnée, Doelle & Rajamani, ibid., pp. 77–101, at 100–1. See also Section 5 below.

27 Ulfstein has similarly argued that ‘[d]ue process guarantees (“procedural safeguards”) are a quid pro quo [of depoliticization] in the sense that empowered independent organs should be subject to procedural control’: Ulfstein, n. 12 above, at p. 418.

28 Heyvaert, V. & Etty, T.F.M., ‘Introducing Transnational Environmental Law’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 1–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 6.

29 UNFCCC, ‘UNFCCC Roster of Experts’, 2014, available at: http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/roe.

30 This aligns with the definition of ‘transnational’ provided by Abbott: ‘An institution, regime or regime complex is transnational when (i) private actors (such as environmental NGOs, business enterprises and technical experts) and/or sub-national governmental units (cities or provinces, for example) play significant roles in its governance, instead of or in addition to states and/or IGOs; and (ii) it operates across national borders’: Abbott, K.W., ‘Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2014) 3(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 57–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 65.

31 Ibid., at p. 67.

32 Sand, P.H., ‘The Evolution of Transnational Environmental Law: Four Cases in Historical Perspective’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 183–198CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 185.

33 Kingsbury, B., Krisch, N. & Stewart, R.B., ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68(3) Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 15–61Google Scholar, at 16, 18 and 28. See also Krisch, N. & Kingsbury, B., ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17(1) European Journal of International Law, pp. 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the other articles in this Symposium issue of the European Journal of International Law, at pp. 1–278.

34 See, e.g., Stewart, R.B., ‘Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness’ (2014) 108(2) American Journal of International Law, pp. 211–270Google Scholar, at 220.

35 Scott, n. 5 above, at p. 230.

36 Gupta, J., ‘Developing Countries: Trapped in the Web of Sustainable Development Governance’, in O. Dilling, M. Herberg & G. Winter (eds), Transnational Administrative Rule-Making: Performance, Legal Effects, and Legitimacy (Hart, 2011), pp. 305–333Google Scholar, at 309.

37 UNEP, n. 1 above, at p. 9. The author of this report uses the phrase ‘compliance mechanisms’ rather than ‘compliance systems’ in relation to these points. However, the phrase ‘compliance systems’ is considered preferable for the purposes of this article as the focus is on the synergistic operation of the multiple tiers within the Kyoto compliance hierarchy. The author also includes ‘dispute settlement procedures’ as a fourth compliance mechanism; however, because such procedures have not been used in the Kyoto compliance system and are not directly relevant to the arguments in this article, they will not be a focus here.

38 Raustiala, K., Reporting and Review Institutions in 10 Multilateral Environmental Agreements (UNEP, 2001)Google Scholar, available at: http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/C08-0025-Raustiala-Reporting.pdf; Treves et al., n. 5 above.

39 Art. 5(2) Kyoto Protocol; A. Herold, ‘Experiences with Articles 5, 7, and 8: Defining the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System under the Kyoto Protocol’, in Brunnée, Doelle & Rajamani, n. 11 above, pp. 122–46, at 125.

40 Zahar, A., ‘Does Self-Interest Skew State Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions? A Preliminary Analysis Based on the First Verified Emissions Estimates under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2010) 1(2) Climate Law, pp. 313–324Google Scholar, at 315.

41 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at p. 96.

42 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above.

43 Decision 4/CMP.2, Compliance Committee, UN Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1, 4 Mar. 2007.

44 S. Urbinati, ‘Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’, in Treves et al., n. 5 above, pp. 63–84, at 65–6.

45 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XI, para. 1.

46 Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at p. 86.

47 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section II.

48 Decision 27/CMP.1 states that the objectives of the procedures and mechanisms are to ‘facilitate, promote and enforce compliance’: ibid., at section I.

49 That is, developed countries and countries in transition. Other categories of countries under the UNFCCC are Annex II countries, which includes members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Community, and non-Annex I Parties, which are developing countries: Urbinati, n. 44 above, at p. 64.

50 Stated differently, the mandate of the Facilitative Branch is to address questions of implementation that are not within the purview of the Enforcement Branch: Ulfstein, G. & Werksman, J., ‘The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement’, in O.S. Stokke, J. Hovi & G. Ulfstein (eds), Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance (Earthscan, 2005), pp. 39–62Google Scholar, at 45.

51 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section IV, para. 4.

52 Oberthür, S., ‘Options for a Compliance Mechanism in a 2015 Climate Agreement’ (2014) 4(1–2) Climate Law pp. 30–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 40.

53 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XV, para. 1; J. Brunnée, ‘Promoting Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, in Brunnée, Doelle & Rajamani, n. 11 above, pp. 38–54, at 50.

54 Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at pp. 81–2.

55 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XIV.

56 Ibid., at section XV, para. 5(b).

57 The three flexibility mechanisms are joint implementation, the clean development mechanism and emissions trading: see Arts 6, 12 and 17 Kyoto Protocol.

58 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XV, para. 5(c).

59 Specifically, a ‘deduction from the Party’s assigned amount for the second commitment period of a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 times the amount in tonnes of excess emissions’: ibid., at section XV, para. 5(a).

60 Ibid., at section XI, para. 1.

61 UNFCCC, ‘Review of the Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention: UNFCCC Guidelines on Reporting and Review’, FCCC/CP/20002/8, 28 Mar. 2003, at section B, para. 2.

62 Zahar, n. 40 above, at p. 315.

63 Ulfstein & Werksman, n. 50 above, at p. 52; Simnett, R., Nugent, M. & Huggins, A., ‘Developing an International Assurance Standard on Greenhouse Gas Statements’ (2009) 23(4) Accounting Horizons, pp. 347–363CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 353–4.

64 T. Berntsen, J. Fuglestvedt & F. Stordal, ‘Reporting and Verification of Emissions and Removals of Greenhouse Gases’, in Stokke, Hovi & Ulfstein (eds), n. 50 above, pp. 85–106.

65 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at pp. 105–6.

66 Ibid., at p. 119, citing UNFCCC Secretariat, Handbook for Review of National GHG Inventories (undated), at pp. 11–2.

67 See the discussion in Section 4.2 below describing the more far-reaching review powers of the Enforcement Branch.

68 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at para. 23.

69 Ibid., at para. 25.

70 Herold, n. 39 above, at p. 135.

71 UNFCCC, n. 29 above.

72 Zahar, n. 15 above, at pp. 423–4.

73 The largely procedural requirements for non-Annex I countries under the UNFCCC relate to establishing emissions inventories, emissions mitigation programmes and producing national communications reports: Art. 4(1)(a), (b) and (j) UNFCCC.

74 T. Fransen, ‘Enhancing Today’s MRV Framework to Meet Tomorrow’s Needs: The Role of National Communications and Inventories’, World Resources Institute, June 2009, at p. 8, available at: http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/national_communications_mrv.pdf.

75 ERTs are responsible for ‘in-depth review’ of Annex I Parties’ national communications and technical review of their inventories under the UNFCCC. They are also responsible for the ‘periodic’ reviews of national communications and the ‘annual reviews’ of inventories under the Kyoto compliance system: Zahar, A., International Climate Change Law and State Compliance (Routledge, forthcoming 2015), at p. 41Google Scholar.

76 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at para. 21 (emphasis added).

77 UNFCCC, n. 61 above, at p. 83.

78 Klabbers, nn. 6 & 7 above.

79 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at p. 104.

80 Ibid.; Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 7.

81 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 2(c) (emphasis added). See also Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, paras 5, 106 and 117.

82 Fransen, n. 74 above, at p. 8.

83 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 8 (emphasis added).

84 Zahar, n. 15 above, at p. 420. The requirements for facilitative dialogue are provided in Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at para. 7.

85 Zahar, n. 15 above, at p. 422. This situation is compounded by drafting weaknesses resulting in a lack of clarity regarding which requirements are mandatory and which are not: Zahar, n. 75 above, at pp. 67–8.

86 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol’ (2014), available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/2875.php.

87 Doelle, M., ‘Early Experience with the Kyoto Compliance System: Possible Lessons for MEA Compliance System Design’ (2010) 1(2) Climate Law, pp. 237–260Google Scholar, at 260.

88 Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at p. 94.

89 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at para. 8.

90 Compliance Committee, Report of the Review of the Annual Submission of Bulgaria Submitted in 2009, CC-2010-1-1/Bulgaria/EB, 17 Mar. 2010, at para. 200.

91 Doelle, M., ‘Compliance and Enforcement in the Climate Change Regime’, in E.J. Hollo, K. Kulovesi & M. Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 2012), pp. 165–188Google Scholar, at 182.

92 Decision 22/CMP.1, n. 18 above, at paras 2(c), 5 and 7.

93 Compliance Committee, Decision under Paragraph 2 of Section X, CC-2010-1-17/Bulgaria/EB, 4 Feb. 2011, at para. 14.

94 Compliance Committee, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Seventh Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/5, 3 Nov. 2011, para. 28, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/05.pdf.

95 Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 33 above, at p. 39.

96 Compliance Committee, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Eighth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/6, 8 Nov. 2012, para. 28, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/eng/06.pdf.

97 Compliance Committee, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Ninth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2013/3, 1 Oct. 2013, para. 7, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cmp9/eng/03.pdf.

98 Montreal (Canada), 16 Sept. 1987, in force 1 Jan. 1989, available at: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php.

99 Washington, DC (US), 3 Mar. 1973, in force 1 Jul. 1975, available at: http://www.cites.org.

100 See, e.g., A. Fodella, ‘Structural and Institutional Aspects of Non-Compliance Mechanisms’, in Treves et al., n. 5 above, pp. 355–72, at 360.

101 See n. 19 above.

102 UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 29 above.

103 This argument is informed by Dubash & Morgan, n. 13 above, at p. 290.

104 Ibid.

105 See further discussion in Section 5 below.

106 Doelle, n. 91 above, at pp. 171–2.

107 Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at p. 99.

108 See n. 79 above.

109 Oberthür, n. 52 above, at p. 40; Zahar, n. 75 above, at p. 72.

110 Zahar, n. 75 above, at pp. 72–4, 79–82.

111 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section VIII.

112 See n. 33 above.

113 Dubash & Morgan, n. 13 above, at p. 289; Schrefler, n. 23 above, at pp. 77–80.

114 Tanzi & Pitea, n. 5 above, at p. 573; Klabbers, n. 7 above.

115 See nn. 2–4 above.

116 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at sections VIII.3 and VIII.4; Decision 4/CMP.2, n. 43 above, rule 20.

117 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section II, para. 6.

118 Decision 4/CMP.2, n. 43 above, rule 4.1.

119 Ibid., rule 4.2.

120 Ibid., rule 4.4.

121 The UNFCCC Secretariat has said that the Compliance Committee is ‘neither an international organization nor an international court. … The function of the enforcement branch may, however, be described as “quasi-judicial”, in the sense that the branch determines whether states have complied with their legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and it applies predetermined consequences in cases of non-compliance’: UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘Procedural Requirements and the Scope and Content of Applicable Law for the Consideration of Appeals under Decision 27/CMP.1 and Other Relevant Decisions of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Approach Taken by other Relevant International Bodies Relating to Denial of Due Process’, Technical Paper, FCCC/TP/2011/6, at para. 43.

122 The travel and subsistence expenses of representatives from some developing and low-income countries are reimbursed by the Secretariat: Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at pp. 83–4.

123 Ibid., at p. 84, reflecting on their personal experiences as members of the Enforcement Branch.

124 Ibid., at pp. 83–4.

125 Decision 14/CMP.7, Appeal by Croatia against a Final Decision of the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee in Relation to the Implementation of Decision 7/CP.12, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.2, 15 Mar. 2012, at para. 1.

126 Kyoto Protocol Secretariat, Annual Report of the Compliance Committee to the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Sixth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/6, 8 Oct. 2010, at para. 53; see also Ulfstein, n. 12 above, at p. 420.

127 Kyoto Protocol Secretariat, ibid., at para. 50.

128 Fodella, n. 100 above, at pp. 362–3.

129 Tanzi & Pitea, n. 5 above, at p. 573; Klabbers, n. 7 above.

130 Bodansky, n. 3 above, at p. 251; Klabbers, n. 6 above, at pp. 996–7.

131 Brunnée, n. 15 above, at p. 306.

132 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XV, paras 5(a), (b) and (c).

133 The eight substantive matters that have been decided by the Enforcement Branch to date concern Greece, Canada, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Lithuania and Slovakia: UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 86 above.

134 More broadly, however, the inability of the Kyoto compliance system to address or resolve Canada’s non-compliance with its first commitment period target, which ultimately led to Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, resulted in ‘heavy criticism of the compliance system as a whole’: Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at p. 99.

135 This is one of the aims of global administrative law: see Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, n. 33 above, at p. 28.

136 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section XI, para. 1.

137 Ibid., at section XI.

138 Decision 14/CMP.7, n. 125 above, at para. 1.

139 Decision 27/CMP.1, n. 19 above, at section VII, paras 4 and 5; section VIII, para. 7; and section IX, para. 6.

140 UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 121 above, at para. 31.

141 Ibid., at para. 37. However, the CMP does have authority to change the substantive rule upon which the non-compliance is based: ibid.

142 Lefeber & Oberthür, n. 26 above, at p. 85.

143 This figure was calculated by Rajamani: Rajamani, L., ‘The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action and the Future of the Climate Regime’ (2012) 61(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 501–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 516.

144 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘At UN Climate Conference in Doha, Governments Take Next Essential Steps in Global Response to Climate Change’, Press Release, 8 Dec. 2012, at p. 2, available at: http://unfccc.int/files/press/press_releases_advisories/application/pdf/pr20120812_cop18_close.pdf.

145 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter XXVII Environment: 7.c Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol’ (2014), available at: http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&lang=en. In order for this amendment to enter into force, an instrument of acceptance must be received by the Depositary from at least three quarters of the Parties to the Protocol: Art. 20(4) Kyoto Protocol.

146 Rajamani, L., ‘Addressing the “Post-Kyoto” Stress Disorder: Reflections on the Emerging Legal Architecture of the Climate Regime’ (2009) 58(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 803–834CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 830.

147 Rajamani, Brunnée & Doelle, n. 11 above, at p. 7; Rajamani, L., ‘The Cancun Climate Agreement: Reading the Text, Subtext and Tea Leaves’ (2011) 60(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 499–519CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

148 Decision 1/CP.16, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2011, at para. 44; Decision 23/CP.19, Work Programme on the Revision of the Guidelines for the Review of Biennial Reports and National Communications, including National Inventory Reviews, for Developed Country Parties, Advance Unedited Version.

149 Decision 1/CP.16, ibid., at para. 63.

150 Ibid., at para. 44.

151 The majority of these technical experts will be from developing countries: Decision 20/CP.19, Composition, Modalities and Procedures of the Team of Technical Experts under International Consultation and Analysis, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.2, Annex, at para 5.

152 Ibid., at para. 63.

153 On the trend towards greater symmetry of obligations for developed and developing countries in the evolving climate regime, see generally Rajamani, n. 143 above, at pp. 507–10.

154 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘International Assessment and Review Process’ (2014), available at: https://unfccc.int/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/international_assessment_and_review/items/7549.php.

155 UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘National Communications and Biennial Update Reports from Non-Annex I Parties’ (2014), available at: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2.

156 Oberthür, n. 52 above, at p. 42.

157 Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, Annexes II and IV.

158 Ibid., Annex II, paras 11 and 12.

159 Ibid., Annex IV, para. 8.

160 Oberthür, n. 52 above, at p. 43.

161 Decision 23/CP.19, n. 148 above.

162 Zahar, Peel & Godden, n. 16 above, at p. 106.

163 UNFCCC Secretariat, n. 144 above, at pp. 1–2.

164 Dubash, N.K. & Rajamani, L., ‘Beyond Copenhagen: Next Steps’ (2010) 10(6) Climate Policy, pp. 593–599CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 596–8.

165 Rajamani, Brunnée & Doelle, n. 11 above, at p. 7.

166 Oberthür proposes five options for the compliance mechanism for a 2015 agreement, and assesses both their likely effectiveness and political feasibility: Oberthür, n. 52 above, at pp. 44–9.

167 See nn. 94–7 above.