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HOW NOT TO ACCUSE SOMEONE OF PREJUDICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 September 2015

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Abstract

In discussions of racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice, two kinds of fallacious reasoning sometimes appear: the ‘appeal to subjective response’ and the ‘accusation of privilege’. The first fallacy treats someone's subjective response to a comment as sufficient evidence of prejudice or insensitivity. This fails to acknowledge that the reasonableness of the response is always an open question. The second fallacy involves dismissing what people accused of prejudice say in their defence on the grounds that the privileged always speak that way. This insultingly treats what is said as an effect of causes rather than the result of rational reflection. Both forms of specious reasoning risk bringing the worthy cause of combatting prejudice into disrepute.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

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