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Oversight Capabilities in the States: Are Professionalized Legislatures Better at Getting What They Want?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 January 2021
Abstract
Once legislators delegate policymaking responsibility to executive agencies, they have the ability to oversee and potentially influence the actions of these agencies. In this article, we examine, first, whether the actions of agencies reflect the preferences of legislators, and second, whether legislative professionalism enhances the ability of legislatures to influence executive agencies and obtain more preferred outcomes. We study these effects in the context of annual nursing home inspections performed by state administrators and make two predictions. First, as Democratic legislators will, on average, prefer a more activist role for government and for government agencies, we should see agencies issue more citations for violations of regulations when state legislatures are Democratic and fewer when they are Republican. Second, as more professionalized legislatures are better able to monitor the agency inspectors' actions and inspection outcomes, this effect should be intensified for legislatures with greater professionalism. We find support for both arguments: agencies faced with more Democrats in the legislature will be more activist, and this effect is strengthened for more professional legislatures.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 15 , Issue 3: Special Issue Title: Regulation in the States , September 2015 , pp. 366 - 386
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s) 2015
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