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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts

  • Michael Tye

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There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar, 1990; Lycan, 1996; Papineau, 1993; Sturgeon, 1994; Tye, 1995, 2000; Perry, 2001). There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.

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References

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Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books).
Jacksoii, F. 1982. ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127–36.
Levine, J. 2001. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Loar, B. 1990. ‘Phenomenal States,’ in Philosophical Perspectives, 4, Tomberlin, J., (ed.), (Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing Company).
Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books).
McLaughlin, B. and Tye, M. 1998. ‘Externalism, Twin-earth, and Self-Knowledge’ in Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, Macdonald, C., Smith, B. and Wright, C. (eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Mellor, D. H. 1992. ‘Nothing Like Experience,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93.
Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell).
Perry, J. 2001. Possibility, Consciousness and Conceivability (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books).
Sturgeon, S. 1994. ‘The Epistemic View of Subjectivity,‘ Journal of Philosophy, 91, pp. 221–35.
Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books).
Tye, M. 1999. ‘Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion,‘ Mind, 108, 705–25.
Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, Bradford Books).

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  • Michael Tye

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