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² Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 33.Google Scholar

³ Of course Nozick also believes that Rawls has not appreciated the full force of this objection, for it undermines Rawls’ own theory too, so Nozick argues.

⁴ See, for example, the rule-consequentialism of Hooker, Brad, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

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⁶ There is a third qualification. I believe that in some cases, in order to make adequate decisions, we need to add in factors which would not normally form part of an economic decision making mechanism. This is to say that cost-benefit analysis will often need to be supplemented by other considerations, especially where issues of risk to safety are concerned. This takes us beyond the terrain of this paper. I discuss it in Wolff, Jonathan ‘Risk, Fear, Blame, Shame and the Regulation of Public Safety’, Economics and Philosophy forthcoming.Google Scholar

⁷ For this way of breaking CBA into separate steps see Wolff, J. and Haubrich, D., ‘Economism and Its Limits’, in Rein, M., Moran, M. and Goodin, R. (eds.) Oxford Handbook to Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2006).Google Scholar

⁸ O'Neill, Onora, Faces of Hunger An Essay on Poverty, Development and Justice (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 71–96.Google Scholar

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¹⁰ SirBudd, Alan et al. , Gambling Review Body Report, DCMS 2001, http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/publications/archive_2001/gamb_rev_report.htm Interestingly this highest figure was mentioned on the front page of the Daily Mail on 16 October 2004 as part of their campaign against the liberalisation of U.K. gambling laws. It was not mentioned that this figure was the highest of a range of estimates, or that it was produced by a group of researchers who were trying to convince their audience that an expensive form of proposed therapy for problem gamblers provided good value for money.Google Scholar

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¹⁴ Parfit, Derek, ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10, No. 3 (12 1997)Google Scholar, ‘Equality and Priority’, 202–221.

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¹⁷ Op. cit. note 16, 25.

¹⁸ See, for example, Gutmann, A. and Thomson, D., Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ Op. cit. note 1, 19–36.

²⁰ Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P., John Rawls' ‘Theory of Justice’ and Its Critics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991)Google Scholar

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²² Still less by deliberative democracy, of course.

²³ And indeed where a large surplus is envisaged compensation to those who lose in the short-term may often be possible (although for some qualifications to this see note 32 below).

²⁴ Op. cit. note 1, 134.

²⁵ Op. cit. note 1, 147–8. Indeed after this paper was substantially drafted I noticed that in these pages Rawls attributes a version of the view defended here to Edgeworth, and then points out and challenges the underlying assumptions. Some of the arguments of this paper can, therefore, be read as responses to Rawls' criticisms of Edgeworth.

²⁶ However although a different choice is called for, it is less obvious that this case shows that the policy of maximizing average utility has been abandoned. Those with no money at all have steeply diminishing marginal utilities for money, and so 50% chance of £300 will, under these circumstances, have less utility than £100.

²⁷ Can it be that the policies of maximizing expected money and maximizing expected utility come apart? In the short term this is possible, and it is even possible to think up examples in which one maximizes actual utility by following the policy of maximizing not expected utility but expected money (where marginal utilities decline one will refuse risks that would be profitable in utility terms in a longer series). However in a longer series the calculations are more awkward as the utility of money depends not only on how much you receive in total but whether you receive it when you need it or can otherwise make good use of it.

²⁸ Does this reveal some sort of class bias? Martin O'Neill asks whether we would accept the loss so easily if we could predict the death of a teacher or doctor?

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³⁰ Wolff, Jonathan and de-Shalit, Avner, Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2006)Google Scholar. For similar arguments, see Barry, Brian, Why Social Justice Matters (Oxford: Polity Press, 2005).Google Scholar

³¹ See, for example, Sen, A. and Williams, B., Introduction to Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. And, indeed, I have argued for incommensurability myself, see Jonathan Wolff, Addressing Disadvantage and the Good, Human, Journal of Applied Philosophy 2002, 19, No. 3, (2002), 207–218.Google Scholar

³² If this is right then it explains why the apparently appealing idea of ‘cost-benefit analysis with real compensation’; (i.e., those who would lose are compensated with money so that no one actually loses) is more problematic than it may seem. Of course compensation with money can be better than no compensation (although not in every case, see Frey, Bruno, Not Just for the Money (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997))Google Scholar but unless strong commensurability holds it will not ‘return’ people to their baseline situation.

³³ See note 13.

³⁴ Wolff, Jonathan, ‘Rational, Fair and Reasonable in Kelly, P. J. (ed.) Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 35–43Google Scholar. This is, of course, very similar to the idea of cost-benefit analysis with real compensation, mentioned in footnote 32.

³⁵ Bentham, Jeremy, Securities Against Misrule and Other Constitutional Writings for Tripoli and Greece, (ed.) Schofield, Philip (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 38Google Scholar. I thank Philip Schofield for drawing my attention to this text.

³⁶ Op. cit note 1, xiv.

³⁷ I am very grateful Shepley Orr for bringing this to my attention. Musgrave, Richard, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959).Google Scholar

³⁸ Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).Google Scholar

³⁹ I would like to thank audiences at the R.I.P. lecture in London, and Cambridge for their comments and criticisms. I would especially like to thank Veronique Munoz Darde, Martin O'Neill, Shepley Orr, and Michael Otsuka, for extremely helpful written comments.