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Folk Psychology and the Biological Basis of Intersubjectivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2017

Matthew Ratcliffe
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Extract

Recent philosophical discussions of intersubjectivity generally start by stating or assuming that our ability to understand and interact with others is enabled by a ‘folk psychology’ or ‘theory of mind’. Folk psychology is characterized as the ability to attribute intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, to others, in order to predict and explain their behaviour. Many authors claim that this ability is not merely one amongst many constituents of interpersonal understanding but an underlying core that enables social life. For example, Churchland states that folk psychology ‘embodies our baseline understanding’ of others (1996, p. 3). Currie and Sterelny similarly assert that ‘our basic grip on the social world depends on our being able to see our fellows as motivated by beliefs and desires we sometimes share and sometimes do not’ (2000, p. 143). And, as Frith and Happe put it, ‘this ability appears to be a prerequisite for normal social interaction: in everyday life we make sense of each other's behaviour by appeal to a belief-desire psychology’ (1999, p. 2).

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Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 56 , December 2005 , pp. 211 - 233
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Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2005

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