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“Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare1”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2017

Alex Voorhoeve
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Extract

Suppose that we agree that for questions of justice in a pluralistic society, we need a public standard of welfare. An appropriate public standard of welfare will have to meet the following two requirements. First, its conception of each person's welfare should, to the greatest reasonable extent, be something that each person can recognise as encompassing the things she wants for herself and as giving these things weights that reflect the relative importance she gives to them. Second, it should be sensitive to the fact that reasonable people hold conflicting conceptions of what constitutes an individual's welfare. It should therefore, to the greatest reasonable extent, respect neutrality of judgement by refraining from endorsing any particular conception of welfare as superior to any other.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 59 , December 2006 , pp. 265 - 279
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2006

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