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¹⁹ For a good discussion of how the scope and limits of sovereignty in the human rights issue-area have been transformed in Latin America, and the role of principled issue-networks in this transformation, see Sikkink, Kathryn, ‘Human Rights, Principled Issue-networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America’, International Organization, 47 (1993), pp. 411–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²³ Theda Skocpol notes this upsurge of interest in the state. See her ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (New York, 1985), pp. 1–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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