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⁴ See Zacher, Mark, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946–77 (New York: Praeger Press, 1979)Google Scholar for a review of the activities of various regional organizations through much of the Cold War.

⁵ An Agenda For Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁶ Staff Paper Prepared by the UN Secretariat, ‘The United Nations, Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations: Cooperation in the Peace and Security Field’. Prepared for the Meeting on Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations, United Nations Headquarters, 1 August 1994, p. iii.

⁷ See ibid., for a review of past partnerships between the UN and regional organizations.

⁸ See Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, Report of the Work of the Organization, 1993 (New York: United Nations, September, 1993), section IIIGoogle Scholar; and Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael, ‘Pluralistic Security Communities: Past, Present, and Future’, Global Studies Research Program, Working Paper Series on Regional Security, No. 1, June 1994, University of WisconsinGoogle Scholar.

⁹ See Claude, , Swords into Plowshares, pp. 102–13Google Scholar, for a discussion of the merits and demerits of each approach.

¹⁰ A fuller discussion of this argument can be found in Barnett, Michael, ‘The New Politics of UN Peace: From Juridical to Empirical Sovereignty’, Global Governance, 1 (1995)Google Scholar.

¹¹ ‘The UN and National Interests of States’, in Roberts, A. and Kingsbury, B. (eds.), United Nations, Divided World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 111–12Google Scholar.

¹² This distinction draws directly from Jackson, Robert, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

¹³ Emerson, Rupert, ‘Colonialism, Political Development, and the UN’, International Organization, 19 (Summer 1965), p. 486CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Perhaps the most famous statement was the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence o t Colonial Countries and Peoples. Article 6 stated: Any attempt aimed at the partial or whole disruption of the national unity an d the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN.

¹⁵ MacDonald, Robert, The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 33–8Google Scholar.

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¹⁷ It was inevitable that the Cold War would become injected into the politics of decolonization, and peace-keeping forces became a highly useful instrument for encouraging juridical sovereignty and territorial integrity, and defusing potential superpower conflict. Peace-keeping, in effect, served the multiple function of limiting superpower conflict, increasing territorial restraint, and encouraging decolonization and juridical sovereignty.

¹⁸ See Weller, Marc (ed.), Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Ruggie, John (ed.), Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)Google Scholar; and Pickering, Thomas, ‘Power and Purpose: Making Multilateralism Work’, Foreign Service Journal (July 1992), pp. 31–4Google Scholar.

²⁰ Clinton's policy of enlargement is perhaps the clearest policy statement of the relationship between the two. See Lake, Anthony, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’, Dispatch, 4, 39 (1993)Google Scholar; and Halperin, Morton, ‘Guaranteeing Democracy’, Foreign Policy, 91 (Summer 1993), pp. 105–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²² See MacKinley, John and Chopra, Jarat, ‘Second Generation Multinational Operations’, Washington Quarterly (Summer 1992), pp. 113–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for an extended discussion of this definition.

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²⁴ Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York: Alfred. A. Knopf, 1969), p. 93Google Scholar.

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²⁶ S/25996, p. 11.

²⁷ See Adler, Emanuel, ‘Imagined (Security) Communities’ (unpublished MS, 1994)Google Scholar for a discussion of cognitive regions, regions that are defined by shared identity. A greater sensitivity to the relationship between identity and boundaries highlights the concept of ‘liminal states’, states that are ‘betwixt and between’ existing regions, and, accordingly, marked by ambiguity, ambivalence, and contradiction. Turkey, for instance, straddles regions not because of its spatial position but rather because of ideational characteristics; it is frequently referred to as a ‘bridge’ between East and West, between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ societies. The attempt to define the boundaries of the region frequently leans on ideational, rather than geographic, features. See Norton, Ann, Reflections on Political Identity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Evans, Gareth, Cooperating for Peace (St Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 29Google Scholar. The numerous ‘Friends’ group that emerge around specific UN peace-keeping operations might also be considered quasi-regional organizations. The recognition that an unwieldy UN membership would lead to collective action problems and lack of focus and attention on a specific operation led to the creation of ‘Friends’ groups that meet regularly and pressure the local parties. These groups have become nearly institutionalized features of all peace-keeping operations since the end of the Cold War.

²⁹ Still, not all regional security organizations are created equal in terms of the primary functions they play in the international and regional system. Muthiah Alagappa identifies three types of regional security organization: (1) to fulfil the spirit of Chapter VIII of the U N Charter, and, therefore, to be a building-block for global order; (2) to foster the notion of collective self-defence vis-a-vis systemic threats as viewed by global powers; and (3) to encourage the security and welfare of the region through joint action. ‘Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 47 (October 1993), pp. 189–209CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ Meeting at the UN Secretariat on 1 August 1994. The Commonwealth, a regional organization that s i based on a shared historical association and identity rather than geography, also participated in this meeting.

³¹ S/25184, 28 January 1993.

³² See Evans, , Cooperating for Peace, pp. 30–32Google Scholar, for a similar analysis.

³³ See Zacher, International Conflicts, for a complementary view that examines the importance and determinants of consensual arrangements for determining the prospects of a regional organization's intervention and success in regional conflicts.

³⁴ On this point, see ibid., chap. 1.

³⁵ See Nye, Joseph, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar.

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⁴² See Olson, Mancur and Zeckhauser, Richard, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 3 (1966)Google Scholar, for the classic collective action argument applied to alliances and security organizations.

⁴³ See Ruggie, John, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’, in Krasner, S. (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 195–232Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Westport, Princeton U.P., 1957)Google Scholar; and Adler, Emanuel and Crawford, Beverley (eds.), Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

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⁴⁶ On the issue of the size of regional organizations, see Taylor, ‘Regionalism’.

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⁴⁸ Berger, Peter, ‘Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge’, European Journal of Sociology, 1 (1966), pp. 105–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Young, Oran, International Cooperation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 197Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Ikenberry, G. John and Kupchan, Charles, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’, International Organization, 44 (Summer 1990), p. 289CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’, International Organization, 46 (Spring 1992), p. 399CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁵³ One proposal suggests how the UN's desire to have stand-by forces for either preventive deployment or actual peace-keeping duties might be best served by regional organization. Evans, , Cooperating For Peace, p. 84Google Scholar. In a more recent article, Gareth Evans limits his discussion of the potential contribution by regional organizations to peace operations to preventive diplomacy. ‘Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict’, Foreign Policy, 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 3–20Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Boutros-Ghali, , Report of the Work of the Organization, 1993, p. 66Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Yet the recent UN staff paper, ‘The United Nations, Regional, and Sub-Regional Organizations’, hints at a growing role for regional organizations in peace-keeping operations.

⁵⁶ See Barnett, Michael, Confronting the Costs of War Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and Israel (Princeton: Princeton University Press)Google Scholar; Barnett, Michael and Levy, Jack, ‘Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt’, International Organization, 45 (Summer 1991), pp. 369–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Morrow, James, ‘Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security’, International Organization, 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 205–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schweller, Randall, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, International Security, 19 (Summer 1994), pp. 72–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁷ Another way to defray the financial cost is to levy a ‘user's fee’ on those states that are supposedly the greatest beneficiaries of the UN's activities. Simply put, those states who benefit most from these operations should pay a greater share of the cost. This type of financial arrangement began in Cyprus, with Turkey and Greece contributing disproportionately to UNFICYP's annual cost, and became a feature of post-Cold War peace-keeping operations when Kuwait agreed to pay a greater percentage of UNIKOM. Consequently, as the UN's coffers are depleted there is some discussion that regional organizations, whose members are supposedly the principal beneficiaries of the UN's peace operations, should bear a heavier financial burden.

⁵⁸ UN staff paper, ‘The United Nations, Regional, and Sub-Regional Organizations’, p. iv. Undersecretary General Marrack Goulding was nearly prophetic in 1991 when he stated that he could imagine regional organizations and the UN forging ‘a kind of partnership in which, after the two organizations work out together what needs to be done, the regional organization would be the executing agency’. The Singapore Symposium, The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping; quoted from Rivlin, , ‘Regional Arrangements’, p. 106Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Author interview with high-level State Department official, 2 August 1994.

⁶⁰ The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 196.

⁶² ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’, International Organization, 20 (Summer 1966), pp. 367–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ The UN also seeks the approval of and legitimacy granted by regional organizations. For instance, the OAS provided an important legitimation function for the UN's involvement in El Salvador, and the League of Arab States’ approval of the UN's various Security Council resolutions on Iraq proved essential to reversing Iraq's invasion.

⁶⁴ Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit’.

⁶⁵ Conversation with UN official, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 19 October 1993.

⁶⁶ S/25966, p. 11.

⁶⁷ Responding to President Ginton's suggestion that the UN become more active in peace-enforcement and battling the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR Force Commander Michael Rose said, ‘If someone wants to fight a war here on moral or political grounds, fine, great, but count us [the UN] out. Hitting one tank is peacekeeping. Hitting infrastructure command and control, logistics, that is war, and I'm not going to fight a war with painted tanks.’ Cohen, Roger, ‘UN. General Opposes More Bosnia Force’, New York Times, 29 September 1994, p. A7Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Cooperating For Peace, p. 76.

⁶⁹ Also, while the Charter (Article 33) encourages regional organizations to be first in line when dealing with regional security issues, this leaves the most intractable problems for the UN.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 103.

⁷⁰ Claude, , Swords into Plowshares, p. 117Google Scholar.

⁷² New York Times, ‘A UN. License to Invade Haiti’, 2 August 1994, p. A20Google Scholar.

⁷³ On this issue, see Barnett, Michael, ‘Creeping Spheres of Influence?’, unpublished MS, October 1994Google Scholar.