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Since the Lisbon agenda (2000), European policies are increasingly oriented towards R&D and innovation. In this context, we analyze the effects of a centralized R&D subsidy policy upon steady state and welfare using an agglomeration and growth model composed of two asymmetric countries. If the policy leads to a steady state characterized by a higher growth rate and lower inequalities, the welfare analysis provides a more contrasted vision on the effects of the policy. Indeed, even though such a policy can eliminate some distortions and improve global welfare, it implies a zero-sum game at national level (the policy increases the welfare in the periphery country and decreases the welfare in the core country) when knowledge spillovers are sufficiently localized. Consequently, a centralized R&D subsidy policy conducted in an economy composed of two asymmetric countries would be a positive-sum game only if international knowledge spillovers are sufficiently large.
This article appraises the effects of trade liberalization between two industries that have different endowments of skilled labor. Skilled labor is necessary for the production of higher-quality variants of a vertically differentiated good. Skilled labor endowments, therefore, determine the patternof specialization of industries as well as their market structure, both in the final goods market and in the labor market. We analyze how market integration benefits or harms the agents in the industries by delving into the linkages between labor and product markets, and show that bilateral losses from trade can emerge at equilibrium.
The economic and financial crisis has meant sizeable employment losses that resulted from different adjustment mechanisms in domestic firms and multinational companies. This may be due to either production plant closures or downsizing by firms that remain active. This paper evaluates the importance of both phenomena for multinational and domestic firms in Belgium over the period preceding the crisis (1997-2008), using a firm-level dataset. Our results reveal that multinational enterprises tend to leave the local market more frequently than domestic firms with comparable firm and sector characteristics. Further, multinational incumbents face employment adjustment costs for white-collar workers that are around half of those borne by domestic firms. In sum, our findings suggest that multinational firms are more flexible in terms of plant location as well as in terms of employment adjustment. However, before the crisis, foreign multinationals created more jobs on average than other types of firms.
Dans cet article, nous analysons la structure des coûts d'alimentation en eau potable des villes de Côte d'Ivoire à partir d'un panel des centres de production. Considérant les services d'eau comme des monopoles multi-produits fournissant conjointement deux biens (volumes d'eau facturés et volumes d'eau perdus), nous estimons une fonction de coût translog multi-produits sur la base de la dualité entre fonctions de production et de coût. Les différentes mesures de rendements calculées révèlent que le service d'eau moyen ivoirien produit dans la zone des rendements constants. Cependant, en classant les services en petits, moyens et grands selon différents critères, il apparaît clairement que l'opérateur a un avantage économique à accroître sa production et les connections dans la plupart des petits et moyens services. Aussi, la présence d'économies de gamme révèle que la production conjointe des deux biens considérés dans certaines proportions est plus bénéfique que l'amélioration du rendement du réseau. Enfin, les évaluations des coûts estimés font apparaître un coût marginal supérieur en moyenne aux prix marginaux des premières tranches de la grille tarifaire.