Avant de présenter comme il se doit une synthèse des contributions que nous avons rassemblées sur l’intégration monétaire européenne, il nous est apparu nécessaire, à la lumière des développements récents, d’introduire ce numéro spécial par un bref commentaire sur les conditions de réalisation d’une union monétaire viable.

Au seuil de l’échéance symbolique de l’« Europe 1992 » et de son marché unique, les événements monétaires de septembre 1992 sont venus rappeler que la Communauté de monnaie, qui devrait venir accomplir le marché unique en supprimant la dernière source de fractionnements nationaux, requiert le strict respect de préalables dont la réalisation semble encore loin d’être assurée. C’est en tous cas l’opinion des marchés, dont les soubresauts récents ont mis en lumière deux principes essentiels : d’abord la primauté de la convergence des performances et des politiques économiques pour fonder une union monétaire, ensuite la validité du «théorème d’incompatibilité», c’est à dire le caractère instable d’un SME qui serait fondé sur des capitaux parfaitement libres, des changes fixes, et une absence de progrès tangible de la coopération monétaire ou d’engagement politique ferme envers ITJEM tel que la ratification sans bavure du Traité de Maastricht.

Before undertaking the essential synthesis of the assembled contributions on European monetary integration, it seemed necessary, in the light of recent developments, to introduce this special number by a brief commentary on the conditions for the realisation of a viable monetary union.

On the eve of the symbolic date of “Europe 1992”, the monetary events of September 1992 are a timely reminder that a “Community of currencies”, which by suppressing the final source of national divisions will bring about the single market, requires the strict respect of the preconditions. However, the latter appear to be far from being secure; an opinion apparently shared by the markets whose recent somersaults have illuminated two essential principles. Firstly, the necessity for the convergence of economic performances and policies as an anchor for monetary union; and secondly, the validity of the “incompatibility theory”. The latter referring to the unstable character of a European Monetary System (EMS) based on: perfect capital mobility; fixed exchange rates; and the absence of tangible progress on monetary cooperation or a firm political engagement towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), such as the faultless ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht.

The present paper shows that with increasing economic integration the notion of nominal convergence is changing with price convergence more easily achievable, convergence of cost trends becoming more important and convergence of current account balances less essential. Convergence in supply conditions will crucially determine future employment opportunities. The issue of credibility of the supply performance seems to be just as important as the more conventionally accepted issue of macro-economic credibility. Policies which, enhance the supply-side flexibility of EC economies would reduce the temptation to use discretionary policies to influence regional output and employment. Flexibility of relative price and wages would also by itself temper the need for demand management, facilitate adjustment to both temporary and permanent shocks and reduce the need for an intra-EC transfer mechanism. However, the reform of economic structures so as to increase flexibility will itself constitute a shock. Structural reforms may thus themselves be a source of short-term déstabilisation of aggregate demand, prices and employment. Deciding whether or not anticyclical fiscal responses (which may be equivalent to capital controls) are appropriate in such circumstances is not straightforward.

This paper is divided into three main sections. The first considers the implications of the Maastricht treaty for the external economic dimension, concentrating mainly on the inter-relationships between, and allocations of responsibility for, the decisions within the EC on the main policy issues, monetary policy, the exchange rate regime and fiscal policy. The second section considers the non-strategic external economic implications of EMU and the move to a single currency, the Ecu, issues such as the effects on trade finance, reserves, seigniorage and the net external demand for Ecu assets. The third section discusses how the establishment of EMU may affect the workings of the world economy, the exchange rate regime and coordination, such as it may be, among the main players.

We examine proposals to introduce national insurance against unevenly distributed shocks in the European Community. This insurance would operate differently from tax and government spending activities that now yield regional insurance within countries, since these activities are mainly designed for other purpose such as income redistribution and general revenue-raising. According to our evidence, the appeal of such insurance is very limited because the risks are too highly correlated and there is an excessive chance that a country in difficulty would not receive aid. The costs of a continuing programme are likely to exceed the benefits.

In this paper we compare the interregional and international degree of real exchange rate variability of a number of EMS-countries. This allows us to gain insights into the costs of a monetary union. Our major conclusion is that a monetary union among all EMS members would be costly for some of them if it were instituted today. We also find that a monetary union among a «hard-core» of EMS-countries (Benelux, Germany, Denmark) would not involve major costs.

L’article s’interroge sur les relations entre l’intégration monétaire européenne et la persistance de spécificités et d’un certain degré d’autonomie des marchés nationaux du travail, actuellement hétérogènes dans leurs structures institutionnelles, leur fonctionnement et leurs résultats. L’inspiration théorique trouve son origine dans la remarque de John Hicks selon laquelle les économies seraient passées, après 1932, de l’équivalent d’un «gold» standard, à un «labour» standard. L’intégration européenne désigne un changement de régime économique d’ampleur équivalente mais de sens opposé. Le fait que l’intégration monétaire précède très largement la charte sociale pose donc la question de la viabilité de relations professionnelles et des mécanismes nationaux de formation des revenus. En effet, il est peu de variables macroéconomiques nationales susceptibles de garantir le parallélisme des évolutions de prix et l’identité des taux d’intérêt, si ce n’est à relation salariale inchangée, des mouvements divergents du taux de chômage. Il faudrait donc réformer les relations professionnelles mais les partenaires sociaux ne seront pas nécessairement conduits à négocier des contrats salariaux compatibles avec les objectifs macroéconomiques associés à l’intégration européenne.

To answer the question under what conditions during the transition to EMU will firms choose the Ecu as their currency for transactions, the paper develops a simple model of a firm’s choice of currency for pricing, invoicing and receiving payments for its product-its transactions currency. The focus of the model is the presence of network externalities derived from use of the same currency by others. The model points up the fallacy of focusing only on relative inflation performances of currencies when judging their likely adoption for transactions purposes.

The Maasstricht Treaty on EMU has generally been hailed as “a victory for the Ecu”. This is a misinterpretation. Maastricht is a victory for the EMU. EMU does not require the actual Ecu, and the actual Ecu did not receive a boost from the decision to call the future single currency “Ecu” rather than “Euromark”. Maasstricht has not nailed down the actual Ecu’s future and has left some uncertainties. Finally, it is not certain that the future Ecu will be at least as “hard” as the Deutschemark. The Maastricht Treaty went as far as practically possible in anchoring the Ecu’s stability. But performance will depend on factors outside of the Treaty’s scope.

Il est utile d’examiner l’impact de ITJEM sur la profession bancaire. Dans un premier temps, cet article distingue les conséquences immédiates du Traité de Maastricht des questions qui demeurent encore incertaines. Puis, en prenant comme objectif la sécurité et l’efficacité du futur Système Européen de Paiements, il envisage les voies de progrès ainsi que les rôles possibles du SEBC et des banques privées dans ce domaine. Il examine ensuite l’impact combiné du Marché Unique et de l’UEM sur les produits bancaires et sur la concurrence interbancaire. Enfin le lien entre mise en oeuvre de la politique monétaire et concurrence des centres financiers ainsi que le degré d’influence des banques privées et des autorités sur cette concurrence sont abordés.

Starting from the definition of “probability” which provides an approach to monetary and real determinants of exchange rates, that paper tries to explain the relation-ships between the investment choices, business and exchanges rates cycles. The methodological framework is based on the Engel and Hamilton (1991) statistical investigations and an expectation modelling according to Bernanke (1983) work. The empirical results point out, on one hand, a very high option value for the investors in the real sector with respect to the monetary and financial assets. On the other hand, an option value differential according to the countries involved in the international investment process is proved.

This paper asks how EMU will affect foreign-exchange markets, the demands for various key currencies, the behaviour of exchanges rates among them, and policy coordination. The advent of the Ecu as the single currency of the EC may reduce the vehicle role of the dollar in foreign-exchange markets. Yet the share of the Ecu in global reserves may be lower initially than the sum of the shares of the present EC currencies. The private demand for Ecu, domestic and foreign, may also be smaller initially than the demands for the present EC currencies. By helping to unify EC capital markets, however, advent of the Ecu may raise the flow demand for Ecu-denominated claims, causing the Ecu to appreciate in the early years of EMU. Finally, EMU may not help Europe to speak with one voice in international negotiations and may thus interfere with policy coordination.