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Transmission internationale des politiques budgétaires etimparfaite mobilité du capital

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Delphine Béraud
Delphine Béraud*
Affiliation:
EUREQua, Université de Paris I et Cadre, Université de Lille 2
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Résumé

Dans un modèle à deux pays et à horizon infini, dans lequel la mobilité ducapital est imparfaite, on présente une analyse dynamique de la transmissioninternationale des chocs qui affectent les dépenses publiques. Trois typesde financements d’une augmentation des dépenses publiques sont comparés:l’imposition des salaires, l’imposition des revenus du capital à la sourceet l’imposition des revenus du capital selon le principe de taxation à larésidence. L’imposition des salaires ou des revenus du capital à la sourcecrée une réduction du produit dans le pays qui mène cette politique et uneaugmentation du produit à court terme à l’étranger. L’imposition des revenusdu capital de tous les résidents conduit, en introduisant un canalsupplémentaire de transmission internationale, à une baisse de la productionmondiale. Malgré cette baisse, le bien-être progresse dans le pays quiaugmente ses dépenses publiques.

Summary

Summary

In a two-country model where indebted country has a limited access to worldcapital market, a dynamic analysis of the international transmission ofgovernment expenditure is presented. More specifically, we study and comparethe impacts of an increase in government expenditure in the creditorcountry. Alternative methods of finance are presented: a tax on labourincome and a tax on capital income (source based or residence based). Whencapital tax are source based or when income labour is taxed, an increase indomestic government expenditure yields a recession in both the short-run andthe long-run levels of domestic activity. Activity abroad expands in theshort run. When capital tax are residence based, activity declines in thetwo countries. The welfare implications of these policies are alsoexamined.

Keywords

Budgetary policycapital mobilitycapital taxationF43F42F34politique budgétairemobilité du capitalimposition du capitalF43F42F34
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 68 , Issue 3 , 2002 , pp. 287 - 311
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2002 

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References

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