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Pouvoirs de marché et informations privées en équilibre général: la théorie peut-elle avoir un pouvoir prédictif?

  • Louis-André Gérard-Varet (a1)

Résumé

La théorie de l’équilibre général walrasien possède un pouvoir prédictif, du moins tant que l’on veut bien s’en tenir à des environnements en information complète, en l’absence de pouvoirs de marché et où il est connaissance commune que les marchés doivent s’équilibrer. On examine ici les difficultés qui surviennent dès que sont pris en considération des pouvoirs de marché ou des informations privées.

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Pouvoirs de marché et informations privées en équilibre général: la théorie peut-elle avoir un pouvoir prédictif?

  • Louis-André Gérard-Varet (a1)

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