Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T20:29:29.014Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A One-Point Solution Concept for the Provision of a Public Good

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Ping-Yuan Yen
Ping-Yuan Yen*
Affiliation:
Chung-Hsing University, Taiwan
Get access

Summary

The paper intends first to develop a solution mechanism which associates with each economy with a public good a feasible allocation; then, to set up a set of axioms that can make a solution mechanism acceptable in some sense for each agent sharing the cost. It is found finally in the paper that a solution concept, called the Chander dynamic process in which costs are instantaneously shared proportionally to individual marginal rates of substitution, satisfies almost all the required axioms.

Résumé

Résumé

Le but premier de cet article est de construire un mécanisme sélectif associant à différentes économies comportant un bien public une allocation réalisable, et ensuite de fixer un ensemble d'axiomes permettant de rendre ce mécanisme acceptable aux agents participant au coût de production du bien. L'article montre aussi que.presque tous ces axiomes sont satisfaits par le mécanisme appelé procédure dynamique de Chandler associant instantanément les coûts en proportion des taux marginaux de substitution des individus.

Keywords

022022
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , 1993 , pp. 365 - 377
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1993 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

This article is based on the public lecture given by the author at the Université Catholique de Louvain at his thesis defense for the Doctorat en Sciences Economiques on 19 September 1991. For their many valuable comments the author owes a great deal to his supervisor Henry Tulkens, as well as the other members of the jury, Claude d'Aspremont, Parkash Chander, Bernard Cornet and Maurice Marchand.

References

REFERENCES

Bowen, H. R. [1943], An Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 58, 27–48.Google Scholar
Champsaur, P. [1975], How to Share the Cost of a Public Good? International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 113–129.Google Scholar
Champsaur, P. [1976], Symmetry and Continuity Properties of Lindahl equilibria, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 3, 19–36.Google Scholar
Chander, P. [1987a], Cost-Sharing Local Games in Dynamic Processes for Public Goods, C.O.R.E. discussion paper No. 8727, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. Google Scholar
Chander, P. [1987b], Surplus-Sharing Local Games in Dynamic Processes for Public Goods, C.O.R.E. discussion paper No. 8726, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.Google Scholar
Foley, D. [1970], Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods, Econometrica, 38, 66–72.Google Scholar
Kaneko, M. [1977 a], The Ratio Equilibrium and a Voting Game in a Public Good Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, 16, 123–136.Google Scholar
Kaneko, M. [1977b], The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G[N, W] in a Public Goods Economy, Econometrica, 45, 1589–1594.Google Scholar
Mas-Colell, A. and Silvestre, J. [1989], Cost Share Equilibria, A Lindahlian Approach, Journal of Economic Theory, 47, 239–256.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. [1987], Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good, Econometrica, 55, 963–976.Google Scholar
Moulin, H. [1988], Axiomx of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
Samuelson, P. A. [1954], The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of Economic Studies, 36, 387–389.Google Scholar
Shapley, L. S. and Shubik, M. [1969], On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities, American Economic Review, 59, 678–684.Google Scholar
Yen, P. Y. [1989], Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost-Sharing and the M.D.P. Process for Provision of a Public Good, C.O.R.E. discussion paper No. 8911, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.Google Scholar
Yen, P. Y. [1991], Essays on One-Point Solution Concepts for the Provision of a Public Good, doctoral dissertation in economics, nouvelle série N° 207, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, Sociales et Politiques, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve.Google Scholar