Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-n9wrp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-18T04:03:59.486Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

L'efficacité du Contrôle Communautaire des Concentrations : une approche par la méthode événementielle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Béatrice Dumont
Béatrice Dumont*
Affiliation:
Université de Rennes I - CREREG-CNRS
Get access

Résumé

Le Tribunal de Première Instance des Communautés Européennes (TPICE) a récemment retoqué trois vetos des autorités communautaires de la concurrence. Au-delà du camouflet que représentent ces décisions, c'est principalement l'insuffisance de preuves et la faiblesse de l'analyse économique de la Commission Européenne qui sont à chaque fois critiquées. Afin d'évaluer la véracité de ces critiques, nous cherchons à analyser de manière précise si les décisions de la Commission sont corroborées par l'anticipation des marchés. Pour se faire, nous utilisons et étendons la méthodologie d'Eckbo-Stillman (1983), plus communément appelée méthode événementielle. Le principe de base en est simple. Il consiste à tester l'hypothèse de pouvoir de marché (ou de collusion) en analysant comment le cours des actions réagit à des événements importants. L'hypothèse testée est la suivante : si la concentration projetée est susceptible de réduire l'intensité de la concurrence (de se traduire par un surcroît d'efficacité), alors les firmes rivales doivent voir leur valeur boursière augmenter (baisser) lors de l'annonce d'un événement augmentant la probabilité de réalisation de la concentration et se déprécier (augmenter) lorsque la probabilité de survenance de celle-ci diminue. Nos résultats montrent que dans la majorité des affaires, il est impossible de valider l'hypothèse d'effets anti-concurrentiels.

Summary

Summary

Following the recent rulings by the European Court of First Instance to quash the European Commission vetoes on three mergers, we investigate whether mergers prohibited by the European Commission or withdrawn by the parties following a detailed investigation would have resulted, if not challenged, in higher product prices to consumers. To do so, we apply and extent the Eckbo-Stillman (1983) event study methodology and examine the stock market reaction among rival (i.e. non-merging) firms following the announcement of a merger or merger challenge in 14 horizontal mergers attempted between 1991 and 2001. The tested hypothesis is that if the merger is anti-competitive (efficiency-enhancing), rival firms should experience a positive (negative) stock price reaction because they could be expected to share in the future higher post-merger price (not to share in the future the lower post-merger costs of the merged firms). We found that, in general, European antitrust enforcers challenged mergers that the capital market regarded as efficient rather than anti-competitive.

Keywords

Concentration horizontalecours boursierefficienceméthode événementielleL4G14Horizontal concentrationevent study methodologyefficiencyL4G14
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 70 , Issue 3 , 2004 , pp. 317 - 340
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2004 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Universite de Rennes I, crereg-cnrs-UMR 6585, 7 Place Hoche, F-35965 Rennes Cedex T: +33.(0)2.23.23.35.30 - Fax: +33.(0)2.99.38.80.84 - Email: beatrice.dumont@univ-rennes1.fr

References

Bibliographie

Armitage, S., (1995), “Event Study Methods and Evidence on their Performance”, Journal of Economic Survey, Vol. 8(4), pp. 25–32.Google Scholar
Bradley, M., Desai, A. & Kim, E.H. (1983), “The Rationale behind Inter-firm Tender Offer : Information or Synergy ?”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 11(1–4), April, pp. 183–206.Google Scholar
Corrado, C., (1989), “A Nonparametric Test for Abnormal Security-Price Performance in Event Studies”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 385–395.Google Scholar
Demsetz, H., (1973), “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 16, pp. 1–10.Google Scholar
Eckbo, B.E., (1983), “Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 241–273.Google Scholar
Eckbo, B.E., and Wier, P. (1985), “Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act : A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 119–149.Google Scholar
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. & Roll, R. (1969), “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information”, International Economic Review, vol. 10, pp. 1–21.Google Scholar
Jenny, F., (1993), «Droit Européen de la Concurrence et Efficience Economique», Revue d’Economie Industrielle, N°63, pp. 193–206.Google Scholar
Landes, R., and Posner, R. (1981), “Market Power in Antitrust Cases”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 94: 5, pp. 937–996.Google Scholar
McAfee, R.P., and Williams, M.A. (1988), “Can Event Studies Detect Anticompetitive Mergers?”, Economic Letters, Vol. 28, pp. 199–203.Google Scholar
Mc Gee, J.S, (1958), “Predatory Cutting. The Standard Oil (NJ) Case”, Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 137–169.Google Scholar
McGuckin, R.H., and Warren-Boulton, F.R. and Walstein, P. (1992), “The Use of Stock Market Returns in Antitrust”, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 1–11.Google Scholar
McKinlay, E., (1997), “Event Studies”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, pp. 13–39.Google Scholar
Schumann, L., (1993), “The Effects of FTC Antitrust Challenges on Rival Firms 1981–1987 : An Analysis of the Use of Stock Returns to Determine the Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers”, Washington D.C. : Bureau of Economics, Working Paper Federal Trade Commission (1989) and Review of Industrial Organization publié sous le titre “Patterns of Abnormal Returns and the Competitive effects of Horizontal Mergers”.Google Scholar
Schwert, G.W., (1981), “Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 121–158.Google Scholar
Stigler, G. (1968), “The Organization of Industry, in Richard, D. Irwin, Homewood.Google Scholar
Stillman, R., (1983), “Examining Antitrust Policy Towards Horizontal Mergers”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 225–240.Google Scholar
Werden, G., and Williams, M.A. (1989), “The Role of Stock Market Studies in Formulating Antitrust Policy Toward Horizontal Mergers”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 28, pp. 3–21.Google Scholar
Williamson, O.E, (1968), “Economics as an Antitrust Defense : the Welfare Tradeoffs”, The American Economic Review, vol. 58, pp. 18–36.Google Scholar