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Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

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Résumé

L’article examine l’effet d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties opposées dans un litige, dans un modèle à la Bebchuk. On étudie d’abord le cas où le plaignant est la partie informée, en caractérisant l’équilibre sans et avec négociation avant le procès. On étudie ensuite la statique comparative du modèle, ainsi que l’incidence du choix d’une règle d’allocation des coûts du procès. On discute enfin plusieurs extensions: le cas où le défendeur est la partie informée, l’influence de la représentation des préférences et l’existence de biais d’optimisme comparatif ou de représentation de soi (self-serving bias).

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2008

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Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d’une asymétrie d’information sur l’aversion au risque des parties
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