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‘Self-Supporting’ Inductive Arguments
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
Starting with David Hume, most philosophers have maintained that it is illicit to argue that inductive arguments will be successful in the future because they have been successful in the past. This philosophic tradition claims that such an argument is circular since it is an attempt to prove the principle that the future will resemble the past by means of an inductive argument which principle all inductive arguments presuppose. Hans Reichenbach is such a philosopher but he goes on to add that even though induction can not be so justified, our using induction may be justified. Max Black, on the other hand, may be identified as one of the leaders of the movement which accepts what others deem the circular argument. In this paper the position of Reichenbach and Black will be examined.
- Type
- Contributed Papers
- Information
- PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1970 , 1970 , pp. 496 - 503
- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970
References
Notes
1 Experience and Prediction, University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. 348-63Google Scholar.
2 ‘Self-Supporting Inductive Arguments’, Journal of Philosophy (1958) 718-25Google Scholar.
3 ‘Should We Attempt to Justify Induction?’, Philosophical Studies (1957) 37–48Google Scholar.
4 “The Circularity of A Self-Supporting Inductive Argument', Analysis (1962) 138-41. A fuller bibliography of papers on these issues appears in Smart, J. J. C., Between Science and Philosophy, Random House, 1968, p. 204Google Scholar. Many of these papers are reprinted in Nidditch, P. H., The Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, 1968Google Scholar.
8 Macmillan and Company, 3rd edition.