Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-v5vhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-07T12:37:39.162Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Research Programmes and Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Herbert Feigl*
Affiliation:
Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science

Extract

At the risk of being ostracized (if not annihilated) by the community of Popperians present, I wish to remark that Professor Lakatos is - and, I think - cannot help being, a second-level inductivist. If Professor Kuhn has pointed out (most eruditely) that science quite frequently is in a rut, and occasionally gets out of it (and into a new one), then Professor Lakatos appraises problem and theory shifts, and methodological innovations in the sciences, in the light of his criteria of ‘progress’ or ‘degeneration’. There can be little doubt that he wishes to serve (at least) in a critical and/or advisory capacity to scientists. But he can do that only if he ‘places his bets’, i.e., conjectures as to the fruitfulness of a method, and along with it of a theory engendered or supported by such a method along the lines of success or failure, whichever may be plausibly indicated.

Type
Symposium: History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1970

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)