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New Directions, Really?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Gonzalo Munévar
Gonzalo Munévar*
Affiliation:
The Evergreen State College
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Extract

I want to discuss Sandra Harding's claims to the effect that issues conceming race and gender lead, or should lead philosophy of science in new directions. In particular I wish to concentrate on her attempt to extend her previous feminist critique of science to include concems about racism as weil. That attempt is best found in her recent book Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991, page numbers without further attribution will refer to this book) and in her contribution to this symposium.

Type
Part X. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science: Issues of Gender and Race
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 341 - 350
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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