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Methodological Norms in Traditional and Feminist Philosophy of Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
This essay explores one of the fundamental ways in which feminist methodology in philosophy of science differs from most standard philosophy of science. Methodology in general arises from goals which the methods are designed to reach. Feminist goals in philosophy have been scandalous precisely because they are avowed political interventions into what has been considered a cool, apolitical academic activity. Another way to put this point is that feminism self-consciously inserts certain moral and political values into an activity considered to be neutral among moral and political values; it advocates a moral and political point of view in an area presumed to be objective in the sense that it is without any point of view. And precisely because the goals of feminist efforts in philosophy of science are moral and political ones, they appear inimical to the central goals of philosophy of science itself—the morally neutral and apolitical production of theories about how science works.
- Type
- Part IV. Feminist Perspectives on Special Sciences
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association
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