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Is Our Universe a Mere Fluke? The Cosmological Argument and Spinning the Universes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

J. van Brakel
J. van Brakel*
Affiliation:
University of Utrecht
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Extract

Recent discussions about the argument from design have taken into account developments in cosmological theories, most especially the so-called anthropic principle associated with the “Wheeler”- and “Carter”-universes. Part of these discussions can perhaps be summarized as briefly as can be in the following opposition:

  1. 1. The world is very unusual, so it must have been made by an intelligent creator.

  2. 2. The world is very unusual, but unusual things do occur by chance.

    The phrase “the world is very unusual” is short-hand for something like:

  3. 3. It is extremely improbable that a random concatenation of the forces, energies, particles, fields of the universe (or whatever we think the building blocks are) should, in a single trial, form into anything orderly, let alone anything that supports our form of intelligent life.

Type
Part III. Physics
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 75 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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