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The Incredibility of Rejecting Belief-Desire-Action Explanations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Alfred F. MacKay
Alfred F. MacKay*
Affiliation:
Oberlin College
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Extract

An argument of Donald Davidson's (1970, 1973) has convinced many people that there is something suspect about the commonsense, belief-desire-action explanations that most of us apply to human behavior. Alexander Rosenberg (1980, 1983) has been convinced by Davidson's argument, and uses its conclusion (together with some ideas about sociobiology) to explain what he regards as the persistent failures of the social sciences. In this paper I shall not comment directly upon Davidson's argument. Instead, I will discuss an unacceptable implication of Rosenberg's use of it. Whether this reflects on Davidson's argument I leave for others to decide.

This is how Rosenberg uses the conclusion of Davidson's argument to explain the (alleged) failures of economics.

Philosophers have shown that the terms in which ordinary thought and the behavioral sciences describe the cause and effects of human action do not describe “natural kinds,” : they do not divide nature at the joints.

Type
Part II. Economics as a Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 116 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 Philosophy of Science Association

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