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How Scientists reach Agreement about new Observations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

David Gooding
David Gooding*
Affiliation:
Science Studies Centre, University of Bath
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Extract

Epistemology has been socialised. Cognitive and social interactions between observers are now as important as their interventions into the course of nature. This contrasts with traditional views of how we get natural facts into our discourse about nature. These assumed the efficacy of individual observers’ causal interactions with the natural world, making their interactions with other observers irrelevant. Kant’s conclusion that empirical access depends also upon our concepts did not challenge the individualistic character of the epistemology of science. Observers’ agreement about their observations showed that each individual can have independent perceptual access to one and the same world.

Historical and sociological studies of science show that social and procedural aspects of observation in the laboratory make an essential contribution to consensus about observations (see Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983) and Gooding (1985a).

Type
Part IV. General Philosophy Of Science (A)
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 236 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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