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Dutch Book Arguments and Consistency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Colin Howson
Colin Howson*
Affiliation:
The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Extract

Classical Bayesian methodology is based on the following three principles:

  1. (i) individuals have degrees of belief which, measured in the closed unit interval, and subject to a mild consistency constraint, are fonnally probabilities.

  2. (ii) belief functions are updated with the acquisition of new evidence by Bayesian conditionalisation. In other words, if B is learned to be true, then your new probability function P′ takes the value P′(A) = P(A/B) on every A in domain P′, where P is your probability function prior to learning B.

  3. (iii) where Hi is a statistical hypothesis and E sample data, the tenns P(E|Hi) in Bayes’ Theorem calculations are set equal to the probability assigned E by Hi.

Type
Part V: Bayesian Philosophy of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1992 , 1993 , pp. 161 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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