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The Direction of Causation: Ramsey's Ultimate Contingency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Huw Price*
Affiliation:
The University of Sydney

Extract

Our present concern originales with two uncontroversial observations about causation: the causal relation is asymmetric, so that if Ais a cause of B then B is not a cause of A; and effects never (or almost never) occur before their causes. Uncontroversial as they may be, these features of causation are far from unproblematic. A philosophical theory of causation thus has these two non-trivial tasks, among others: to explicate the difference between cause and effect-to reveal the true content of the “arrow” of causation, so to speak-and to explain why the arrow of causation is so well aligned with the arrow of time.

Type
Part VIII. Statistical Asymmetries and the Direction of Causation
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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