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What is Wrong with Strict Bayesianism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Patrick Maher
Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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Extract

Bayesian decision theory in its classical formulation supposes that for any rational agent and for any possible state x of the world, there is a number P(x). which represents the agent’s judgment of the probability of x. Similarly, the theory assumes that for any possible outcome y of the agent’s actions, there is a number u(y) which represents the utility or value of y to the agent. Given these assumptions, the theory is able to define the expected value for the agent of any act. Bayesian decision theory then recommends that the agent should choose, from amongst the available acts, one which has maximal expected utility.

The assumption that an agent has a determinate personal probability function has often been attacked.

Type
Part VII. Probability And Causality
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 450 - 457
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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